[henryaj]

Depressingly, the document talks about plans to make Tor less reliable to dissuade people from using it:

> Could we set up a lot of really slow Tor nodes ... to degrade the quality of the network? > Given CNE access to a web server make it painful for Tor users?

At least the document seems to confirm that GCHQ has a really, really hard time de-anonymising Tor users.

[haakon]

I'm pretty sure Tor does smart peer profiling/selection to optimize for throughput. Lots of people run Tor relays on their silly little home DSLs and Tor still works.

[eterm]

Which is why the slide also talks about reporting as if being a high throughput node. i.e. Report back that you're handling a lot of traffic quickly while handling traffic very badly. Does Tor have protection against a node doing that?

[plorg]

I'm pretty sure Tor profiles against this as well. There's a presentation somewhere on YouTube addressing just this problem.

[axus]

At the end they debate whether killing Tor would be bad, since if they could exploit it they'd have all the "bad guys" in one place.

[aganders3]

But then the last slide has this:

> Critical mass of targets use Tor. Scaring them away from Tor might be counterproductive.

[milsorgen]

If anything this just encourages me to keep my non-exit relay up as much as possible.

[api]

This could be countered by setting up a lot of fast nodes. Stealthier malicious nodes that selectively drop or tar-pit traffic though would be harder to fight...