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>"I don't know if this is practical or not, but what if future regulation were aimed at limiting the total size/amount of money/whatever that a company is allowed to own with the goal of keeping risk distributed enough so that we wouldn't fear letting bad companies fail?" Interestingly, during the Great Depression there existed laws which limited the number of branches that banks could have. Politicians preferred to keep banks small, fearing the power of larger banks. You see, anti-capitalism and a populist distaste for financiers are nothing new. Perhaps surprisingly, states that forced banks to be small were the hardest hit by bank failures in the Depression. The tiny, unthreatening banks did not have the margin of error to wait out the financial chaos. Meanwhile, places like Canada that allowed large national banking conglomerates avoided bank failures almost entirely. Our recent crisis was very different from the Great Depression. Contrary to the 1930s, scale was often a vulnerability, and not an asset. However, the example of the Great Depression ought to drive home to us the danger of optimizing to the last crisis, lest we precipitate a new one in our rashness. There is also danger in drawing simple, neat lessons from a messy crisis. Scale was not always our enemy. We must remember that several private firms were bailed out, not by public dollars, but by private acquirers. Wachovia's sale to Wells Fargo would have been legal under many of the world's regulatory regimes, and it was legal in the 2008 United States, but it would not have been legal in the 1998 United States when we still had anti-scale laws on the books. If those regulations were still in place, at least a few more large firms would have been at the government's door, hat in hand. Populism is politically fruitful, but it can wreak havoc on an economy, and it is almost never thoughtful or well-informed. We ought to pause before giving in to its mellifluous rhetoric. |
No surprise, financiers ripping us is nothing new either.
> The tiny, unthreatening banks did not have the margin of error to wait out the financial chaos. Meanwhile, places like Canada that allowed large national banking conglomerates avoided bank failures almost entirely.
Perhaps they didn't set the right limits, kept them too small. Because we failed to get it right once doesn't mean we should stop trying and just accept being ripped off as a cost of doing business.
Either we figure out how to regulate the market such that this won't happen in the future or we nationalize the banking industry like others have done and admit that the only thing that's really to big to fail is the government.
> There is also danger in drawing simple, neat lessons from a messy crisis.
That, I agree with. But our current system has clearly failed, something needs to be done, time for another experiment.
> We ought to pause before giving in to its mellifluous rhetoric.
Talking about possible solutions on a website is pausing, it's not like we're implementing policy here or anything. It's just an interesting things to speculate about.