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by Sakos
487 days ago
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From the article: > Although it got off to a rocky start, the A320 went on to achieve a better safety record than most traditional aircraft types. And although there have been a couple of close calls, no Airbus has ever crashed because of the sort of computer failure that skeptics so deeply feared. Airbus didn't just fight the need to improve their designs. They just kept improving on their designs and fixed what needed to be fixed. I'm not sure why Boeing and Airbus are being treated equivalently by you and the other commenter. Especially since the two situations are nothing alike. Boeing hid MCAS to avoid a new type rating. The Airbus A320 just had new types of systems that would continue to be iterated on over time and were simply new. |
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I think you misunderstood my intention in posting these links. I'm actually not sure how, since I pointed out clearly in the original text how the cases are very different. I posted them with the intent of "this is arguably the most like that, which is still very different". Maybe to hammer it down more, I gauge the Boeing case to be criminal, the Airbus examples not, and it's worth comparing the manufacturer conduct in these cases.
The common theme is software assists increasing complexity and the likelihood of the operator's thinking to diverge from the machine. I find that interesting personally and professionally (I make safety-critical vehicles with high degrees of automation for a living). If you want some interesting reading, I still recommend them.