[oa335]

my thesis is that the IRGC has successfully established deterrence by demonstrating relative resilience against US attacks (still have boats and missiles), ability to meaningfully strike US bases and its Allies, and willingness to sacrifice a lot of Irans civilian infrastructure. its hard to sift through the propaganda on both sides, but I haven't yet seen anything to disprove this convincingly. anyone else?

[karmakurtisaani]

I also believe they have the upper hand as they are willing to play the long game. It's like when Russia attacked Ukraine, they gambled on taking Kiev with paratroopers on the first few days. Didn't work and they got stuck.

It will be ironic if Iran gets a stronger position than they had before the war as a consequence of a peace treaty.

[ajross]

It's not really an "if". Iran is in a stronger geopolitical position (than the one they held before the war) today. Any deal they make can only improve things for them, by definition (or else they wouldn't take it).

That's precisely the trap the Trump administration has created for itself. If the only way out is to lose, then you've already lost. And Iran knows it.

[karmakurtisaani]

I agree that they have this strong position now, but the war is not over yet. I doubt they'll lose it in any meaningful way, but still it remains to be seen how they manage to capitulate it in a possible peace deal.

[ajross]

Again, they don't have to capitulate. They hold all the cards. The world needs that strait open, and 100%, undeniably, without any question at all will pay Iran tolls to get it.

To the extent that this ends in military action, it's going to be the rest of the world protecting the Iranian toll regime from USA piracy. Even Trump won't pull that trigger. Watch for the TACO.

[karmakurtisaani]

They still need to come to some kind of peace treaty to be able to profit from the control of the strait. Before that happens we might see things like ground invasion or nuclear weapons being used. It's unlikely, but within the realm of possibility.

[ajross]

Again, no, before that happens we'll see Europe and China submit to Iran's tolls and start escorting their tankers through the straight in "violation" of Trump's insane blockade. The US position is 100% untenable here, it relies on everyone else just deciding by fiat that Iran is the bad guy when it's very clearly us.

[Jensson]

> Iran is in a stronger geopolitical position (than the one they held before the war) today

Why do you say that? IRGC lost 90% of their corrupt income when USA blockaded their shadow fleet of oil tankers, they are weaker than ever right now, it is hard for any organization to survive long when losing 90% of their income. They rely on a large amount of mercenaries currently to keep the population under house arrest, but what happens when those no longer get paid?

That seems like a very brittle position to me.

[ajross]

The blockade is 100% unsustainable. It's a joke. The world can't absorb a 25% cut in oil production for anything more than a few months. Reserve capacity is already being tapped. The futures market says it's only a mild disruption because the futures market is predicting (correctly, so far) that it's all a joke that will disappear in a confusing TACO in a few days.

[Jensson]

> The world can't absorb a 25% cut in oil production for anything more than a few months.

IRGC can't absorb that for more than a few months either, and if the world wants to open the strait they would rather attack Iran over the strait than attack USA, so there is no way this state will benefit IRGC if it keeps up.

It was IRGC mining friendly countries waters and attacking ships in friendly waters, every country affected has the right to go attack IRGC over that but they choose to wait and see for now. But if it gets as bad as you suggest then they will just force Iran to open it, they wont force USA to do anything since its not USA that is illegally blocking it.

[oa335]

> IRGC can't absorb that for more than a few months either, and if the world wants to open the strait they would rather attack Iran over the strait than attack USA, so there is no way this state will benefit IRGC if it keeps up.

This is not at all obvious to me. Money and economic power historically is downstream of military power - men with guns can expropriate whatever they want or need from their unarmed, isolated population. The only thing that is potentially upstream of military power is ideology, which also favors IRGC and Iran security forces as they seem to be most ideologically fervent faction in Iran.

[ajross]

> they wont force USA to do anything since its not USA that is illegally blocking it.

The USA is literally blockading the strait to prevent tolling. I mean, in some sense you're right: the Trump threat is fake and he'll cave. But the policy you're ascribing to Iran, incorrectly, is actually what your government claims to be doing!

I remain just absolutely dumbfounded at the ability of this administration's defenders to just dig in on obvious lies. Surely on some level you get that you're being lied to, right?

[maxglute]

IMO Ability to break US forward base sancturary breaks entire US expeditionary model. US+co land basing responsible for most of strike sortie generation/sustainment. Carriers are mathematically supplementary in theatre level conflicts.

Degrade land based strike sorties and support sorties and push CVG back to ~1000km (where strike stories drop to ~50% due to tanking) = entire strike sortie sustainment math breaks hard. Less strike sorties -> even more dependence on high-end munitions. Combined with resilient antiair also denied US ability to move to budget (i.e. JDAM) mop up phase. Strategically Iran being able to soak US damage and still fire back = US air campaign tactically failed to degrade Iran missile complex chokehold over region. Consider US used up ~half of highend standoff and interceptors (if you believe CSIS) then status quo after crippling forward bases simply broke US war logistics. US cannot sustain (not even matter of afford) to fight Iran with current highend munition burnrate + cvg sortie generation, and and defeat Iran tactically to rely on lowend munitions without more political exposure, i.e. a few more pilot rescues going to start meaningfully chip away at US CSAR fleet. Nevermind political fallout of failed rescue or F35 down in Iranian soil.

Hence Trump pivoted to threatened civil infra / counter-value, US saw limits / diminishing returns on ability to neutralize remaining Iranian counter-force threats. US simply cannot afford to prosecute prolonged counter-force standoff air campaig without further strategic exhaustion. Same reason Iran shifted to counter-value oil/infra because the damage to US basing already done, and their ability to degrade US CSG sorties limited.

Obviously this applies to WestPac.

[oa335]

thanks for your insights. do you have a background in defense?

much of what you are saying sounds plausible to me, but i really don't know much about modern military tactics. do you have any suggestions for where i can learn more about that topic wrt how it applies to this war?

> Obviously this applies to WestPac

do you mean a a potential war with China? i dont think China has leverage over a critical choke point like Hormuz and is instead exposed to one (Malacca) that US would surely blockade.

[maxglute]

Wall of text warning. No background in defense, imo slightly more informed/less stupid enthusiast. There isn't specific reading, most narratives are politically motivated and not worthwhile outside of relevant statistics to inform analysis. Really need to understand subject matter from first principles and run available numbers (that pass smell test). Even declassified will get you a long way, i.e. carrier strike sortie generation at various distances, forward basing sortie generation, munition / interceptor stockpiles, weaponeering (munition expenditure) all relatively known. Useful to also correlate with reporting and compare to past conflicts.

Iran as example: Iran is ~5x larger than Iraq by most metrics, US generated ~5x more sorties in Iraq than Iran (with more carriers and regional basing). Factor in hits on Iraq was with 10% precise munitions, Iran has 100%, but Iran doctrine also designed to tank hits by forcing US to expend more munitions etc... rough napkin match suggests mathematically unlikely for US to damage Iran on same scale vs Iraq given Iran's size, US+co sortie #s and air campaign time frame.

Then see initial claims that 100% of Iran regional strike complex destroyed, but Iran obviously still hitting regional targets at XYZ rate (online trackers etc) and you get better sense of picture. News of ~50% of US forward basing hit, enablers like AWACS or radars hit that will further reduce US efficiency, carrier moved from 500km to 1000km standoff, losing airframes flying over Iran, and it's clear Iran maintains ability to fire back, and what they can hit is effectively forcing US to adopt more conservative tactics to stay outside of Iranian fires. Which translates to even less efficiency - less strike sorties (more tanking) and more highend munitions (to reduce risk). Integrate relevant stats as they become available - CSIS report on ~50% of high end stand off, ~50% of high end interceptors expended and numbers suggest US can not mathematically sustain air campaign tempo which has reached marginal effect in terms of suppressing Iranian ability to fire back without unsustainably burning through high end munition stockpiles for much longer before complete strategic insolvency (US cannot fight peer war without these munitions). It all comports to US air campaign cannot defang Iran militarily, even if it might, continuing would be Pyrrhic, then all the talk about blowing up Iranian civilian infra, doing counter blockade to conserve munitions, moving to negotiations suddenly makes sense.

>i dont think China has leverage

In terms of immediate leverage ~90% of highend semi production and/or semi supply chain, reminder many, many, sole source semi suppliers feeding TSMC Arizona / US fabs from east Asia. Arguably bespoke semi supply chain is currently MORE vulnerable, i.e. less redundant than global oil which have many geographic sources.

In terms of blockade, draw a 5000km circle around PRC. That is PRC IRBM / Antiship range covers Malacca, Hormuz, Aden, aka all critical energy SLOCs. PRC have demonstrate coordinated hypersonic antiship missile strike on moving target at sea, with sufficient space ISR to track US shipping in these regions + PRC industrial base = PRC has magnitude greater potential than Iran to degrade US in much broader geographic theaters, and not just land basing but actively deployed navy, i.e. US not capable of blocking Malacca for long because PRC IRBMs can (at least according to demonstrations) take out US ships, their replenishment fleet or the basing that tops up the replenishment fleet... every piece of logistic chain that sustains USN is exquisitely vulnerable to PRC fires. Ditto with USAF tanking/sustainment/logistics.

In terms of REAL PRC leverage, Draw a 8000km circle, this reaches CONUS - 2025 DoD/W China report finally acknowledges PRC has ability conventionally strike west coast. Note earlier disclaimer that important to filter motivations, i.e. these capabilities have existed for years, it was only acknowledged in 2025. Now ask if PRC can make their 10000km+ missiles conventional, then simple geography math will inform that will reach Texas... that's PADD3, i.e. most of US oil strategic production. That's PRC actual leverage to US blockade (legally act of war) - escalating to reciprocal energy disruption on CONUS. US blockade was only viable strategy if damage unilateral/lowcost (i.e. PRC 10-15 years ago / Iran now). Current consequence with respect to PRC is PRC has option to reciprocally degrade CONUS energy extraction/refining at source for mutual disruption. All signs point to PRC skipping US model of CSGs, B21s for rocket based conventional global strike. Hence game theory behind blockade is broken. I surmise will take a few more years before DoD China report acknowledges broader CONUS vulnerability, and once PRC's CONUS level leverage is treated as baseline, a lot of strategic calculations / narratives will have to shift.

[oa335]

so trumps golden dome actually IS a good idea from US perspective?