|
|
|
|
|
by sho_hn
487 days ago
|
|
> I'm not sure why Boeing and Airbus are being treated equivalently by you and the other commenter. I think you misunderstood my intention in posting these links. I'm actually not sure how, since I pointed out clearly in the original text how the cases are very different. I posted them with the intent of "this is arguably the most like that, which is still very different". Maybe to hammer it down more, I gauge the Boeing case to be criminal, the Airbus examples not, and it's worth comparing the manufacturer conduct in these cases. The common theme is software assists increasing complexity and the likelihood of the operator's thinking to diverge from the machine. I find that interesting personally and professionally (I make safety-critical vehicles with high degrees of automation for a living). If you want some interesting reading, I still recommend them. |
|
implies that Airbus and Boeing should be treated similarly. When the issue isn't necessary the automation or software, it's how each company behaves in situations where there are serious faults or deficiencies with their designs.