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by gnaritas
6296 days ago
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I like the idea that if a company is too big to be allowed to fail, then it's to big to be allowed to exist. After we recover, possibly if, companies like AIG that are single points of failure need to be broken up. I don't know if this is practical or not, but what if future regulation were aimed at limiting the total size/amount of money/whatever that a company is allowed to own with the goal of keeping risk distributed enough so that we wouldn't fear letting bad companies fail? They'd also have to monitor board membership and stock ownership to ensure you didn't end up with hundreds of companies being virtually one giant company behind the scenes all following the same bad policies. I'd imagine this isn't all that dissimilar to dealing with monopolies. Too little competition is bad and now we've learned that allowing any single point of failure is just as bad. As all hackers know, single points of failure are risky, even if a crash is unlikely. Our economies load needs to be better distributed. |
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Interestingly, during the Great Depression there existed laws which limited the number of branches that banks could have. Politicians preferred to keep banks small, fearing the power of larger banks. You see, anti-capitalism and a populist distaste for financiers are nothing new.
Perhaps surprisingly, states that forced banks to be small were the hardest hit by bank failures in the Depression. The tiny, unthreatening banks did not have the margin of error to wait out the financial chaos. Meanwhile, places like Canada that allowed large national banking conglomerates avoided bank failures almost entirely.
Our recent crisis was very different from the Great Depression. Contrary to the 1930s, scale was often a vulnerability, and not an asset. However, the example of the Great Depression ought to drive home to us the danger of optimizing to the last crisis, lest we precipitate a new one in our rashness.
There is also danger in drawing simple, neat lessons from a messy crisis. Scale was not always our enemy. We must remember that several private firms were bailed out, not by public dollars, but by private acquirers. Wachovia's sale to Wells Fargo would have been legal under many of the world's regulatory regimes, and it was legal in the 2008 United States, but it would not have been legal in the 1998 United States when we still had anti-scale laws on the books. If those regulations were still in place, at least a few more large firms would have been at the government's door, hat in hand.
Populism is politically fruitful, but it can wreak havoc on an economy, and it is almost never thoughtful or well-informed. We ought to pause before giving in to its mellifluous rhetoric.