| > I do not know why you mention Windows, i never referred to any specific platform Because this is already a solved problem on all popular platforms aside from Windows. Plus others earlier in this discussion singled Windows out too (likely for the same reason I cited above). > Linux does not actually have what you describe because Linux is a kernel and what you describe is something that would live on the userland - the userland heavily relies on what software is installed It’s pretty normal for people to talk about Linux as a computing platform. You know this yourself so making the “it’s just a kernel” argument is next level pedantry. > and many setups, like mine, do not have such a thing I’d put money on you having one installed and not even realising it (eg gnome-keyring, which is a dependency for many desktop applications even without having gnome installed) > What i refer is how to provide a more secure approach to to THE SAME THING that people are already doing with clipboard copy/paste without breaking the versatility of the clipboard I understood what your approach was. The issue isn’t that I don’t understand it. The issue is that you are unwilling to accept the last 20 years of development in this field. I mean have you never even used password management in Firefox / Chrome? Avoiding the need of clipboard for sharing secrets is a security and usability feature. Your solution is terrible in comparison and this is precisely why browsers have integrated password stores. > What you refer to is having a different workflow, have applications add explicit support for the specific data mentioned and be accessed in a different way and up to the last reply you were referring to permanent storage. Your solution was to add a new API. You stated that explicitly. You then said users should authorise which applications have authority to use that API, that’s a new workflow too. The standard approach (ie that way the industry works, this isn’t something I’ve just made up) allows applications to communicate directly to your secrets store. This doesn’t add a new workflow, it removes an existing one entirely. Plus you still need to copy your passwords from somewhere to use your API so why bother with it in the first place? It’s literally just adding in a process for the sake of it. Except that process is insecure, a usability nightmare and contradicts decades of established solutions in this precise domain. The fact that you’re refusing to even look into this concept is astonishing tbh > am just not referring to the same stuff you do. indeed, your stubbornly clinging onto a terrible idea and rejecting decades of industry best practices. The idea you’re proposing has already been superseded by years of research and development towards much better solutions. And you can install them right now if you wanted. I’m not making this shit up. |
In this case the "pedantry" makes sense because...
> I’d put money on you having one installed and not even realising it (eg gnome-keyring, which is a dependency for many desktop applications even without having gnome installed)
...i do not have such a thing. I use plain Xorg with Window Maker and i have removed anything i deemed unnecessary from my PC.
> The issue isn’t that I don’t understand it.
No you do not understand it because you wrote:
> I mean have you never even used password management in Firefox / Chrome? Avoiding the need of clipboard for sharing secrets is a security and usability feature. Your solution is terrible in comparison and this is precisely why browsers have integrated password stores.
My solution is to *NOT* use the clipboard *exactly* because it is not secure for the reason mentioned in the *linked article*! Which is why i mention a *second* API to exist *alongside* the current one. The only reason i use the term "clipboard" is because from a usability perspective (for both the users and, for the most part, the programmers) the use will be the same so it is the closest to understand.
> Your solution was to add a new API. You stated that explicitly.
Yes i did. I explicitly wrote that new applications can use it, existing applications can be made to support it and with some minimal effort from the user even existing applications that do not support it can be made to do it.
> You then said users should authorise which applications have authority to use that API, that’s a new workflow too.
No i never mentioned that, in fact i never even mentioned how that part would work. Here, this is what i originally wrote: "that you can lock as tight as you want with explicit permissions for reading it, notifications for writing to it and whatever else you want."
> The standard approach (ie that way the industry works, this isn’t something I’ve just made up) allows applications to communicate directly to your secrets store.
Because...
> Plus you still need to copy your passwords from somewhere
...i do not...
> to use your API so why bother with it in the first place?
...refer to just passwords.
This is about *ANYTHING* that can go on the clipboard that can be sensitive. This is about stuff that is temporary. *THIS IS NOT ABOUT PERMANENT STORAGE*.
I already wrote that stuff, gave examples and yet you claim that i am the one who is "stubbornly clinging" to my idea.
How about following the HN commenting guideline about "Please respond to the strongest plausible interpretation of what someone says, not a weaker one that's easier to criticize. Assume good faith" and using your imagination to try and understand what i refer to instead of calling me stubborn?
If you do that you may realize that what i describe isn't even incompatible with secure stores and can be functionality that is provided by them.