[gphil]

> What is the "I" that is going to choose?

Another good question!

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/

> It seems to me that all these compatibilist arguments aren't really taking that seriously. (Perhaps not surprisingly, since they're being made by philosophers, not physicists.)

They are. Nothing about naturalism implies "I'm a machine made out of atoms, nothing more." Even granting that I am a machine made out of atoms, I'm not just that. I possess other properties than just being a machine made out of atoms--e.g. those atoms are in a particular location, they can affect other sets of atoms, etc.

Going back to the original point, there's nothing innate about sets of atoms that implies they can't also be the subject of moral assertions. I understand that you may not intuitively agree with this position, but there's nothing about sets of atoms that logically rules out this possibility.

You should actually study the philosophy before dismissing it.

[AnimalMuppet]

To be honest, I'm not going to bother. It's going to be another couple of centuries before compatibilists are finally argued into submission; and the grounds of their "you can't logically rule it out" are going to shift another three or four times before they run out of hiding places.

To me, the physics is pretty convincing. I don't care that philosophers object "but you can't totally rule it out!". There's lots of things I can't totally rule out. That doesn't mean that they should be seriously considered.