[AnimalMuppet]

I think that I'm arguing on a different level than that link. If all we are is matter obeying the laws of physics, then you can't say "It was wrong to do that" because I couldn't have done anything else. Each of my atoms is just obeying the laws of physics; that's driving my biochemicals according to the laws of biochemistry, and those are driving my neurons according to the laws of neurology. At no place in there do I have anything that looks like free will, or any ability to make a non-programmed choice.

As Sam Harris said, either I'm a deterministic machine, or I'm a random machine, but in neither case do I have moral responsibility for what I do.

[gphil]

You're really bringing the Philosophy major in me out tonight!

First off, naturalism does not necessarily imply determinism. But even given physical determinism, the incompatibility of it and free will is not a certainty:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

The point I'm really trying to make is that there are a lot of smart people who have written on all these topics, and the answers are far from settled.

[AnimalMuppet]

Naturalism (as we currently understand the laws of nature) doesn't totally imply determinism. There is some quantum uncertainty at the lower layers. But that isn't the same as me having free will, because my free will doesn't control the quantum uncertainty.

As for compatibilism... it looks like "you can't totally prove that materialism implies no free will, so it might be possible." No mechanism, not even a guess at one, just "it could still be". Forgive me, but I don't find that very persuasive.

I think that my objection to most of the compatibilism stuff is this: What is the "I" that is going to choose? In a purely naturalist view, all I can be is a collection of matter that obeys the laws of physics, because there's nothing else for me to be. I'm a machine made out of atoms, nothing more. It seems to me that all these compatibilist arguments aren't really taking that seriously. (Perhaps not surprisingly, since they're being made by philosophers, not physicists.) They therefore have some intuitive, experience-based idea of what a person is that sneaks in to their arguments, rather than really grappling with the implications of the purely naturalist position.

[gphil]

> What is the "I" that is going to choose?

Another good question!

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/

> It seems to me that all these compatibilist arguments aren't really taking that seriously. (Perhaps not surprisingly, since they're being made by philosophers, not physicists.)

They are. Nothing about naturalism implies "I'm a machine made out of atoms, nothing more." Even granting that I am a machine made out of atoms, I'm not just that. I possess other properties than just being a machine made out of atoms--e.g. those atoms are in a particular location, they can affect other sets of atoms, etc.

Going back to the original point, there's nothing innate about sets of atoms that implies they can't also be the subject of moral assertions. I understand that you may not intuitively agree with this position, but there's nothing about sets of atoms that logically rules out this possibility.

You should actually study the philosophy before dismissing it.

[AnimalMuppet]

To be honest, I'm not going to bother. It's going to be another couple of centuries before compatibilists are finally argued into submission; and the grounds of their "you can't logically rule it out" are going to shift another three or four times before they run out of hiding places.

To me, the physics is pretty convincing. I don't care that philosophers object "but you can't totally rule it out!". There's lots of things I can't totally rule out. That doesn't mean that they should be seriously considered.