| > Virtually every crime is enforced only at a policy level. No. This is not the case. Take some of the records (Skype for example) that the NSA had to contact companies with judges signatures to get. This is enforced by a separation of powers. I'm not sure you addressed the main point, or admitted that in the reports they disclosed that the NSA did have direct full takes of the data (which you had been arguing against). > It's not suspicion-less - it's done to answer specific questions This is a false dichotomy. You can try to answer specific questions without suspicion of guilt. This is what is happening. They are answering specific questions, but they don't have suspicion of guilt. An alternative is to get a warrant on the 'known terrorists' (which in practice is used very rarely for 'terrorist' and very often for other interests) and see directly who they have been contacting without having to see that I called my my babysitter and you called your attorney in the meantime. I mean, if that's all they were doing and that's all they needed, this would be a solution. (It's not all they are doing.) > I'm personally comfortable with the information collected being used for exactly that purpose, and nothing else You may want to look into what else is being done with the records. Phone and otherwise. > I'm taking issue with cherry picking quotes to make your point. But you didn't. I suggest rereading your comment. > This isn't law enforcement, it's foreign intelligence. It's foreign intelligence that is collecting vast swaths of information on American people. This information can be used to investigate Americans without going through normal investigative channels. It is law enforcement, though you can mince words. If you prefer we can call it foreign intelligence so long as we remind ourselves that it is principally different than how foreign intelligence is supposed to work in the United States. > There's nothing in the PCLOB report that says that. The report makes it pretty clear that the whole three hop process pertains to phone records. Perhaps I've confused PCLOB revealed information with the technical information revealed in Snowden documents then? I fear we'll need to drag out technical documents to resolve this specific dispute. But even if you don't take the other networks into account three hops is still huge, especially with a large number of targets. It is gross overcollection without selectors. > It's inaccurate because he states that the NSA can hand attorney-client communications over to federal prosecutors, when the document he's citing says the exact opposite. Perhaps he should have said attorneys? Were it destined for prosecutors, the intelligence will make its way to prosecutors later (when and if there is a trial). > How could it be parallel construction if the person is already indicted? Because parallel construction can be done to collect evidence and because the gathered intelligence can be used in the indictment of other targets - and here the source of the intelligence used to do this remains undisclosed. And because communications (as written below) contain records from before an indictment, which will contain lots of information useful to get an indictment and lots of useful information to a prosecution after an indictment. Also we should note that the NSA only marks attorney-client communications a no-go after there has been an indictment: attorney-client communications are a confidential and privileged communication whether you are on trial, expect to be indicted, or are talking to your attorney about what you should do to avoid legal trouble because of what your peers are engaged in. > if the purpose was to feed intelligence to US law enforcement by circumventing client-attorney privilege, why would they put in those additional restrictions? If we grant that 'the purpose was to...' then the answer is: to comply with - or to appear to comply with - the law of the land in the most minimal way. But we should be careful. The question of whether something is used for a purpose is a separate one than what it was designed for. If there is opportunity and there is motive there will be cases. |
No, I didn't address, but neither does the linked article - the documents cited state that they can keep encrypted data past 5 years in order to decrypt it. It doesn't say anything about "warrantless bulk collection of encrypted communications". The "warrantless" doesn't make sense in that you don't need a warrant to collect purely foreign communications, and the "bulk" part neither has evidence to back it up nor does it make sense: why would the NSA stored every single piece of encrypted traffic and devote the (expensive) time and energy needed to decrypt it all if they didn't have reason to believe it was of significant value. I'm submitting this comment over HTTPS - there's no reason to store the TCP traffic that accompanies it.
> An alternative is to get a warrant on the 'known terrorists'
They don't need a warrant to collect against foreigners for foreign intelligence purposes; they're not collecting information for use in a criminal indictment.
> This information can be used to investigate Americans without going through normal investigative channels.
Section 702 collection (what I was addressing in my comment and what declan was referring to in his article) can be only be used to target foreigners, not Americans. If there is evidence of them using that legal authority to intentionally target Americans, please do write in to the papers because that's cut and dry illegal.
It seems like you're mixing up the 215 and 702 programs, which collect dramatically different information from completely different groups. 215 is the bulk domestic phone records program - the NSA gets the number called, calling number. date/time, call length and trunk identifier. They don't get the identities behind the phone numbers, locations, etc. 702 is collection against specific foreign targets using US providers - they get the full take on that.
> Perhaps he should have said attorneys?
The relevant part is: "so that appropriate procedures may be established to protect such communications from review or use in any criminal prosecution"
> (It's not all they are doing.)
> You may want to look into what else is being done with the records. Phone and otherwise.
Please enlighten me. My biggest issue with just about all of the reporting that's come out of the Snowden disclosures is that they talk a lot about how the NSA performs collection, but leave out who the who, what and why - often at the same time saying something like "it is unclear whether [or how many] American's communications have been collected". One embarrassing set of articles in particular was the Angry Birds disclosures: the newspapers gawked about how the NSA could be collecting everyone's marital status, incomes, sexual preferences, etc., but it was discovered that the newspapers improperly redacted the documents and the redactions were removed, it turned out that the NSA was using the information to track Al Qaeda in Iraq. I see lots of accusations that the NSA is spying on regular people, but the only disclosures I've seen talking about their targeting are along these lines: http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/09/nsas-strategic-mis...
I've been following this issue closely. To date, I have yet to see any smoking gun showing actual evidence that the NSA is targeting regular Americans or anyone else other than for purposes of gathering foreign intelligence outside the US.