[modeless]

What if the texting program has a built in feature to print the texts you receive and mail a copy to the company that wrote the program, and it nags you to enable this feature all the time, and most of your friends have it enabled? Because that's a lot closer to the scenario here.

> An unencrypted system-level backup doesn't mean that the program being backed up is failing at security.

iOS programs can choose how their data is backed up. iMessage isn't just getting its data stolen by iCloud accidentally. These backups are a feature of iMessage as much as iCloud. And besides, iCloud is made by the same company, it's not a separate entity.

[Dylan16807]

iMessage itself bugs you to enable backups?

> iOS programs choose how their data is backed up.

Well desktop apps don't. Would you say that no desktop app that saves its key can ever qualify as end-to-end encrypted?

> And besides, iCloud is made by the same company, it's not a separate entity.

I'm not convinced that's relevant to whether the encryption is end-to-end or not.

[modeless]

> Would you say that no desktop app that saves its key can ever qualify as end-to-end encrypted?

I would say that no app can qualify as end-to-end encrypted if a large fraction of users send their data to the maker of the app in a form that can be decrypted by the maker of the app, regardless of the reason.

[Dylan16807]

If iMessage was made by a third party and worked exactly the same then you'd have no objection to calling it end-to-end encrypted?

[modeless]

No. This is a necessary condition for being end-to-end encrypted, not a sufficient one. But iMessage doesn't meet it.

[Dylan16807]

Okay, so if I can't guess your point of view, then it would really help if you would answer the question I asked about desktop apps.