| > But it still requires developers to use a new API. So why get them to used a half arsed security enclave when you can design a proper secrets store instead? Because the entire point of this is NOT to store something but to transfer something from one application to another without both applications explicitly knowing about each other (so they can't just communicate in a P2P fashion). The rest of your message is about storing data, which is not what the clipboard use is all about. Which is why i wrote it is irrelevant - you refer to something else. E.g. > clipboards are temporary which means you need to copy data into them. This creates an extra step for users to follow as opposed to applications querying the secrets store directly The API i mention is not about permanently storing data, it is explicitly about having a secure temporary store with the same(ish) UX as a clipboard but for secure data. Applications can also use a secure store for that and the data that is being copied to the secure clipboard could also come from an application that stores its own data to it from there, but again this is a separate issue, this is orthogonal to what a discuss here. > secrets managers are encrypted, clipboard isn’t This is irrelevant as the data isn't stored elsewhere outside the memory of the process that would manage the secure clipboard's functionality (and of course you could encrypt that if you'd like but IMO that'd be pointless since it'd need to be decrypted at some point anyway and these would be meant for temporary storage - regardless of you do or not encrypt it though it'd be again orthogonal to the rest of what i describe). > secrets managers can store multiple secrets, a clipboard cannot. Thus you then still need to have a secrets manager to copy your password into the clipboard anyway. So why not do away with that middleman entirely? Because this isn't about storage. > if you’re going to introduce a new API for secrets then you might as well do it properly from the outset. That'd be a "proper" solution for a different problem, hence barely a solution at all. |
If you want to pass secrets securely between applications then you use a secrets manager. It’s how Linux and macOS work. It’s how secure systems in the cloud works. And thus it makes complete sense for Windows to follow suit. We aren’t talking about some theoretical concept here. It is absolutely how passing secrets between applications should be done.
If you have scepticism about this approach then you need to read up in this topic rather than pushing for a half baked kludge around something you’ve already acknowledged isn’t fit for security.
Sorry if this sounds blunt but this is a solved problem you’re trying to re-engineer and your solution is worse than the industry standard in a number of ways which I’ve already highlighted. And ironically it isn’t even just worse for security but also worse for usability well (you’re creating administrative overhead with the user approving safe applications. This wouldn’t be needed with a secrets manager since each application only has visibility of its own enclave). And if you remember back to your first post, usability was the entire reason you designed this solution in the first place.