[pdpi]

> but I'm more concerned with the moral implication that if we can find a wrong Y that is worse than wrong X, we shouldn't care about X.

Definitely not "shouldn't care". But you should ask yourself "if there's a ton of materially similar things I'm ok with, why should I feel outraged about this one in particular?"

Sometimes the answer is that you shouldn't feel outraged at all, other times the answer will be that you should be outraged at all similar things. It's only rarely that the outrage should be focused on the one particular incident.

[JoeAltmaier]

Utilitarian arguments lead you strange places. You can end up eating children or burning hobos for fuel. Be very careful.

[roarkjs]

All arguments can lean you strange places. They're inconsequential if they don't.

Luckily, the modern pragmatist is also socially aware.

[pc2g4d]

You seem to be judging the worth of an argument by the "strangeness" of its implications. That's a curious standard.

[voteforchange]

I think we would all agree that persuasiveness is an axis upon which to judge arguments. "Strangeness" is far out there on the persuasive axis.

Maybe so far out there that Richard Dawkins and Neil Degrasse Tyson are arguing in the other room... but its on the axis somewhere.