[throwaway2380]

Boisjoly later revealed this memo to the presidential commission investigating the disaster and was then forced to leave Morton Thioklol after been shunned by disgruntled colleagues.

I find this phenomenon so difficult to understand.

[poof131]

Seems fairly standard. He provided feedback that could have prevented a disaster and the managers ignored it. So at the very least, the managers would dislike him for the fact that he illuminated their incompetence, but even more so for the fact that he would be a reminder of the massive tragedy that ensued and for which they were partially to blame. With management's resentment, his peers would have a choice, maintain a friendly relationship with him and risk their careers and management’s wrath, or distance themselves from him.

It’s sad, but the natural tendency of organizations is to close ranks in situations like this. It is incredibly tough to perform an open, honest, self-assessment. The procedures need to be in place to force the self-examination and strong leaders need to push for it. Even then, politics sometimes place the blame on the wrong people. I’ve seen this happen time and time again in the military from working with SF in Iraq [1] to joining a squadron just after a disaster [2].

[1] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/20/world/africa/20iht-20iraq....

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_San_Diego_F/A-18_crash

[pmarreck]

By ending up being the only one who was correct about a catastrophe warning, and being vocal about it in the aftermath, you somehow implicitly throw everyone else under the bus.

Since "everyone else" > "you", majority rules, you go.

It's a bureaucracy problem. I've seen it, and it's also gotten me at least once, when I decided to stick up for principles. My ego left intact, my job did not.

This is also why getting fired should not automatically carry a negative stigma.

I have a counterpoint- I bet that, given any risky endeavour, there are ALWAYS some naysayers/doubters. So the probability that someone at an organization ends up being correct when a disaster occurs, is probably fairly high. Thus, just because you won the disaster prediction lottery, may not entitle you to as much acclaim as you might think.

[deciplex]

> I have a counterpoint- I bet that, given any risky endeavour, there are ALWAYS some naysayers/doubters. So the probability that someone at an organization ends up being correct when a disaster occurs, is probably fairly high. Thus, just because you won the disaster prediction lottery, may not entitle you to as much acclaim as you might think.

Conversely, achieving success despite taking a great number of risks in the process, may not entitle you to the acclaim that you do get.

[csense]

You just found out your company screwed up big, and it turned into people dying and a bunch of geopolitical egg on your country's face, but if everybody keeps quiet, then maybe you'll get lucky and nobody will figure out it was your fault.

But one guy tells the world exactly how you screwed up. Now you're in fear of your reputation and job -- but if he'd just kept his mouth shut, then you might be okay.

[camperman]

You need to read a book called Systemantics by John Gall. It's a hilarious and accurate look at how large systems fail. Although parts are somewhat dated, the principles are the same.

In particular his material on bureaucracies is relevant: when threatened, bureaucracies immediately fight for self-preservation. Boisjoly was threatening the bureaucracy and so had to be eliminated for it to survive. Its actions makes perfect sense in the light of this. Ugly, yes but understandable.

[pmarreck]

If you like books of that nature, have you heard of Thinking in Systems? http://smile.amazon.com/Thinking-Systems-Donella-H-Meadows/d...

[camperman]

I haven't - thanks for the heads up.