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by Myrmornis 14 days ago
It's an allopatric population. It's one of the great embarrassments of biology. The question "is this population part of the same 'species' as this other population" is simply not defined in biology when they are allopatric. Look at your country's bird identification guide. If you're in Europe or N. America you'll find lots of "species" that are just allopatric populations accompanied by some mtDNA / sound recording data claiming they're "sufficiently" distinct.

It shouldn't be controversial to say that this is nonsense. The main problem is that it is challenging for conservation biology to admit that 'species' isn't well defined in allopatry. That is indeed unfortunate. But, science can't be politics.

Think about it: there's nothing about the laws of physics, chemistry, or fundamental biology that implies that all populations must be clearly assignable to distinct categories. What biology says is that sexual eukaryotic organisms exist and they breed and distribute themselves more of less connectedly over space, and, stuff happens over time. Whether or not you can interbreed in sympatry is profoundly important -- loss of interbreeding is the basis of biological diversity. And allopatry is profoundly important -- it's the main way you lose the ability to interbreed. But two allopatric populations are just that: the organisms don't interbreed because they can't; they're not in "cruising distance". You could take two groups of individuals of any population you like and ship them off to islands on the other side of the world and they won't interbreed. They were part of the same "species" before their trip so presumably they still are when they get to their new homes. But the question of "when in the future should we say that they've evolved apart enough for us to call them different 'species'" is a question about what's convenient or useful, not a question about biological concepts or mechanisms.

So it's not that studying the biology of allopatric populations isn't worthwhile -- far from it -- it's just that biology has a sentimental attachment to the idea that populations can always be assigned to "species". You can consider their ancestry as organismal pedigrees, and you can consider the ancestry of different parts of their genome, you can model it mathematically, you can collect genetic data and try to make inferences about it and about how the world they evolved in gave rise to it all. Population genetics, phylogeography, biogeography, phylogenetics etc are all extremely interesting and worthwhile. But with those subjects came confused "species concepts" stretching over decades trying to explain why some or other genealogical or phylogenetic criterion was the right basis to use to define the word "species".

But the correct thing to do was much simpler: just accept that there is no scientific reason for the question "are these allopatric populations the same thing or not" to have any particular meaning, let alone answer.

People who have written some sense among the decades of nonsense: Jürgen Haffer and and Ernst Mayr's geographical species, and Jody Hey's in his book "Genes, categories and species".

3 comments

I agree that the species concept is a bit of a mess but how do you conclude that these two populations can still interbreed?

From the article I do not get the same suspicion. Even though they mention the "sister species" is 1200km removed this might be true while being a "finished" allopatric speciation.

From the paper:

"Our fossil calibrated mitochondrial clock analysis estimates the most recent common ancestor of C. congoensis and C. satanas existed ~4.27–5.78 Ma. In an additional analysis that used the same secondary calibration point as Roos and Zinner [36], we obtained younger divergence estimates by approximately 1 million years (3.44–4.73 Ma)."

Hi, two answers:

Firstly,

> how do you conclude that these two populations can still interbreed?

I'm saying that people shouldn't spend time asking that question of allopatric populations.

Secondly you're right that I didn't read up on these monkeys. I wanted to rant about species concepts, but I was doing it in a discussion about some doubtless wonderful and very interesting monkeys and I am definitely guilty of not doing justice to them or to the people studying them.

A definition that is debatable at the edges doesn’t have to be debatable at the center, so I don’t think it follows that we need to completely throw out the concept. Nature doesn’t provide neat categories, but speciation is nonetheless a real natural phenomenon that isn’t perturbed by having fuzzy boundaries.
Yes I completely agree with every word of this. I hope I didn't give the opposite impression. Clearly the sexual organisms living in one place belong to discrete groups, defined by what breeds with what, no objection to using the word species for those groups in sympatry, and the process by which those species come into existence is extremely important and worth studying (I used to do that). As you say, the problem is that the definition doesn't apply in all situations (e.g. populations that don't live in the same place).

That shouldn't be controversial, but unfortunately the idea that you can and should try to "determine" whether such populations are conspecific is completely entrenched in biology; has been since Linnaeus basically.

It’s a debated issue, not a great embarrassment.

This article is a good guide to the topic: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/species/

Thanks, I've looked at that before, but I don't think I've ever read it properly. Are you sure it's not missing the simple answer? Give up the idea that the question of whether populations are "conspecific" should be assigned a meaning.

Words are just labels we attach to concepts that we find ourselves wanting to refer to. My claim is that there is no concept in allopatry that's worth naming.

Have a look at Hey's underappreciated book (he's the first author cited in the article you linked).

It is an embarrassment: because there's a simple answer (the one I just gave), and because the confusion over "species concepts" has persisted for decades and confused generations of biologists, and hundreds, if not thousands of flawed papers have been published claiming "sufficient divergence" of allopatric populations.

Trying to summarize a big comment into a small one here:

I think it’s more of a deeper problem with language and reality more generally. To me it seems like species is a noun, like other nouns, but reality is ultimately a process. What is needed is a “verb-based” language for describing reality.

A lot of “process philosophers” like Whitehead, Deleuze, etc. have argued similar things.

So yeah I suppose I agree it’s ultimately a taxonomy problem, but in order to fix that I think you essentially need to reinvent language entirely. So it’s not a quick fix for biologists, it’s a systemic issue that I’m not sure really has a solution from within science itself.

I know this sort of doesn’t engage directly with your comment, but process philosophy is a personal interest and I wanted to link to the SEP, heh.

I’ll check out those books though, thanks.

Thanks, your noun/process suggestion is interesting. Perhaps that is indeed a good way of characterizing what happened in biology. It's clear that biology has stumbled into a linguistic/philosophical trap; if it were actually science they wouldn't have been "working on it" since Darwin! I'll try to find time to look at the philosophy you refer to.

Do you know of comparable "messes" like the one in biology that you suspect were caused by a lack of more process-based language?

Are there some human languages that are more process-based than English?

It makes me wonder whether what the LLMs have captured in their training data might be effective for looking over different languages to see if there are any interesting different ways of handling "species".

I think it's probably just a problem with every field. Specifically though, at least for my interests, is traditional theology: God being omnipotent, eternal, etc. causes a lot of philosophical problems, which is what Process Theology aims to address. A lot of this goes back to Plato's idea of forms, which are essentially eternal, unchanging concepts.

I can't seem to find much on the idea that certain languages are more suited to this than others. Theoretically a verb-oriented language would be better.

To me it seems like a giant philosophical project: to create a language that is process-first. It might simply be beyond the capability of humans to actually use such a language in the world, though: which is where AI might be interesting, as it doesn't have the kinds of cognitive limitations on delineations like humans do.