No. These questions have been well explained by a couple of old French philosophers, but they're usually presented in such a weak form ("weak man") that their answers aren't appreciated.
Pascal's infamous wager, for instance. It's usually rendered in the form of salvation and probability, but it's better for modern people to think of it in terms of meaning rather than salvation, and the probabilistic part of it can be simplified away.
Instead of asking, "Is there a God", ask first, "Does anything matter in any meaningful sense?".
If the answer is no, then one of the things which doesn't matter, is what you answer to that question. So you might as well answer yes. But if the answer is yes, then you should definitively answer yes, no matter what thing matters (because clearly, it also matters that it matters).
A better version of the argument in Pascal's wager is thus that "nihilism isn't more reasonable than the alternatives, even on its own terms". So you might as well have positive beliefs (though which ones, this argument can't answer). Bringing in probabilities is not necessary.
The classic argument against Pascal's wager is "but what if there's a God who will punish you from following the logic of this argument?". You can make that argument in a non-probabilistic way too, and suggest that maybe the positive meaning of existence is to not buy into arguments about the positive meaning of existence.
But that is rejected by another much misunderstood French philosopher's argument, Descartes' demon. The argument is that if there's some demon messing with my thoughts and perceptions to make me come to exactly the wrong solutions, then I am screwed anyway. Outsmarting it by definition won't work. So obviously, we might as well reject this assumption too.
To sum up, we reject the assumption that we have no meaning in the universe, because if that is true, we might as well. And we reject the assumption that the universe is out to get us, because if that is true, it makes no difference what we think.
Precisely. If atheists are correct and there is not a god, you gain/lose nothing. However if the other side is correct and God does exist, the risk of existential woe is unfathomable. (None of this describes a personal perspective, merely things I’ve read)
The refutation that occurs to me (and has been raised before) is thus: if your belief in a god is wholly predicated on self preservation (avoiding eternal damnation/suffering/etc), and not motivated by the moral tenets of the religion, does that not defeat the purpose of being a believer? More to the point, if a god is all-powerful and all-knowing (or at the very least has some supernatural insight into human drives and motivations), there is little chance of deceiving the deity into accepting you as a true believer.
I would say a better reading of pascal's wager is to live your life morally and compassionately (relative to social norms), and accept that any god that may exist will judge you based on the character of your actions and decisions, and not on adherance to strict dogma.
That is exactly the "straw" interpretation I tried to argue against. It's not about God, at least not on this point.
It's about existential nihilism being pointless on its own terms. If you ask the question, "why does this matter" (and "this" can be absolutely anything) you've already assumed some things matter more than others. We absolutely won't get anywhere talking about God if we don't talk about this first.
Gnosticism/Agnosticism are, for all practical purposes, useless terms.
Gnosticism is what you know.
Theism is what you believe.
The two words are splitting hairs, the difference is just the level of certainty. You don't wait for absolute knowledge to act. You act on your beliefs.
A-gnosticism is a lack of total knowledge
A-theism is a lack in a belief in a god.
The definition of atheism is a lack in a belief in a god, not a claim that gods don't exist. There are some atheists who believe that no god's exist, but that is something extra beyond atheism.
Pascal's infamous wager, for instance. It's usually rendered in the form of salvation and probability, but it's better for modern people to think of it in terms of meaning rather than salvation, and the probabilistic part of it can be simplified away.
Instead of asking, "Is there a God", ask first, "Does anything matter in any meaningful sense?".
If the answer is no, then one of the things which doesn't matter, is what you answer to that question. So you might as well answer yes. But if the answer is yes, then you should definitively answer yes, no matter what thing matters (because clearly, it also matters that it matters).
A better version of the argument in Pascal's wager is thus that "nihilism isn't more reasonable than the alternatives, even on its own terms". So you might as well have positive beliefs (though which ones, this argument can't answer). Bringing in probabilities is not necessary.
The classic argument against Pascal's wager is "but what if there's a God who will punish you from following the logic of this argument?". You can make that argument in a non-probabilistic way too, and suggest that maybe the positive meaning of existence is to not buy into arguments about the positive meaning of existence.
But that is rejected by another much misunderstood French philosopher's argument, Descartes' demon. The argument is that if there's some demon messing with my thoughts and perceptions to make me come to exactly the wrong solutions, then I am screwed anyway. Outsmarting it by definition won't work. So obviously, we might as well reject this assumption too.
To sum up, we reject the assumption that we have no meaning in the universe, because if that is true, we might as well. And we reject the assumption that the universe is out to get us, because if that is true, it makes no difference what we think.