[lisper]

> excessive arrogance

Why excessive? The objective fact of the matter, as I point out in the first article in the series, is that the scientific method produces vastly more accurate predictions than anything else humans have ever tried. This is the whole reason science is even a thing. I think that justifies a little bit of cockiness until someone actually comes up with something better.

[raskelll]

The arrogance I mentioned is directed towards the people who think of themselves as appropriate to speak for the century-long success story of science itself while not really addressing (and understanding) how science emerged. Science as a human enterprise has flourished best without anyone putting boxes on what does and what doesn't consitute science.

[lisper]

Ah.

FYI, I have a whole series of unpublished chapters about the (very messy) history of science. I decided to take this different approach because I thought it would be a more effective way of reaching my target audience.

> Science as a human enterprise has flourished best without anyone putting boxes on what does and what doesn't consitute science.

That's not true. There is one box you cannot get out of without destroying the process: any hypothesis that is inconsistent with experiment must be rejected (and as a corollary to that, unfalsifiable hypotheses must be rejected). But yeah, beyond that pretty much anything goes.

[AnimalMuppet]

I'm with you that, if you don't close the loop via experiment, you don't have science. But you have to be careful that you not go too far, and say that science is the only way we can know truth. Logical positivism is dead for a reason. (Actually, for several reasons.)

[lisper]

> science is the only way we can know truth

You need to read the third installment in my series:

https://blog.rongarret.info/2024/04/three-myths-about-scient...

and in particular Myth #3.

[jfengel]

I don't disagree with Myth #3, but I had a hard time getting to it after reading Myth #2:

The scientific method assumes naturalism/materialism/atheism... This is false. The scientific method contains no assumptions whatsoever. The scientific method is simply that: a method.

I don't think that's a good way to put it. There is an assumption that this method is a valid, useful, good thing to do. A souffle recipe presupposes that you want a souffle, or you wouldn't be reading it.

The scientific method hints ambiguously at epistemological commitments, and that ambiguity is not a point in its favor. Different people make those assumptions tacitly and don't realize that they disagree with each other, and don't even apply them consistently to themselves.

I also happen to agree that the scientific method has some kind of epistemic benefit, especially as compared to the potential alternatives. But those benefits prove maddeningly difficult to nail down. The epistemic commitments always turn out to be too loose (admitting pseudosciences) or too strict (rejecting sciences that resist the kinds of experiments you'd like to do).

[autoexec]

> I don't disagree with Myth #3,

You could. It says "First, science never proves anything; instead it produces explanations of observations." but science doesn't have to explain an observation. There are tons of times when science tells us what we'll observe under certain conditions while never giving us an explanation for how/why it works out that way. An explanation is the ideal, but all science needs is to give us something we can reasonably predict to be useful.

[lisper]

> There is an assumption that this method is a valid, useful, good thing to do.

No, that is not an assumption. That is an observation. The scientific method produces theories with predictive power, and it does this better than any other known method. That is an empirical fact, not an assumption. This is the reason science is a thing.

[6510]

I'd fill that last bit under unnecessary and undesirable processing. Things are what they are(!) A hypothesis inconsistent with experiments is a hypothesis inconsistent with experiments. It is a mistake to attempt to make more or less from it. You get nothing extra or beneficial out of the effort of rejection. A failed experiment is a failed experiment. There are lots of ways to fail. Faulty materials, defective equipment, outside influences, incompetent experimenters, poor design, POLITICS etc etc

A repeatedly failed experiment sounds just as bad as it should.

[lisper]

> repeatedly failed experiment

That is an oxymoron. A repeatedly "failed" experiment is a valid scientific result. There is even a classic example:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michelson%E2%80%93Morley_exper...

[fastasucan]

>hypothesis that is inconsistent with experiment must be rejected

Not really, this is a conclusion that is drawn only by looking at the big names and highlights throughout the scientific history. In practice the experiments in themselves is flawed, so if the hypothesis is not confirmed through experiments the experiment design need to be fixed. Other times they are confirmed where the experiments also was flawed.

Also there are a lot of hypothesis we cannot reject, but we still build scientific work upon them.

[lisper]

> In practice the experiments in themselves is flawed

Yes, of course. Experimental error is always a possibilities, but that is just another hypothesis that needs to be considered along with all the other possibilities.

> Also there are a lot of hypothesis we cannot reject, but we still build scientific work upon them.

Like what?

[raskelll]

Let me revisit my statement once I've read those chapters then.

Regarding your second statement, out of curiosity, I wonder how you would characterize the 1989 series of experiments done by Fleischmann and Pons.

[lisper]

> Let me revisit my statement once I've read those chapters then.

You can find them here:

https://flownet.com/ron/TIKN/

Note that they are quite drafty. That was the result of a previous effort to tackle this project of writing about the scientific method for a general audience that I ultimately abandoned in favor of this current approach. The history part starts in chapter 5.

These were based on a series of lectures I gave a few years ago. I can dig up those links too if you're interested.

> I wonder how you would characterize the 1989 series of experiments done by Fleischmann and Pons.

I'm not sure what you expect me to say. The results have not been reproduced, so whatever happened in 1989 it was almost certainly not cold fusion.

[vixen99]

No, we don't yet know what's happening in that area: as the DARPA 2022 report puts it in a press release entitled 'Solid State verification of nuclear particles in electrochemical cells'. "Work should continue - much interesting science to be done. Results do not yet rise to level publishable in peer-reviewed physics journals". Bottom line: some neutrons appear and they cannot explain the mechanism. If neutrons are detected and it's definitely 'cold' then what would you call it?

There are many other reports more or less with the same proviso. 'Not yet publishable'. Many will wonder about the 'yet' but that's usually the case with potentially new areas of science.

https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0153487 Li–Pd–Rh-D2O electrochemistry experiments at elevated voltage

[lisper]

I would call it "anomalous room-temperature neutron production".

[maxnoe]

This is easily solved by adding the well known quote (Sagan):

"Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence."

An older quote, addressing this case more directly would be (Eddington):

"The law that entropy always increases holds, I think, the supreme position among the laws of Nature. If someone points out to you that your pet theory of the universe is in disagreement with Maxwell's equations — then so much the worse for Maxwell's equations. If it is found to be contradicted by observation — *well, these experimentalists do bungle things sometimes.* But if your theory is found to be against the second law of thermodynamics I can give you no hope; there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest humiliation."

[lisper]

Well, Fleischmann and Pons claimed to have extraordinary evidence. They were just wrong.

Also, I cover the Sagan quote in the previous installment:

https://blog.rongarret.info/2024/04/the-scientific-method-pa...

[mikhailfranco]

No, the 2nd Law is just a statistical property relating macrostates to microstates. It can never be the foundation of physics for the underlying system.

Life does a pretty good job of evading it, locally, for lifetimes. Civilizations overcome it for longer, perhaps indefinitely, as long as there are stars/blackholes in the sky, or uranium/hydrogen nuclear fuel to be scavenged.

Wolfram recently tried to explain the 2nd Law, as a consequence of time-coherent computationally-bounded observers. As always with him, it is fascinating and infuriatingly in equal measure:

https://www.wolfram-media.com/products/the-second-law-resolv...

Those subsystems that evade it (life) also need explanation. Friston, Levin, Lane, England and others are starting to give plausible models and explanations.

[anuraj]

J D Bernal already addressed it through his magnum opus - Science in History.

[strogonoff]

My pet theory is that success of predictions of modern science helped us achieve a local maximum which, while useful, also makes it difficult to evolve towards a higher (globally) maximum.

The axioms are:

1. Some models are useful, but all models are necessarily incorrect, incomplete, and/or unfalsifiable. (This can be restated in an unsettling, for a natural science enthusiast, manner as “there is always the unexplained”.)

2. We cannot know where the incorrectness/incompleteness lies.

However, the arrogance of modern natural science due to its success makes us disinclined and demotivated to look outside the box of its current models and tempts us into, e.g., treating the entities described by current models (wrong, per above) as ground truth, treating consciousness (you’d think, the only thing we have direct access to) as an illusion (red flag, explaining away), etc. Thus, we get entrenched in a local maximum.

[lisper]

It's true that science is not complete, and cannot be. We know, for example, that we cannot solve the halting problem, we cannot predict chaotic systems, etc. But that's the wrong thing to focus on. There are a lot of things we can predict, and the scientific method produces better predictive theories than any other known method.

> disinclined and demotivated to look outside the box of its current models

OK, but that is not the scientific method's fault. If you want to look outside the box, nothing in the scientific method says you can't. An indeed the biggest breakthroughs have come when people have thought outside the box.

The problem is that it's often hard to distinguish between brilliance and crackpottery. But again, that's not a shortcoming of the scientific method, it's just the Way The World Is. Some problems are hard.

[dekhn]

The halting problem isn't scientific, though. It's entirely mathematical (mathematics and science are typically treated as distinct domains, see https://www.maths.ed.ac.uk/~v1ranick/papers/wigner.pdf for some discussion). We do not know if there is a scientific way to make a machine which exceeds the ability of a Turing machine, see for example this paragraph from the wikipedia page on the halting problem:

"It is an open question whether there can be actual deterministic physical processes that, in the long run, elude simulation by a Turing machine, and in particular whether any such hypothetical process could usefully be harnessed in the form of a calculating machine (a hypercomputer) that could solve the halting problem for a Turing machine amongst other things. It is also an open question whether any such unknown physical processes are involved in the working of the human brain, and whether humans can solve the halting problem"

One of the most important things to recognize about science is that we rarely, if ever, work with absolutely well-determined systems with analytically solvable equiations. INstead, we work almost untirely with underdetermined systems with only approximate methods, and while somewhat unsatisfying, those methods are almost always a more efficient way to make falsifiable hypotheses and run experiments. I don't think anybody ever truly makes a falsifiable hypothesis- in the sense of Descartes' great deceiver, we can't truly know for certain what the underlying state of the system was.

[lisper]

> The halting problem isn't scientific, though. It's entirely mathematical

No, it isn't. The halting problem arises out of a mathematical model of a physical system. We don't know for certain that it's impossible to build an oracle for the halting problem, just as we don't know for certain that it's impossible to do an end-run around the Second Law. But the evidence in both cases is (IMHO) equally compelling.

[dekhn]

Everything written about halting machines presumes a mathematical system, not a physical system. It makes statements about model systems, some of which have physical counterparts. THe whole point of a turing machine is that it's abstract, not made of tape or transistors or anything else.

The halting problem is not really widely discussed in physics journals. They care much more about the physical limits of actual computing. If you have good examples of physics people talking about the halting problem in a non-theoretical and distant way, I'm happy to see it. But from waht I can tell, physicists are not concerned with uncomputable functions.

[lisper]

> The halting problem is not really widely discussed in physics journals.

So? Golf clubs aren't widely discussed in physics journals either but they are physical systems nonetheless. You can't draw valid conclusions about what is not a physical system based on what is absent from physics journals.

[strogonoff]

> the scientific method produces better predictive theories than any other known method

Better theories in what sense? (If possible, in terms that are genuinely extrinsic to scientific method itself.)

> If you want to look outside the box, nothing in the scientific method says you can't

Nothing in the scientific method says you can’t, indeed. However, some people tend to misinterpret it (possibly due to a suppressed religious impulse finding its way) as revealing objective truth through its models, as opposed to what it does: offer predictions as to what we would observe if we do X. For many of those (very smart) people, imagining radically new models that focus on different aspects (e.g., that conspicuous we above, or something else) and sideline other aspects (e.g., the various entities described by current models) is taboo.

[lisper]

> Better theories in what sense?

In their ability to make accurate predictions.

> However, some people tend to misinterpret it (possibly due to a suppressed religious impulse finding its way) as revealing objective truth through its models

But science does reveal objective truth, in the sense that it reveals truths (or at least very good approximations to truths) that are independent of what anyone's opinions are. What it does not do is reveal metaphysical truth, but that's not the same thing. But even then, it does put constraints on what metaphysical truth could be. For example, unless quantum mechanics is wrong (which is extremely unlikely) then it is not possible for metaphysical truth to be classical.

[strogonoff]

> In their ability to make accurate predictions.

That is a bit too close to defining them as better within the framework of scientific method.

For example, though I suspect you won’t like this line of question, are we by chance able to make increasingly accurate predictions about something increasingly irrelevant or not beneficial to ourselves?

Edit: I would be the first to say that the answer to that question is probably negative, but that is just to illustrate, maybe this would push you to define “better” better.

> But science does reveal objective truth, in the sense that it reveals truths (or at least very good approximations to truths) that are independent of what anyone's opinions are

Models are metaphors to aid our minds in coming up with more predictions to test. If a model was able to predict N outcomes that does not make it correct, unless you can guarantee that there will not be a future outcome that makes that model incorrect, which you cannot as that notion would presume you have come up with a provably correct and complete model in finite time.

> But even then, it does put constraints on what metaphysical truth could be. For example, unless quantum mechanics is wrong (which is extremely unlikely) then it is not possible for metaphysical truth to be classical.

I cannot object to that, except the part where you claim that quantum mechanics being wrong is extremely unlikely. I will stand by my initial assumptions and claim that it is not just extremely likely but a near certainty that quantum mechanics is wrong—just because it is foolish to assume that any of today’s models is finally correct and true. It may be useful in meantime, though.

[lisper]

> That is a bit too close to defining them as better within the framework of scientific method.

No, that is simply pointing out the reason that science is a thing at all.

> are we by chance able to make increasingly accurate predictions about something increasingly irrelevant or not beneficial to ourselves?

Probably, though putting effort into this would obviously not be the wisest choice.

> except the part where you claim that quantum mechanics being wrong is extremely unlikely

You need to read "The Relativity of Wrong" by Isaac Asimov.

[strogonoff]

> We know, for example, that we cannot solve the halting problem, we cannot predict chaotic systems, etc.

This violates the second axiom I assume: in your examples, we know where the incompleteness lies. If you disagree that not knowing that would necessarily hold for modeling the system that we are part of, then perhaps we won’t be on the same page to argue productively.

[lisper]

Sorry, that didn't parse. What do you mean by "the second axiom"? What axioms are you talking about?

[strogonoff]

> My pet theory is that success of predictions of modern science helped us achieve a local maximum which, while useful, also makes it difficult to evolve towards a higher (globally) maximum.

> The axioms are:

> 1. Some models are useful, but all models are necessarily incorrect, incomplete, and/or unfalsifiable. (This can be restated in an unsettling, for a natural science enthusiast, manner as “there is always the unexplained”.)

> 2. We cannot know where the incorrectness/incompleteness lies.

(It is an axiom because I strongly suspect I will maintain this position but am not willing to spend time defending it. Maybe I should call it “assumption”.)

[lisper]

Ah. Sorry, I'm responding to a dozen different threads and I'm having trouble keeping all the context in my head.

I think your axiom #2 is almost certainly correct. But just because we can't know where all of the uncertainty lies doesn't mean we can't know where some of it does.

[mikhailfranco]

I don't think that all models are necessarily incorrect. Scientific models are precisely correct until they are falsified.

For example, the inverse-square law for electromagnetism and Newtonian gravity is just an exact feature of continuous 3D space (surface area of a sphere). It only became an approximation when Einstein proposed warped spacetime, and will become even more incorrect in detail, if/when someone finds evidence for discrete spacetime structure. Then the inverse square law becomes a double approximation, over macro and micro structure of spacetime (lattice, wolfram graph, spin foam, ...).

It just so happens that at the moment, we know that the whole of physics is pervasively incomplete (approximate nonsense), so very few current models are likely to be preserved in future better theories. QFT is a terrible hack, with renormalization and virtual hand-waving. QFT depends on a fixed background spacetime, but we know that background is dynamic (GR). We don't know how QFT and GR fit together, but I would guess almost all current models are incorrect.

However, it is possible that some future Theory of Everything is correct indefinitely (until end of civilization, while not being ontologically True, of course).

[ordu]

> the arrogance of modern natural science due to its success makes us disinclined and demotivated to look outside the box of its current models

I'd say it is not the arrogance that stops us, but the sheer amount of work invested into current theories. You cannot match it with mere personal effort.

> treating the entities described by current models (wrong, per above) as ground truth

Psychology shares one special property with sociology and economics: theories not just describe a object of a research, they change the object. In some obvious ways (like popularization of IQ scores makes life easier for people with high IQ score) and in less obvious ways.

It doesn't mean that anything said by a psychologists becomes true, but many things are. I'd bet that even if consciousness was not an illusion it is now.

[spywaregorilla]

Seems to me we have very strongly evidenced beliefs about where incompleteness lies.

[strogonoff]

Consciousness is perhaps the most glaring one (as far as current models offered by natural sciences are concerned), if nothing else then because we deal with it every moment of existence or because it is what natural science itself stems from, is shaped by, is dependent on and exists because of.

Of course, whether it is the only unknown is unknown.

[lisper]

Have you read Dennett's book?

[strogonoff]

No, but I’m familiar with his take on consciousness and it is more or less what I mean by thinking in the box of existing models and trying to explain away something inconvenient to them.

[lisper]

Maybe you should actually read the book before you pass judgement on it.

[keiferski]

Arrogance is almost by definition against the values of scientific inquiry, and so if you see someone placing science on a quasi-religious pedestal, you’d best be skeptical of whatever that person is selling.

This tends to go with excessive praise of particular thinkers and the wholesale dismissal of entire fields and/or thinkers as “manifest nonsense” or some other ill-informed claptrap.

If you read actual philosophy of science books and papers by real philosophers, you’ll find that the attitude is more appropriate and not so laudatory. As it should be.

[lisper]

> wholesale dismissal of entire fields and/or thinkers

Like what?

[keiferski]

Like dismissing the work of Feyerabend or Wittgenstein without seemingly having read either:

https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=pastMonth&page=0&prefix=tr...

I'm really not sure how seriously I'm supposed to take writings about the philosophy of science when the author thinks major thinkers in the field, like Feyerabend, are just writing gibberish. That's...not really a serious opinion, whether you agree with his ideas or not.

[BoingBoomTschak]

About Feyerabend, a quick glance at Wikipedia (with all its massive biases) showed me a dubious character that would fit perfectly into https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fashionable_Nonsense...

Actually, a search inside said book vindicated this sentiment.

Anyway, when I see "philosopher" and "20th century" together, my bullshit radar gets extremely attentive.

[lisper]

I read Feyerabend a long time ago. It was recommended to me by someone I deeply respect so I was predisposed to like it, but it struck me as unalloyed nonsense. It was a long time ago and I don't really remember the details any more. My impression is that Feyerabend is mostly cited by crackpots who are bitter because they are not being taken seriously.

However, this question too can be settled empirically: can you point to any useful results that were produced by someone who credits them to Wittgenstein or Feyerabend? I'm not aware of any.

[keiferski]

It's really crazy to me that your argument is literally, "I read it a long time ago and don't remember," as if that is supposed to be convincing.

Like I said, this isn't a serious discussion.

[lisper]

It wasn't meant to be convincing, it was meant to be an honest report of the situation. I don't remember the details. All I remember was that my assessment of it at the time was that it was devoid of merit, which is one of the reasons I don't remember the details.

Now, there are two possibilities: one is that I was wrong, that it has merit, and if I go back and revisit it that I will see now what I missed then. The second possibility is that I got it right back in the day.

But notice that we can actually use the scientific method to test this. These are hypotheses and they make predictions. In particular, the first hypothesis predicts that there should be some evidence that Feyerabend has merit. In particular, I would expect to be able to find someone who produced a useful result and credited that at least in part to his or her having read Feyerabend. I have never seen such an example. To the contrary, the only people I see citing Feyerabend are crackpots who are bitter about not being taken seriously.

Of course, I haven't looked very hard either, so it's entirely possible that there are counterexamples out there. But the appropriate response is not to argue about this or impugn my character, but simply to point me to the evidence that I've missed.

[mistermann]

It's like an aggregation of the worst parts of scientism manifest in one single human...I have trouble believing this is actually real, it's too far beyond what my absurdity meter can measure.

I see you too were present for the former clinic he put on in the philosophy thread, that was something to see.

[wddkcs]

That would depend upon what you count as a prediction. The Oracles of Delphi operated for hundreds of years, the Sibylline Oracles were relied upon for thousands of years, and both were universally regarded in their day as unnerving accurate. Dismissing their longevity as religious superstition I would argue is itself anti-science. It is the arrogance of dismissing such history that leads people to eventually declare themselves to be 'the science'.

[lisper]

Actually, science can explain oracles. There is a whole field of study devoted to understanding how to deceive people. It's considered more art than science, but it actually is both. It's called "magic". And there is a whole sub-field of magic called mentalism that deals specifically with things like what the oracles did.

BTW, since you brought up oracles, you might enjoy this:

https://blog.rongarret.info/2018/01/a-multilogue-on-free-wil...

[mistermann]

What if your premises are less solid than they seem, and because of the "our thinking style is not only better on a relative scale, on average, it is near flawless in an absolute sense" mindset that often comes along with the culture of "science" you're unable to even consider such possibilities?

[lisper]

What premises? The scientific method has no premises, it's just a method. If you are "unable to consider" some possibility that is not the fault of the scientific method, that is a shortcoming in your mental abilities. The scientific method doesn't stop you from considering anything. All it forces you to do is reject ideas that are at odds with experiment.

[mistermann]

> What premises?

- The objective fact of the matter

- the scientific method produces vastly more accurate predictions than anything else humans have ever tried

- This is the whole reason science is even a thing

- I think

- that justifies

- a little bit of cockiness

- until someone actually comes up with something better

- [reality], the phenomenon that shall not be discussed, upon which your entire argument/experience/reality rests

> The scientific method has no premises

https://www.google.com/search?q=axioms+of+science+site%3Aphi...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_and_indirect_realism

> it's just a method.

By "just", do you mean only?

If so, you have a burden of proof on your hands (and proofs of nonexistence are some of the trickiest, in no small, part because they typically have the appearance of being (thus "are") the easiest).

If not, what do you mean?

An angle to test your claim against: are scientists a part of science? If not, how does "science" accomplish anything in the material plane (concrete reality)?

> If you are "unable to consider" some possibility that is not the fault of the scientific method, that is a shortcoming in your mental abilities.

a) Is "I am unable to consider..." actually happening though, in shared reality? (Is this mind reading, or persuasive, misinformative rhetoric?)

b) What if your "Science is just (only) a method" premise is not true though? What if science also has culture (like most any organization involving Humans), or even a style of thinking (say, delusions of omniscience, or Pure Perfect Rationality)?

c) Might you have any shortcomings in your mental abilities, and is it possible that those shortcomings could cause unrealized/unrealizable (due to your cultural thinking style) error in your evaluation of my mental abilities?

> The scientific method doesn't stop you from considering anything. All it forces you to do is reject ideas that are at odds with experiment.

If these claims are True (in JTB, be careful your mind doesn't get so obsessed with the "J" that you forget all about the "T", or forget that the "B" is ever present, and very misleading), you should be able to present a proof (an articulation of one of your own, or simply link to or reference by name an existing one).

Do you have the ability do do that, and if so can you demonstrate you actually have the ability, by actually doing it, physically, in this thread?

(inb4: "well of course I'm just expressing my opinion, that's all everyone is ever doing", and various other rhetorical get out of jail free (or, look over there) cards science folks appeal to when they get caught engaging in Scientific Soothsaying.)

Also, let the record show that you did not even attempt to address the majority of my comment (perhaps you will later, I am just pointing it out).

[lisper]

I don't think you understand what the word "premise" means. None of the examples you give are premises. Most of them aren't even complete sentences.

Yes, I know that a lot of people say that science has premises. They are simply mistaken.

> By "just", do you mean only?

Yes.

> If so, you have a burden of proof on your hands

What exactly is it that you think I need to prove?

> If these claims are True

You need to read this:

https://blog.rongarret.info/2024/04/three-myths-about-scient...

particularly Myth #3.

[mistermann]

I am happy to stand as is:

- you leaving all of my questions unanswered

- you essentially declaring victory, as is the culture of science's style when encountering inconvenient questions, or the unknown.

Congratulations.

[lisper]

You can let it stand however you like, but the claim that I'm not answering your questions is manifestly false.

[nairboon]

> The objective fact of the matter, as I point out in the first article in the series, is that the scientific method produces vastly more accurate predictions than anything else humans have ever tried.

Which scientific method? As far as i know, there is no such thing as "the scientific method". Though, there are many methods.

[mr_mitm]

Which ones do you know? I have only heard it referred to in this context, that there is the scientific method: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method

[lisper]

No, there is only one scientific method, which is to say, one method that works better than any other to produce theories with predictive power. I describe it in the inaugural post of the series:

https://blog.rongarret.info/2024/03/a-clean-sheet-introducti...

If you know of a process that works better than the one described that would be Big News.

https://blog.rongarret.info/2024/04/the-scientific-method-pa...