| > that limitations on querying them are enforced only at a policy level. I love it when people throw this out. Virtually every crime is enforced only at a policy level. There are no technical limitations preventing a cop from going from door to door and using his issued weapon to kill everyone inside, but you don't see people crying out to disarm cops to prevent it. > The issue is not about whether there has been abuse. The issue is about the fundamental principles of freedom in our country against suspicion-less search and seizure. It's not suspicion-less - it's done to answer specific questions: are any phone numbers on a given list of foreign terrorist numbers in contact with other phone numbers inside the US? If so, which numbers are they in contact with? It was implemented to address a specific fault found by the 9/11 Commission. I'm personally comfortable with the information collected being used for exactly that purpose, and nothing else (although I'm guessing you're going to come back and say you're not). That's why in evaluating the program, it's critical to look at whether the NSA has deviated from guidelines set down by the courts. Neither of the two review groups recommended shutting down the program, they recommended keeping the phone records at the phone companies instead. > First, it seems you agree with the parent? You don't dispute him, just add an addendum about minimization. I'm taking issue with cherry picking quotes to make a point. > The issue is that the collection is done in the first place without a person being suspected of a crime. Their content can be collected, then it can be decided if they are suspect of a crime or not, and then it may possibly be released. This is principally different than how law enforcement is supposed to work in the United States. This isn't law enforcement, it's foreign intelligence. The document in question pertains to Section 702 collection, which is targeted against specific e-mail addresses/accounts/identifiers used by foreigners. There already has to be a stated foreign intelligence purpose to collect against that specific address to begin with. The document further goes on to direct analysts to destroy any collected information that pertains to US persons is not of foreign intelligence value. > Another thing we learned from the Obama Administration oversight panel is that anything within three hops of a target is considered relevant for collection (and the hops are counted across Facebook, Twitter, AIM, Snapchat, LinkedIn, Gmail, phone, geolocation, etc). There's nothing in the PCLOB report that says that. The report makes it pretty clear that the whole three hop process pertains to phone records. > but I would also classify his statement as accurate It's inaccurate because he states that the NSA can hand attorney-client communications over to federal prosecutors, when the document he's citing says the exact opposite. > almost reads like... parallel construction... How could it be parallel construction if the person is already indicted? The entire point of that section is to protect client-attorney communications - if the purpose was to feed intelligence to US law enforcement by circumventing client-attorney privilege, why would they put in those additional restrictions? |
No. This is not the case.
Take some of the records (Skype for example) that the NSA had to contact companies with judges signatures to get. This is enforced by a separation of powers.
I'm not sure you addressed the main point, or admitted that in the reports they disclosed that the NSA did have direct full takes of the data (which you had been arguing against).
> It's not suspicion-less - it's done to answer specific questions
This is a false dichotomy. You can try to answer specific questions without suspicion of guilt. This is what is happening. They are answering specific questions, but they don't have suspicion of guilt.
An alternative is to get a warrant on the 'known terrorists' (which in practice is used very rarely for 'terrorist' and very often for other interests) and see directly who they have been contacting without having to see that I called my my babysitter and you called your attorney in the meantime. I mean, if that's all they were doing and that's all they needed, this would be a solution. (It's not all they are doing.)
> I'm personally comfortable with the information collected being used for exactly that purpose, and nothing else
You may want to look into what else is being done with the records. Phone and otherwise.
> I'm taking issue with cherry picking quotes to make your point.
But you didn't. I suggest rereading your comment.
> This isn't law enforcement, it's foreign intelligence.
It's foreign intelligence that is collecting vast swaths of information on American people. This information can be used to investigate Americans without going through normal investigative channels. It is law enforcement, though you can mince words. If you prefer we can call it foreign intelligence so long as we remind ourselves that it is principally different than how foreign intelligence is supposed to work in the United States.
> There's nothing in the PCLOB report that says that. The report makes it pretty clear that the whole three hop process pertains to phone records.
Perhaps I've confused PCLOB revealed information with the technical information revealed in Snowden documents then? I fear we'll need to drag out technical documents to resolve this specific dispute. But even if you don't take the other networks into account three hops is still huge, especially with a large number of targets. It is gross overcollection without selectors.
> It's inaccurate because he states that the NSA can hand attorney-client communications over to federal prosecutors, when the document he's citing says the exact opposite.
Perhaps he should have said attorneys? Were it destined for prosecutors, the intelligence will make its way to prosecutors later (when and if there is a trial).
> How could it be parallel construction if the person is already indicted?
Because parallel construction can be done to collect evidence and because the gathered intelligence can be used in the indictment of other targets - and here the source of the intelligence used to do this remains undisclosed. And because communications (as written below) contain records from before an indictment, which will contain lots of information useful to get an indictment and lots of useful information to a prosecution after an indictment.
Also we should note that the NSA only marks attorney-client communications a no-go after there has been an indictment: attorney-client communications are a confidential and privileged communication whether you are on trial, expect to be indicted, or are talking to your attorney about what you should do to avoid legal trouble because of what your peers are engaged in.
> if the purpose was to feed intelligence to US law enforcement by circumventing client-attorney privilege, why would they put in those additional restrictions?
If we grant that 'the purpose was to...' then the answer is: to comply with - or to appear to comply with - the law of the land in the most minimal way.
But we should be careful. The question of whether something is used for a purpose is a separate one than what it was designed for. If there is opportunity and there is motive there will be cases.