[lisper]

> Better theories in what sense?

In their ability to make accurate predictions.

> However, some people tend to misinterpret it (possibly due to a suppressed religious impulse finding its way) as revealing objective truth through its models

But science does reveal objective truth, in the sense that it reveals truths (or at least very good approximations to truths) that are independent of what anyone's opinions are. What it does not do is reveal metaphysical truth, but that's not the same thing. But even then, it does put constraints on what metaphysical truth could be. For example, unless quantum mechanics is wrong (which is extremely unlikely) then it is not possible for metaphysical truth to be classical.

[strogonoff]

> In their ability to make accurate predictions.

That is a bit too close to defining them as better within the framework of scientific method.

For example, though I suspect you won’t like this line of question, are we by chance able to make increasingly accurate predictions about something increasingly irrelevant or not beneficial to ourselves?

Edit: I would be the first to say that the answer to that question is probably negative, but that is just to illustrate, maybe this would push you to define “better” better.

> But science does reveal objective truth, in the sense that it reveals truths (or at least very good approximations to truths) that are independent of what anyone's opinions are

Models are metaphors to aid our minds in coming up with more predictions to test. If a model was able to predict N outcomes that does not make it correct, unless you can guarantee that there will not be a future outcome that makes that model incorrect, which you cannot as that notion would presume you have come up with a provably correct and complete model in finite time.

> But even then, it does put constraints on what metaphysical truth could be. For example, unless quantum mechanics is wrong (which is extremely unlikely) then it is not possible for metaphysical truth to be classical.

I cannot object to that, except the part where you claim that quantum mechanics being wrong is extremely unlikely. I will stand by my initial assumptions and claim that it is not just extremely likely but a near certainty that quantum mechanics is wrong—just because it is foolish to assume that any of today’s models is finally correct and true. It may be useful in meantime, though.

[lisper]

> That is a bit too close to defining them as better within the framework of scientific method.

No, that is simply pointing out the reason that science is a thing at all.

> are we by chance able to make increasingly accurate predictions about something increasingly irrelevant or not beneficial to ourselves?

Probably, though putting effort into this would obviously not be the wisest choice.

> except the part where you claim that quantum mechanics being wrong is extremely unlikely

You need to read "The Relativity of Wrong" by Isaac Asimov.

[strogonoff]

I will read it some time.

I still do not know what makes a theory “better” if it will never be provably correct, is most likely drastically wrong, and comparatively brings us little value. A theory that would instead focus on ourselves, whatever that might look like, seems like potentially a much “better” option, but because the path is poorly trodden the scientific community would defend its own dignity by laughing at those who venture there. Anyway, I’m not awake enough to argue well at this point.

[lisper]

> brings us little value

You don't see value in the ability to make accurate predictions about the future?

[strogonoff]

Not necessarily. It depends on what predictions those are, I suppose.

[lisper]

> Not necessarily.

OK, I guess we'll just have to agree to disagree about this. If you don't see the value in being able to predict the future, I'm not going to try to persuade you of it.