| > Subjective experience is what you and only you, different from other beings, experience in and about the world. So subjective experience is subjective experience? Do rocks have subjective experience? The main goal of any definition is to say clearly what is doesn't cover. It is not enough to say what is subjective experience, you should say it in a way that excludes everything else. Like what is objective experience? How it differs from subjective one? Do LLM experience objectively or not experience at all? How can you say? > But you cannot say the opposite either, so saying 'machines could think' base on a false assumption I can say that they could think. The thought process implies a measurable product. Yes, there are similar situation with it, it can be hard to say sometimes if we observe a product of a thought or something else. But science has some success with this, like claiming that bees can think and solve problems. > That's a very narrow understanding of what language is, what linguists do/research, and the contributions made in the field. Linguists are (since already 2 o 3 decades) focusing more and more on psychological/cognitive matters. I'm telling you, psychologists (who specialize on mind research) do not know what consciousness is and they do not have a definition of a subjective experience (well, if we treat your proposed definition as a valid definition, then we should say they have plenty). And my claim still stands: until you heard about new science "Subjectology" you can be sure that no one knows what subjective experience is. Including linguists. > the topics you mention here are already settled in the philosophy space You shouldn't believe that anything can be settled in the philosophy space. Philosophers can think they have settled things, but until science agreed and started empirical studies, it is just philosophers believing that they settled things. > Exactly because of this. And is this what I am talking about... Exactly because of this I'm vary of any "settled things". You see, people have all the reasons for motivated reasoning. People are historically very wary of any attempts to extend the group of beings covered by "human rights" or whatever it was actual at their time. People would fight to the death to not include another group of beings to the list of "sentient", "conscious" or what it is today is euphemism to "morally equal to a human". And I do not trust anyone to overcome this deep psychological bias. I do not trust myself, I do not trust philosophers, I do not trust linguists, I do not trust neurologists and psychologists. Well, psychologists are probably the most prepared to it, but I do not trust them still. Just think about it, lets suppose someone proved beyond any doubt that LLM has conscious experience. What happens then? Try to imagine that counterfactual world. It will be a very troubled world, won't it? Any sentient human feels it, they feel the level of push back they would receive if they claimed that LLM is conscious. So any sentient person unconsciously feel the urge to join the side claiming that LLMs are not conscious: it is safe to argue they are not, you can publish papers on it and you won't face a strong condemnation from angry scientists, politicians, large corporations hoping to make a shitton of money with LLMs, various religious groups, etc. Our world just have no place for a sentient LLMs. If they are sentient we have to either ban them, or to do sweeping changes to make room for LLMs with human rights. No philosopher/linguist/neuroscientist/psychologist is safe from this unconscious bias, and they do not speak math, they say things like your definition of subjective experience above. Things that can mean anything if you try hard enough. It means you can't just take logic and check their reasoning, you have to _feel_ that they are right, but your feelings a subject to your psychological biases too. You can trust your subjective experiences because they are subjective. If philosophy "settled things" then I even more wary of it. It has even more biases to keep status quo. Wanna me to draw you a picture how the philosopher opinion would evolve if it turns out that LLM are conscious? History shows us how these things unfold. It won't happen overnight, people working with LLMs will notice some patterns and they will ask new questions and slightly modified versions of "already settled questions". The latter will be forced into "already settled answers" (Thomas Kuhn, normal science phase). The former might be answered in the current paradigm (and become settled) or just thrown away as "meaningless" questions. It will be a long process: people noticing things, world class thinkers forcing them into the paradigm. With each step it will become more and more ridiculous, until everyone will see that paradigm doesn't hold. After that politics will take over and it will be defending "traditional paradigm"... well, I can't predict the next phase, but it doesn't matter. What does matter is the alternate Universe where LLMs are sentient would look to you just like ours. Matters settled already, all questions have answers. Well, some don't, but those are nonsensical questions. etc. etc. |
My original comment was that it seems (and it is actually documented in the books I referenced) that the AI research space builds its claims on assumptions, not on facts, and that those assumptions are flawed. So a nice discussion, to begin with, would consider:
1) why I make the claim that the AI research space builds its claims on assumptions instead of facts, why we could say that there are actually no assumptions but facts, or why the assumptions are correct.
2) instead of strictly and directly dismissing readings on philosophy, I would expect intelligent and curious people to embrace new references. Particularly if those references are highly regarded and a solid contribution during the last 120 years
Regarding point 1), I can barely count a single comment in this thread that tries to engage in the idea of the assumptions (except for some comments that agree with the premise).
Then regarding point 2), I can barely count research papers, books or contributions in the space of AI research that references (either to built upon or dismiss) philosophy that is pertinent to AI, pertinent to philosophy of technique or cognitive linguistics. This is strange. It looks like if the space revived during the 2000s with the invention of neural nets (RL, GAN, etc), and then became isolated from contributions about human intelligence, even though it continually tries to explain intelligence in its own terms.
The reference to What Computers Can't Still do is precisely relevant because it narrates exactly this same discussion (false assumptions, claims built upon assumptions instead of facts, dismissal of evidence from psychology, dismissal of frameworks from philosophy, fallacies about progress), but it was written in 1972. Still, you read the book today, and it is totally relevant.
Now, regarding your comments:
> Do LLM experience objectively or not experience at all? How can you say?
The world cannot be experienced 'objectively'. If they experience the world most probably you won't notice. Given that the only way of interacting with an LLM is through a process initiated solely by a human actor, it would be difficult to assess whether an LLM experiences anything at all.
> I can say that they could think. The thought process implies a measurable product. Yes, there are similar situation with it, it can be hard to say sometimes if we observe a product of a thought or something else. But science has some success with this, like claiming that bees can think and solve problems.
The moment you say 'they could think', that implies an assumption about the actual possibility of thinking as a process that can be modeled and executed by a machine. There is, as far as I know, no current evidence that human beings process information the same way a computer does it, nor that though processes necessarily imply a measurable outcome.
> I'm telling you, psychologists (who specialize on mind research) do not know what consciousness is and they do not have a definition of a subjective experience (well, if we treat your proposed definition as a valid definition, then we should say they have plenty). And my claim still stands: until you heard about new science "Subjectology" you can be sure that no one knows what subjective experience is. Including linguists.
Psychology is a very broad field with lights and shadows through its short history. Here, and in my original comment, I am not talking about linguists in general, but specifically about cognitive linguistics. The contributions made be the field are significant and mostly lacking in AI research (for example, the idea of embodiment, the rebuttal of generative grammars, prototype theory, frame semantics, among others). What you mention as 'subjectology', would be just psychology. Foucault explains more or less clearly why this cannot be a science, and that's just fine (in The Order of Things).
> You shouldn't believe that anything can be settled in the philosophy space. Philosophers can think they have settled things, but until science agreed and started empirical studies, it is just philosophers believing that they settled things.
Well... certainly nothing can be 'settled' (not even in science, btw), but my point is: there is already enough convincing arguments in the field of philosophy so as to say that current LLM systems do not posses agency or experience, and that they do not behave like us.
Again, read the sources, what are you people afraid of? Just read the sources, and then engage in the conversation.