[whakim]

Isn't Maturana's theory that consciousness has to do with language, and the use of language to make distinctions about ourselves and others? To me, this seems clearly insufficient to explain consciousness - qualia totally precede language; one could experience qualia without language, etc.

[simiones]

> qualia totally precede language; one could experience qualia without language, etc.

While I do believe this as well, I don't think there is any way to prove this with current knowledge. You can introspect and separate your experience of a color from your language, but this type of introspection can also be misleading. And that's about all you can do - we don't know of any way to objectively test if another organism experiences qualia, and any historical/evolutionary evidence is also lost.

[visarga]

The relation is not qualia at the base and language on top, even if qualia is more primitive, because language directs action and action leads back to qualia, so they form a recursive loop which cannot be analyzed component by component anymore.

Qualia represents the compressed past experiences acting as a screen on which we represent new experiences, language is compressed past experiences from others and from past generations. Both work to reduce costs of cognition and action. (imho)

[whakim]

Sure. We can't prove that other organisms experience qualia; we can only look at the effects of qualia (e.g. behaviors that are likely to be the product of emotions) and assume that an organism is therefore conscious. The real point, though, is that suggesting language gives rise to consciousness lacks any explanatory power as to why language should be accompanied by consciousness.

[simiones]

Most proponents of the existence of qualia regard them as fundamental to what they call the hard problem of consciousness. People like Chalmers and Searle assume that all of the externally observable behaviors of people could be (at least in principle) explained without the need for qualia; that is, they believe it's possible for p-zombies to exist; this then gives rise to this question of consciousness - if all physical behaviors can be explained without qualia, and yet everyone of us has qualia, how and why does this happen?

I thought the point above was in a similar vein - that qualia and language are theoretically separable phenomena, so that we can imagine a being might have qualia without language, or language without qualia, and so these need to be explained separately. I was trying to point out that we have no proof for the existence of beings that possess these two qualities separately, so that I don't think the theoretical distinction is necessarily true. Just like any volume of gas has a temperature and a pressure, the existence of separate concepts doesn't mean they are physically separable.