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by Myrmornis
15 days ago
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Thanks, I've looked at that before, but I don't think I've ever read it properly. Are you sure it's not missing the simple answer? Give up the idea that the question of whether populations are "conspecific" should be assigned a meaning. Words are just labels we attach to concepts that we find ourselves wanting to refer to. My claim is that there is no concept in allopatry that's worth naming. Have a look at Hey's underappreciated book (he's the first author cited in the article you linked). It is an embarrassment: because there's a simple answer (the one I just gave), and because the confusion over "species concepts" has persisted for decades and confused generations of biologists, and hundreds, if not thousands of flawed papers have been published claiming "sufficient divergence" of allopatric populations. |
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I think it’s more of a deeper problem with language and reality more generally. To me it seems like species is a noun, like other nouns, but reality is ultimately a process. What is needed is a “verb-based” language for describing reality.
A lot of “process philosophers” like Whitehead, Deleuze, etc. have argued similar things.
So yeah I suppose I agree it’s ultimately a taxonomy problem, but in order to fix that I think you essentially need to reinvent language entirely. So it’s not a quick fix for biologists, it’s a systemic issue that I’m not sure really has a solution from within science itself.
I know this sort of doesn’t engage directly with your comment, but process philosophy is a personal interest and I wanted to link to the SEP, heh.
I’ll check out those books though, thanks.