| > Note that what i refer to is not about breaking any standard API but adding a secondary one that is explicitly about secret/sensitive stuff. But it still requires developers to use a new API. So why get them to used a half arsed security enclave when you can design a proper secrets store instead? > If the source of the data to be placed in the secure clipboard (for lack of a better name) is some encrypted storage (like a local secrets manager) or a plain text file is irrelevant here. It’s very relevant because: * clipboards are temporary which means you need to copy data into them. This creates an extra step for users to follow as opposed to applications querying the secrets store directly * clipboards don’t have RBAC unlike password stores. Which means any application with permissions to read from the clipboard can read any secret that any other application had written to it. Your solution of having an additional permissions set where you chose which applications have that permission is solved with secrets store where each application only has permission to the secrets it creates. Thus zero risk of leakage * secrets managers are encrypted, clipboard isn’t * secrets managers can store multiple secrets, a clipboard cannot. Thus you then still need to have a secrets manager to copy your password into the clipboard anyway. So why not do away with that middleman entirely? I get the incentive of wanting to “fix” the clipboard but if you’re going to introduce a new API for secrets then you might as well do it properly from the outset. |
Because the entire point of this is NOT to store something but to transfer something from one application to another without both applications explicitly knowing about each other (so they can't just communicate in a P2P fashion). The rest of your message is about storing data, which is not what the clipboard use is all about. Which is why i wrote it is irrelevant - you refer to something else.
E.g.
> clipboards are temporary which means you need to copy data into them. This creates an extra step for users to follow as opposed to applications querying the secrets store directly
The API i mention is not about permanently storing data, it is explicitly about having a secure temporary store with the same(ish) UX as a clipboard but for secure data.
Applications can also use a secure store for that and the data that is being copied to the secure clipboard could also come from an application that stores its own data to it from there, but again this is a separate issue, this is orthogonal to what a discuss here.
> secrets managers are encrypted, clipboard isn’t
This is irrelevant as the data isn't stored elsewhere outside the memory of the process that would manage the secure clipboard's functionality (and of course you could encrypt that if you'd like but IMO that'd be pointless since it'd need to be decrypted at some point anyway and these would be meant for temporary storage - regardless of you do or not encrypt it though it'd be again orthogonal to the rest of what i describe).
> secrets managers can store multiple secrets, a clipboard cannot. Thus you then still need to have a secrets manager to copy your password into the clipboard anyway. So why not do away with that middleman entirely?
Because this isn't about storage.
> if you’re going to introduce a new API for secrets then you might as well do it properly from the outset.
That'd be a "proper" solution for a different problem, hence barely a solution at all.