[ostrophonics]

This sort of thing is always by turns boring and frustrating to read, because there are good and interesting philosophical criticisms to be made of Foucault's epistemology, but the idea that for him facticity itself is questionable isn't one of them. Foucault is never really in doubt about what constitutes, e.g., an event, occurrence, or fact - actually his entire corpus very self-consciously relies on having a common set of texts that we agree constitute accounts of what happened in a given field of inquiry in a given time period. Foucault's epistemology strongly requires and insists on the objectivity of the archive. He wouldn't be able to make authoritative claims about the historical importance of Kantian representation, or Bentham's pantopticon, if he didn't think the archive of philosophical and scientific writings had some objective merit that wasn't in question. He's emphatically not the moral relativist he's made out to be by low-hanging fruit conservatism like this. What he - and a lot of his colleagues in France at the time - wanted to know was whether the system of interpretations that has accrued around this archive has gotten to the bottom of what our 19th century forebears were really up to when they were, for instance, busy examining the shapes of skulls to determine personality traits.

[Veen]

There would be little problem if his methods were confined to examining questions such as the truth of phrenology, the ideological presumptions that made it an appealing set of beliefs, and power relations that motivated them. Unfortunately, his followers (and Foucault himself) cast a far wider net than that, to the point at which power-knowledge becomes the predominant or even the only acceptable analytical framework in some fields. While that may not be entirely Foucault's fault, it is harmful nevertheless.

[FooBarBizBazz]

The Focaultian mindset makes you twitchy, paranoid, and hostile.

We think of it as "of the Left", but there's also nothing to stop "the Right" from buying the idea that everything is just about Power. Then if you keep at that line of thought pretty soon you turn into a Nazi. Or at the very least, you will hear all claims from "the Left" about "care" or "empathy" with knowing cynicism.

And my perception is that these ideas have begun to spread subliminally throughout the culture, particularly among people who are younger or more educated. Everyone becomes more guarded. The social anxiety ramps up. The persona you see is increasingly a mask. The wall goes up a mile high and ten feet thick.

Have you ever met a friendly dog (stereotypically, perhaps, a golden retriever), that has never been mistreated? It will walk up to you wagging its tail; it is happy to meet you, because you are a person, and people, it has learned, are friendly and good.

Next: Have you met a skittish street-dog, the kind that shop-owners kick and curse as a cur, that walks around with nimble jumpy motions, with its tail between its legs?

The dog is a social animal, and is a model for humans. I observe that we humans are turning into the second, skittish type. You could call it a process of "de-domestication". We are all going feral. Uncivilized.

Life as a social animal is difficult to tolerate when your amygdala is constantly firing around others. But that's exactly the emotional effect of these ideas. And they are infecting everyone.

[whimsicalism]

You blame this "de-domestication", this guardedness, on the spread of Foucault-esque ideas about the nature of truth.

My counter-hypothesis - maybe this is what happens when the heights of power and wealth keep getting higher and higher. We are transforming more and more into a dog-eat-dog society. This is how civilizations have fallen repeatedly over the past and we are increasingly turning to a new gilded age.

[robertlagrant]

A lot more wealth and power these days is coming from value creation rather than political or historical roots. Or, as was the case of the gilded age, people from poor countries migrating to a country that was rapidly enriching its citizens.

[whimsicalism]

A majority of private wealth is inherited (not earned as income) by the top 5% wealthiest households.

How is inheriting wealth creating value?

[ostrophene]

Foucault's biggest inspirations were Nietzsche, where Foucault gets the basic notion of power's universal systematicity (everything is already/can be articulated as a master/slave relation); and Heidegger, for whom the core essence of Being was always and eternally retreating from sight. combine these two notions and you get someone endlessly searching for a power he knows is screwing him but which he can't see or hear or touch. and combine THAT with generally declining career prospects for left-leaning Anglos studying continental philosophy... yes i'd say you have yourself a personality type.

[naravara]

> but there's also nothing to stop "the Right" from buying the idea that everything is just about Power.

I think this ship sailed long long ago.

[082349872349872]

So what is power-knowledge? Any suggested introductions?

After a quick skim of https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/foucault/#HistPris I think I can relate the idea of power-knowledge to something with which I am much more familiar: closed loop control theory.

Under that model, it makes sense that one's ability to control would be dependent not only upon how good one's effectors may be ("power"?) but also upon how good one's sensors may be ("knowledge"?). (let alone questions of system identification!)

But that could easily be me using the wrong prism ("observability/controllability") for analysis.

[knowhy]

I'm not familiar enough with closed loop control theory to make a statement if the analogy is appropriate. But a quick skim is definitive not enough to get an understanding of Foucault. However these two quotes from the plato article should make a good starting point:

> The key idea of the archaeological method is that systems of thought and knowledge (epistemes or discursive formations, in Foucault’s terminology) are governed by rules, beyond those of grammar and logic, that operate beneath the consciousness of individual subjects and define a system of conceptual possibilities that determines the boundaries of thought in a given domain and period.

> On Foucault’s account, the relation of power and knowledge is far closer than in the familiar Baconian engineering model, for which “knowledge is power” means that knowledge is an instrument of power, although the two exist quite independently. Foucault’s point is rather that, at least for the study of human beings, the goals of power and the goals of knowledge cannot be separated: in knowing we control and in controlling we know.

[rvense]

I didn't read the linked article yet, but to me, Foucault really is one of the most interesting intellectuals of the 20th century (or longer) - if only because of how differently people perceive him. There's that old debate between him and Chomsky, and it's incredible how different people will score that debate. Some see obscurantist posturing versus Chomsky's towering, rigourous intellect, where others see Chomsky outclassed so thoroughly he doesn't even understand what's going on.

(If you happen to be on the latter team, it's a meme format: https://foucaultnews.files.wordpress.com/2020/10/foucault-20...)

[steveklabnik]

One of my favorite takes on this debate, from a software developer: http://byfat.xxx/chomsky

(SFW even though it's on an .xxx domain)

(It is "this debate" in a broader sense, not this specific debate, which I also happen to love. I both agree with you that it is amazing how everyone sees what they want to see in that debate, and also am in the "lol Chomsky got owned so hard he didn't even know what was going on" camp.)

[svat]

The position taken in that post is an even more severe indictment of "postmodernism" than anything Chomsky (or even anyone in this thread) wrote: it is saying, basically, that postmodernists intentionally adopt a dialect and "styles of discourse" to turn off people like Chomsky and drive them away from its circles.

If true, this is even worse than simply being obscure, wrong, muddle-headed, nonsensical, or whatever. By default my assumption when encountering stuff I don't understand is that there's something meaningful and useful being attempted to be communicated, and if I just work harder I may be able to get something of value out of it. But if the claim here is true (would most postmodernists agree, BTW? have they said something to that effect?)—namely that, let alone failing to be clear, they're not even trying (worse, actively trying not to be clear to everyone)—then I can just ignore them completely, as they're not even operating in good faith. Being wrong is just an intellectual failure that can happen to all of us; being intentionally unclear is almost a moral failure. (Or at least, it's diametrically opposed to my values, and while I can recognize the possibility of other systems of values, I have no wish to engage with a community rejecting this value.)

(BTW, the link in that 2012 post to Chomsky's post is broken, but it's saved here: https://web.archive.org/web/20120711000559/http://cscs.umich... — it's not quite that, as the post claims, Chomsky threw out everything "on the basis of dialect alone", but what he asks in that post is for examples of all that "theory" throwing up some practical conclusion that wasn't already well-known. He also points out that in say, physics or mathematics, where too he may not understand everything, "I can ask friends who work in these areas to explain it to me at a level that I can understand, and they can do so, without particular difficulty" — but this is not true of (what is/was called) "[critical] theory".)

[fenderbluesjr]

The link provided was just an elaborate way of saying 'postmodernism is good, Chomsky doesn't get it'. It doesn't tell you what the novel 'ways of thinking' are, just asserts that they are there and require 'investing serious time' to grasp. There's no defense here and I don't see how you can appreciate this take unless you are already firmly decided beforehand and just like seeing people you disagree with pilloried

[steveklabnik]

Not every piece of writing is trying to convince, it's true.

FWIW, I don't see the piece as saying "postmodernism is good." And I think the final two paragraphs are good bits of advice, regardless of the topic at hand.

[ostrophene]

very good take here, and it gets to the heart of the issue: Chomsky comes out of the analytic tradition where the goal is to rigorously explain and define everything that can't quite be pinned down by mathematical symbolization. French intellectual traditions owe way more to existentialism and phenomenology, where the goal is rather to understand experiences in new, historically appropriate ways. the latter partakes, even where Foucault, for instance, is apparently undertaking a historical analysis, far more of poetic language, because the thinking is "we here in history are disclosing the historically unthought that everyone before us couldn't see"

[Bodell]

Can you share a link? The only videos I’ve ever seen are either a short clip or not translated. Maybe a written transcript would be best.

[wazoox]

Here you go: https://youtu.be/3wfNl2L0Gf8

[rvense]

I think the longest version that exists is just over one hour with some narration in between. I've watched it recently on Youtube, but I didn't save the link.

[zyxzevn]

Complexity and language:

It is always funny how long boring sentences are found in philosophy. I think the problem is that our language is lacking in clarity for describing the subtle nuances of reasoning and logic.

And sadly it is a bit confusing. Especially if one (like me), does not know all the people listed in the paragraphs.

Personally I tend to shorten the sentences and focus on the presentation of the information in logical blocks. While it may not read as glorious, it can improve the clarity of the information. Maybe this tendency is related to my background in programming.

What problems did Foucault try to solve?

And I think that your statement is related to the differences in problems that Foucault tried to solve, and problems that we face now.

In his culture people believed that personal traits were related to skull shapes. So the idea that these facts about skull shapes do not really matter, seems very reasonable. Especially we now know that this does not relate at all.

So, the "facts" are related to "beliefs" that give certain values to those "facts". In science we would call those beliefs "models". And while well tested, they have some limits that are relevant.

Pseudo-philosophy or different belief systems?

Some philosophy wants to avoid "facts", here called pseudo-philosophy. But often they do not deny the "facts", but have complete different "beliefs" in which the "facts" do not have the same meaning.

The writer of the article wants to downgrade the "false beliefs" as "pseudo-philosophy". But as a solution, I prefer to look at the limits of the beliefs (or models) that are held on to. This is for both true beliefs and "false beliefs".

Talking about limitations gives an opportunity for dialogs and understanding different sides. People don't feel attacked but feel that they can contribute to mutual knowledge.

And regarding scientific beliefs/models, we may find problems with them, which is essential for scientific progress.

[protonfish]

I don't think the problem is inherent flaws and limitations of our language. In the spirit of "I would have written a shorter letter, but I didn't have the time" I have seen many examples of, with proper effort and skill, highly complex ideas described in clear and simple language.

When you read incomprehensible gobbledygook, it is because the author is being lazy, at best. At worst it is a deliberate attempt to appear as if making a complex point, while saying nothing. Verbose and opaque writing can make one appear intelligent and be a shield from criticism. (If you don't understand me, it's because you aren't smart enough, and until you understand you aren't allowed to criticize.)

Remember, the burden is on the author to be clear and understandable. If they can't be bothered to make the effort, you are under no obligation to believe a single word.

[gmtx725]

Would you apply the same criteria to literature? Film? Art? Why isn't someone like, say, Jackson Pollock as 'clear and understandable' as a renaissance painter?

[User23]

You clearly have a pragmatic mind so perhaps you’ll find this of interest. The problem of clarity has been recognized for a while. CS Peirce took a pretty good stab at it with How to Make Our Ideas Clear[1] and even that is a little dense. Partly due to 19th century prose though.

[1] https://wps.prenhall.com/wps/media/objects/5396/5525631/docu...

[denton-scratch]

> Long boring sentences

OMG Willard Quine!

I was told he was an excellent writer. I accept that his reasoning/arguments were very lucid; I did not find his writing lucid.

> our language is lacking in clarity

I take it you mean English. English is highly allusive and ambiguous. Many words that mean completely different things are spelled the same. Many concepts are referred to by severaal different words, typically imported from different languages, and carrying different connotations. It's a wonderful language for describing things, but not so good for pinning things down.

There's a reason that the language of International Law is French (and just because you speak French, that doesn't mean you have to write like Foucault). German is a pretty matter-of-fact language, very well-suited to philosophical discourse.

If I read someone like Fred Ayer, I have the sense that it would have been easier to understand him if he wrote in German. Wittgenstein's Tractatus I have only ever read in English; but it was originally in German, and even though the Tractatus is more difficult than Ayer, I find it hugely more lucid.

[wnoise]

> English is highly allusive

Absolutely.

> and ambiguous

extremely rarely.

> Many words that mean completely different things are spelled the same

Homographs are rarely a problem precisely because they generally mean completely different things. Inelegant, sure.

> Many concepts are referred to by severaal different words, typically imported from different languages, and carrying different connotations.

Mostly true, but the richness of English vocabulary is the exact opposite of a problem. When you need to distinguish between shades of meaning, having more words available is useful. English doesn't have the problems of using the same word for 'high' and 'tall'; or for 'pasta', 'paste', and 'dough'; or for 'pen' and 'feather'. Loneliness and solitude really are distinguishable states.

[paganel]

> facticity itself

There are facts and facts. The OP thinks that Foucault's (pseudo-)philosophy is against the fact that the Earth is non-flat, or that saying that the Earth is non-flat is somehow infused with ideology, but there are also facts that are given to us as true (and which affect the lives of hundreds of millions of people) which are indeed infused with ideology, one of the latest examples being the "fact" that austerity was the thing to do after the 2008-2010 crisis (a "fact" which has recently been debunked by the IMF itself, originally one of its most important ideological backers).

[elgaard]

That the Earth is non-flat is a fact.

That austerity was the thing to do was never a fact. Even in 2008-2010 it was a much debated policy.

Just because governments do something that you believe is wrong, it does not mean that they have used their power to somehow change the truth.

[ostrophene]

yes. the point of my post was that Foucault, rightly or wrongly, has a clear delineation of what counts as fact and what counts as Fact. we can freely debate the ideological implications of THAT division. but he does not - and this is my point - throw the baby of reliable objective reference out with the bathwater of ideological knowledge formation.

[naravara]

I agree with you. I also thought it was odd that this piece's author specifically called out "the humanities and social sciences" as the main purveyors of "pseudophilosophy" before directing all his fire at Foucault, a philosopher. And then he concludes that the solution to pseudophilosophy is a philosophical education but I'm not sure who in their right minds would argue that Foucault didn't have one of those? Or Sartre, for that matter, who he also called out as a pseudophilosopher.

It starts to make one wonder if his idea of "pseudophilosophy" is really just a new coat of paint over some already well-worn critiques of postmodernism.

[whimsicalism]

Philosophy is in the humanities.

> It starts to make one wonder if his idea of "pseudophilosophy" is really just a new coat of paint over some already well-worn critiques of postmodernism.

I think pretty clearly yes, along with the preceding continental philosophy and also Sam Harris (?).

[BlueTemplar]

I'm interested about this claim :

> This kind of fallacious critique of the notion of objective truth is a particularly pernicious aspect of obscurantist pseudophilosophy in general. Often, it’s due to simple misunderstandings (such as confusing truth with belief or knowledge), but sometimes it’s due rather to wilful obscurity (as in the case of Foucault).

Now, surely if this is a valid claim, it would have been made during Foucault's life ? What did he respond to criticisms like these ?

EDIT : I guess this Foucault/Chomsky debate might answer this question ? I'll have to find time to listen to it... https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26077760

[BlueTemplar]

Yeah, isn't it basically a repeat of Jordan Peterson's criticism of 'French Theory' academics ?

I don't know that much about 'postmodernism', but it seems like both JP and the North American academics responsible for the 'French Theory' are pretty much misunderstanding those French philosophers (which is partially the fault of French philosopher's dense prose, which isn't new for philosophers (I hear some Germans are even worse ?), and maybe also the North American academics being unable to read French, which is new ?

https://medium.com/s/story/peterson-historian-aide-m%C3%A9mo...

https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/french-theory-how-foucault-derrida-...

Funnily enough, Peterson is in a way right about calling their bullshit ? But that's easier than being constructive... (Which he probably also is in that book of his, but self-help isn't philosophy.)

[ostrophene]

French intellectual celebs from the period only started talking postmodernism in the 70s and 80s, after Anglos started asking them about it!

the idea itself is largely derived from Fredric Jameson's writings on it in the 1980s. he characterizes it primarily as a flattening of emotional and historical affect such that all time periods represented in culture fundamentally partake of a liberal market-oriented ideological framework. in that sense, Foucault can be seen as paradigmatic through his willful 'rewriting' of the historical archive.