[brightball]

I filled out a ton of enterprise questionnaires on this stuff before and we just told people that it would be deleted when the backups expired after X days because we didn't have the capability to delete specific rows from our backups. Nobody ever argued.

There's not a single customer I've ever run across who's going to halt a contract because you can't purge their data from your backups fast enough. They're signing up because of what you offer, not the termination clause.

[e1g]

A recent example from the other side: a client contacts me and says they will have to exit from our existing contract unless we can update our (AWS) infrastructure to use their (AWS) encryption keys for servers and databases handling their tenancy. In Enterprise, some tenants are very opinionated about what cloud you use and how their data lives/flows within it. I run all our infosec, including SOC2 & ISO27001 programs, and I know that using their encryption keys is nothing but security theater. But with $500k p.a. on the line, I also know when it's showtime.

[brightball]

Fwiw, we also priced in dedicated database instances for people who wanted it where we had that capability. For the extra costs, nobody ever took us up on it.

[victor9000]

This is the right answer. You always say yes, and tell them how much it will cost. Then you can sit back and enjoy the sweet sound of crickets.

[mixmastamyk]

Or "cha-ching!"

[POPOSYS]

Would you please like to explain why "using their encryption keys is nothing but security theater"? Thanks!

[X-Istence]

If you give me access to use your KMS key to encrypt/decrypt an EBS volume, and grant me access to that EBS volume/mount it to an AWS EC2 instance I manage, I can read/write data on that EBS volume all day long.

The fact that you own the KMS key doesn't stop me from reading/writing that EBS volume. It doesn't offer any additional security guarantees, especially if I was already encrypting the EBS volumes with a KMS key.

If I am a SaaS offering, whether I use a KMS key I own or one you own doesn't change the fact that I still have access to all of the unencrypted data that is silently being encrypted by those KMS keys, I've got access to the layer above it.

Sure, if the contract ended they could revoke the KMS key and now the data on the EBS volumes is no longer readable by me, but any backups I have of that data is still within my purview.

[vlovich123]

Human systems (contracts/legal) step in when technological systems can’t. Until there’s homomorphic encryption, enforcing that you’re using their key can give them piece of mind that they can revoke it. While true that you could be doing anything with that data, a contract in good standing and normal human ethics probably adds a high degree of likelihood that you’re not. However, if the relationship sours, they want the freedom to revoke quickly without needing your good will. If your backups aren’t using their keys, I think you’d be violating the contract.

But yes, from a purely technological perspective security theater. They could also misunderstand what’s happening and it’s also not worth it to try to explain for you at the risk of losing the contract.

[X-Istence]

I don't know how this is for others, but in the environments I am in we use a different KMS key for our backups so that if something were to happen, like a mis-click in a web interface or an accidental terraform destroy, we can recover the data.

It is also stored in a different location than the original (different AWS account).

[buzer]

The only real extra protection that I can think of that they get is that they can revoke the access at any time (e.g. right after terminating contract). If someone malicious gets into the provider's AWS account it's highly likely that they can get the access to the running machines and extract the data. I guess if attacker is stupid and just tries to restore the encrypted backup it could alert the customer instead of just the provider assuming that's a non-standard operation.

If there was a very deep integration, essentially column-level, it could make a lot more sense, but that could give quite a big performance & cost hit as well as limit what you can do (essentially you wouldn't be able to do any matching on content level).

[e1g]

Other comments from X-Istence, vlovich123, and buzer are correct. If our apps/admins can get to client data, using their keys does not help to mitigate any plausible attack vector. If we become hostile or compromised, their data is toast anyway. Adding this technical control increases friction and makes the overall system more rigid/brittle but does nothing to increase security. Hence "security theater".

Other examples of such meaningless-and-impotent controls in infosec include "must run a firewall on your Linux server on a private subnet", and any policy requiring password complexity/rotation. But as a business, it's more productive for us to just tick the checkboxes than to spend resources on educating the market about the actual best practice (unless you're in the business of education).

[LAC-Tech]

Interesting that they are so privy to how you administer stuff. Would they have terminated on the spot if you had been using azure or google or digital ocean? Or was using AWS in the initial contract?

[e1g]

We had cases when a prospect said we must use AWS (because that's what they use, and are comfortable with how our data bridges would work/integrate), and when a prospect said we must not use AWS (because they are in retail and want to avoid feeding the 1,000-pound gorilla that's mauling them).

I don't want to imply this is common - it's not. Such cases come from the "arbitrary enterprise rules" side rather than the "SaaS/tech" side.

[voberoi]

This is the way -- also never had an issue across US healthcare and enterprise SaaS.

[coenhyde]

i did the same with the same results

[wahnfrieden]

same. but! it’s a liability nonetheless, go talk with legal etc

[mikeodds]

thirded