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by ikken 4112 days ago
The article doesn't provide anything to back the claim that moral opinions may be universally, non-subjectively true. The cartoonist example is deeply flawed. We're outraged because this event violated our deepest beliefs and values we hold dear, not because it violated some universal eternal moral law. We also know that there were people that weren't saddened by this event too.

This is the problem I have with many philosophers. In the whole text you cannot find a single strong logical evidence. Everything is just an opinion.

It is impossible to prove that e.g. "stealing from others" is universally "bad". It may not be a beneficial strategy in a game theory, or maybe some statistical analysis can show societies are better off with this rule, or just that people sleep better knowing that others can't steal. But neither of this is universally true for humanity in general, and there are examples in game theory were cheating actually is a winning strategy.

8 comments

Yes I am guilty of moral relativism, that I am not alone in that is interesting, so the article is one I find interesting. But it is flawed, your example is apt and that's not the only one:

Me: “I believe that George Washington was the first president. Is that a fact or an opinion?”

Him: “It’s a fact.”

Me: “But I believe it, and you said that what someone believes is an opinion.”

Him: “Yeah, but it’s true.”

Me: “So it’s both a fact and an opinion?”

The blank stare on his face said it all.

...

I also tend to stare blankly at people when I'm thinking "Duh" too. He could have done better than accept a blank stare as freedom to interpret whatever he wanted.

With a mathematical operator: Fact > Opinion, one is a higher form of truth.

What does it mean for something to be 'a higher form of truth'? More valuable, according to some appropriate standard? More useful, according to some appropriate standard?
I mean it's a statement with a lower "margin of error". More testable.
The point of the article is not to prove that values are objective. Rather, the point is to undermine the fact/opinion distinction.

If moral sentiments were mere opinion, then there'd be no point to arguing over whether some action is right or wrong. When you tell me that you really like the taste of sushi, I don't argue with you - I just accept that that's your taste. But that we don't simply accept as 'taste' other's moral sentiments suggests that our own understanding of what is at stake is different.

People argue about tastes all the time. That tastes can't be argued over is what we tell ourselves, not what we actually do. Why else would we say "he has bad taste"?
I use taste just because it's the most widely-accepted instance where subjectivism applies. But, certainly, a substantial minority will hold that for certain kinds of tastes, objectivism holds. If you think there are meaningful disagreements about taste, that makes you an objectivist. In which case, you already agree that there are facts about these kinds of things.
"If moral sentiments were mere opinion, then there'd be no point to arguing over whether some action is right or wrong."

...who says there is? Whether that makes you uncomfortable or not has no bearing on whether it is the case.

I do accept other's moral sentiments as taste - maybe I'm some sort of sociopath? To hell with me. I see arguing over right and wrong as the mob enforcing its rule.
But the point is that, as a society, we don't treat moral sentiment as taste. For instance, when someone murders another person, we don't say: "Well, that person just likes murdering people. Who are we to disagree?!" Instead, we say they did something wrong, and we punish them.

If you're not prepared to give up all claims on how others should act, then you're not really a moral relativist. And the point of the author is that, as a society, we seem to have an inconsistent position.

If you're not prepared to give up all claims on how others should act, then you're not really a moral relativist.

I disagree completely. The claim might simply be based on might. We as a society are more numerous and stronger than the occasional murderer, and therefore we'll act on our moral taste and punish him.

I agree that people don't actually think like that, but that doesn't prove that moral facts exists, just that many people think they do.

It's not the punishment that's relevant, it's the claim, or the ability to judge behaviour by a moral standard. You can judge behaviour even if you're too small and weak to enact punishment.

But if you're a moral relativist, you can't judge at all — you can't say "that killing was wrong, it was murder". The best you can say was "that killing was morally wrong by my standards, but might well have been acceptable by his, therefore the discussion can go no further".

Relativism reduces morality to little more than a preference, and makes it as impossible to reason or debate about morality as it is to debate about whether you should like your eggs sunny side up. Very few are really moral relativists; the logical consequences of believing in it are usually too much for people to stomach.

(This doesn't mean moral facts exist, though! There are more options available than just moral relativism or moral objectivism, not that the article bothers thinking about any of them)

Sure you can judge - based on your own, subjective morality. "To me, that killing was wrong, it was murder". All you need is to acknowledge that other people will judge it differently, and that their judgment is just as objectively valid. And you can still judged them for judging so!

And it doesn't make it impossible to debate about morality - merely futile.

I don't see what's so difficult to accept in this, frankly.

> "I agree that people don't actually think like that, but that doesn't prove that moral facts exists, just that many people think they do."

I think this is all the author wants to prove. We, as a society, seem to be of two minds about this. He's not trying to prove that moral facts exist.

May be, but I think you're reading a more interesting article than it's actually there :)
"Might" is pretty much how I think about it anyway.
Moral relativism is not incompatible with not tolerating practices which you personally disagree with. You may simultaneously believe that morality is relative, and not have any particular regard for other systems of morality. You may enforce your system of morality on others simply because you can and because your morality, which you recognize as relative, permits such enforcement.

> "Be it so. This burning of widows is your custom; prepare the funeral pile. But my nation has also a custom. When men burn women alive we hang them, and confiscate all their property. My carpenters shall therefore erect gibbets on which to hang all concerned when the widow is consumed. Let us all act according to national customs."

Sir Charles James Napier may not have earnestly bought into cultural relativism, but the sentiment he expresses is not inherently incompatible with it.

You don't need to believe that your system is "correct" in some sort of universal way. You merely need to believe that your system will be best for your personal interests.

Moral relativism is incompatible with judgements that other's moral judgements are wrong. You can judge someone else's views as wrong while still tolerating them.

One other things:

> "You don't need to believe that your system is "correct" in some sort of universal way. You merely need to believe that your system will be best for your personal interests."

Relativism is not egoism.

> "Moral relativism is incompatible with judgements that other's moral judgements are wrong."

Right or wrong have absolutely nothing to do with it. It can't, because without a universal morality any notion of universal "right" or "wrong" evaporates. This is about refusing to tolerate another culture not because "it is wrong" but rather because it is beneficial to you to do so.

Your problem here is that you seem to be assuming some sort of universal "respect the right of others to coexist" or "live and let live" morality, where you should not stamp out other cultures unless you have determined that they are "wrong". This sort of universal tolerance for other systems of morality does not exist. It really simply doesn't; history would be far less bloody if it did.

People that do not believe in universal morality are still very capable of acting only in their own best interests, at the expense of others. Egoism is not incompatible with moral relativism.

Moral relativism is incompatible with judgements that other's moral judgements are wrong.

How so, as long as you accept that those meta-judgements are still subjective?

Well you picked a good one with murdering and the death penalty and so forth.

> If you're not prepared to give up all claims on how others should act, then you're not really a moral relativist.

My only claim extends as far as I can act or influence others to act to serve my own needs and wants. Am I not a moral relativist?

I'm not sure that the author is commenting on society, but young people who are morally relativistic. I think he badly misrepresents their argument and doesn't really make one of his own.

> "My only claim extends as far as I can act or influence others to act to serve my own needs and wants."

That egoism, not moral relativism.

I took it that the author was making the following point about our society: we teach them in school that things like "cheating is wrong" is mere opinion, and yet similar judgments like "tax-evasion is wrong" aren't treated as mere opinions when they grow up.

egoism sounds about right. i wonder are they mutually exclusive. reading wikipedia, i'd disagree with normative moral relativism and agree with meta-ethical/descriptive moral relativism. just because i'm an egoist doesn't mean i think everyone else is.

> and yet similar judgments like "tax-evasion is wrong" aren't treated as mere opinions when they grow up.

I don't see anything like that written in the article, where did you take that from?

We do argue that all the time, we just call killing something other than murder if we don't want to impose a negative judgement on it.

You don't have to be a moral relativist to see that the foundations of moral facts are often built on sand.

The author blustered about how awful his strawman was, played semantic games on his son, and proved nothing at all.

The author can be ignored. Now focus on my words.

There is no point debating without first accepting the existence of absolute, universal and objective moral truth. You can't claim that someone "is wrong" (in the objective sense) if "being wrong" is not something that can exist. When a subjectivist "debates", it can only be motivated by selfishness - never by truth.

Self-awareness is the only thing that matters. The system only exists to understand itself, as accurately as possible. That's what we also call "truth", and that's the most important thing. Really.

Truth is about convergence, as there exists only one truth. When a person lies, it increases entropy (that's not good). While there exists only one truth, there can exist infinitely many lies. You can't disprove truth, but you can disprove lies, if only through contradictions. Whenever a person lies, progress (proximity to truth) slows down. That's the definition of evil. Therefore, lying is objectively/universally/absolutely a bad thing.

It is not important whether a lie today could lead to a better outcome in the future. We can't accurately predict the future. We don't even know "when" the future is. It is therefore, impossible to evaluate whether something is good or not based on future events, as it can never be known.

This is at this point that you must realize that what matters is not the end, but the means. The means justifies the end, not the other way around. Failing to understand that hurts the universe.

Aim for efficiency. Aim for truth. You will find that these two things are just one. Only then will you be one with the universe.

You just asserted a lot of stuff. You're not debating, merely preaching.
> Everything is just an opinion.

Including everything you just wrote. I'm not sure why you're so down on his claims when your position is circular at best.

Is everything relative so everyone has a valid opinion? Or is everything relative so that nobody has a valid opinion? Either way, why do you care?

He cares because if he's being deceived that's well immor.. uh no, ba.., not that, eh unethi.. well... he doesn't like it because reasons.
I'm not defending the article, but you are wrong.

Stealing from others is bad if it decreases your pleasure and it is good if it increases your pleasure.

That is objective.

How is that objective? Why is something bad if it decreases your pleasure?
What other meaning could there possibly be for words like "bad" and "good"?
Really? Self-sacrifice and penance are almost the basis of one the most popular moral theories in the world. Just go ask the closest Christian you might have.
> Self-sacrifice and penance are almost the basis of one the most popular moral theories in the world

You can't make those objective, though. That is my point. (It's not like I haven't actually heard of Christian morality before.)

Ultimately, the only thing that actually matters for any living organism is pleasure. Thus, only pleasure, ultimately, can be good or bad for an organism.

I mean "pleasure" in the broadest possible sense, but it's always either a physical sensation or an emotion.

Ultimately, the only thing that actually matters for any living organism is pleasure.

How so? Why can't subjective things matter to a living organism? You're jumping some logical steps there, I think.

That's a big "if", though. For others, stealing might increase one's pleasure. This decrease v. increase of pleasure about something is what's called an "opinion".

It's not objective if it changes based on who you ask and how you observe it.

> It's not objective if it changes based on who you ask and how you observe it.

Sure it is. I'm not sure what you think the word "objective" should mean.

> > It's not objective if it changes based on who you ask and how you observe it.

> Sure it is.

No, its not. "Objective" means, exactly, that its truth is not dependent on who you ask or how you observe; "subjective" is the word that describes claims that are dependent on those things.

If I get pleasure from doing X, that is an objective fact.

If I value Y, that is an objective fact.

Anyway, I'm not going to present a full epistemological theory of objectivity in the comments of HN. That would be futile. If you want to know about it, you can go research it. I don't mind chatting about it, I'm just pointing out that you can't expect too much from me here. Generally, the most I try to do in an online philosophical discussion is get people to think (when I disagree with them), not try to prove something. It's just not possible to prove much without, like, writing a book.

I think what javert meant is this: The sentence "Goodness of stealing is directly proportional with the net pleasure." (positive net pleasure = good) is objective. And the sentence "Badness of stealing is inversely proportional with the net pleasure" (negative net pleasure = bad) is equally objective.

These roughly convert to: If stealing brings you pleasure it is good for you. If stealing brings you pain it is bad for you. If being stolen from brings you pleasure it is good for you. If being stolen from brings you pain it is bad for you.

Yes.

But to clarify for anyone wondering, I would also say that stealing is never pleasurable unless someone is severely fucked up, in which case overall their life is going to be unpleasurable (shitty) in general.

So it's not like my argument is an excuse to steal.

In fact, if I were to write it all out carefully, it would be the ultimate and most compelling justification for practically never stealing.

Could you explain why/how pleasure is objective? It's not obvious to me what you mean.
Does it go from objectively bad to objectively good if you feel differently about it on different days?
No.
It seems that philosophers rarely make use of rigorous logic even though they stand to benefit from it immensely.
Philosophers invented rigorous logic. This one sure didn't present any, though.
Contemporary academic philosophy is full of rigorous logic. Either you're ignorant of what actual academic philosophers do, or you can't recognize rigorous logic when you see it.
Sure, many academic philosophers produce good work, but as many popular articles of this nature are riddled with logical holes and give a poor impression of what philosophy is.
So universal human rights are not objectively good? It's fairly easy to assert that some moral standards are objectively better. Take slavery for example, society a practices it while society b does not. Which society gives a better environment for the whole of its people?

And the same thing can be extended to take your example, don't know why you've put in game theory into the mix, but in general people tend to live better lives where there is law and order rather than live a life under constant threat and having to be the biggest meanest SOB out there to feel safe.

Not to mention that when you live in a society in which your home and self can be raped and pillaged at any moment you tend to invest quite a bit of resources in protecting your own self. While this can still be seen in society today e.g. Police forces, safes, guns etc. It's no where near the amount of resources that would be wasted if you would be living in the wild west.

While it might not be politically correct to think that you live in a society which is more moral and better than others, the truth is that if you live in the west you most likely live in one. And and in fact he luxury of this life style is what allows you to live in that nice little bubble of political correctness.

I personally believe that moral equivalence (or relativism) leads to moral bankruptcy, and sadly too many people have gone under. They promote the equivalence of the moral values of cultures with completely "different" moral values, values that sorry to say in many cases are objectively less "moral" than modern western values. Cultures that if the roles would've been reversed would not only let them speak but would actively silence them.

And while i might agree that everything might be just an opinion as you would said, there just might be some opinions which are better than others. I would like to live in a free and open society, a society that protects it's members and grants them as many rights as possible without hurting the rights of others and without devolving into anarchy. I rather live in a society that does not practice slavery, where women are equals, and no one gives a fuck what is on your plate or who is in your bedroom. And while you might think that a society that stones women for adultery and hangs homosexuals on construction cranes at the local square is just as moral correct as the one mentioned i would disagree. And if you want to quantify that, just quantify the well being of its members, including the ones that would be stoned, hanged, or locked in prison for life for being of or attracted to the wrong sex or simply by promoting other ideas.

And yes there is a good reason why I've not continued to rebuttal on that "stealing from others" example you've given, because It's too simplistic and irrelevant. A society can be morally bankrupt and still practice law and order. And I'm pretty sure that you would not want to live in a society which either allows crime to be committed without consequences nor practices cruel and unusual punishment in some eye for an eye biblical fashion. Because as much as i would think that the guy who broke into my flat and got away with my TV deserves to pay for his crime (and get some help in the process) i don't think that a boy who stole a loaf of bread from the market should get his hand chopped off because the law says so.

Oh and of course this is all my opinion, but i think given the chance we know exactly in which society people would chose to live in.

What you are writing is exactly why I threw game theory into the mix. Game theory show strategies that given a certain set of rules are beneficial for the player or all players (for interesting example see Nash equilibrium). The example you have given in first paragraph, that forbidding slavery creates a better environment for the whole of it's people is exactly just that - showing one strategy to be more beneficial than the other. It's not showing that slavery is "objectively" wrong. I remember seeing a nature documentary where two species were explained to live in something that could be seen a master/slave symbiosis which benefited them both. (As a sidenote, I'm all against slavery and I do not accept causing harm to others no matter how beneficial it would be to myself).

You say that "people tend to live better lives" and "I would like to live in" etc. This is very subjective. As for quantifying wellbeing of members, we may ask if it's better for 100% of society to feel well, or is it better for 80% of society to feel fantastic and 20% miserable and in fear. It's again a matter of opinion and we can use mathematical concepts like game theory to better explain using formal methods why some moral values would be beneficial for us and other's not. That's why I threw it into the mix.

You also say that some opinions are better than others. This general statement is very dangerous and was used throughout the ages by proponents of slavery, racism etc. They definitely claim that their opinions are better than yours while you do otherwise. The thing is, some opinions are better to achieve certain goal given some set of circumstances, rules and participants. Acknowledging that opinions and moral values are not objectively right or wrong doesn't make us crazy to pursue those that we see as moving the society we live in in the direction we want.