[root_axis]

> In the present context, the fallacy manifests in claims that LLMs could not possibly be good models of some cognitive capacity because their operations merely consist in a collection of statistical calculations, or linear algebra operations, or next-token predictions

Nobody actually makes this argument though.

[azakai]

If you want examples of this, see the recent book "The AI Con"

https://www.goodreads.com/en/book/show/217432753-the-ai-con

which describes LLMs as "souped-up autocomplete", complex statistics that cannot truly understand anything. A more recent example is this paper:

https://zenodo.org/records/20071869

which says,

> [LLMs], as turbo-charged statistical models (recall their formal relation to logistic regression) can only but provide correlations.

And, of course, the Stochastic Parrot paper is the classic example in this area. It is from 5 years ago, but "LLMs only do statistics / can't understand" is very much alive and active among academics, even if it is a minority position.

[root_axis]

None of those arguments claim "LLMs could not possibly be good models of some cognitive capacity"

[rerdavies]

The "some cognitive capacity" that's relevant to the current discussion is "consciousness".

[azakai]

What about the cognitive capacity of understanding?

[root_axis]

The use of the term "understanding" in the quote you mentioned is a claim about metaphysics, not cognitive capacity.

[hodgehog11]

From Merriam-Webster:

cognitive: as in reasonable; of, relating to, or involving conscious mental activities (such as thinking, *understanding*, learning, and remembering)

[hodgehog11]

Are you serious? I hear it every single day, especially from computer scientists. There are top ranked posts here on HN _today_ with this argument.

[root_axis]

Please link one of these top ranked posts. Before you do, be aware that I'm going to read what it says and assess if it meets the description of the argument as claimed.

[DangitBobby]

I understood the quoted sentence to be saying, in essence "people claim LLMs aren't really and can't really be thinking or experiencing anything" which is certainly something people say and have written papers on.

[root_axis]

The phenomenological quality of subjective experience is never described as "cognitive capacity".

That term is used to describe mental aptitude or skills, like the ability to learn new languages or do math.

[DangitBobby]

It's never used as a description of that specific phenomenon, but depending on your beliefs you may or may not separate cognition from experience conceptually. Regardless, you are focusing on a very narrow part of what I said. The point is to help you get past your narrow interpretation of what people are saying so you can join them in the conversation they are trying to have instead of litigating the conversation they aren't trying to have.

[hodgehog11]

As an example, "They're made out of weights" describes why the weight-based construction of neural networks should impact the way that you think about them and their outputs. I would argue that an offhand description of its microscopic formulation tells us nothing at all about how to think about these outputs, or the models themselves. Even if it is a cute story, I think it definitely classifies as succumbing to this fallacy, but maybe I missed some subtle point that you or someone would be happy to illuminate?

By the way, I know it's a parody of another story that makes this exact refutation. But I think this only serves to highlight the point.

[root_axis]

> They're made out of weights" describes why the weight-based construction of neural networks should impact the way that you think about them and their outputs.

How do you connect that description to "LLMs could not possibly be good models of some cognitive capacity"?

[rerdavies]

The false conclusion that's being drawn is "therefore LLMs could not be good models of consciousness" (consciousness being a cognitive capacity). Plus, I suppose a subtle implication that a good model of consciousness is not actually conscious. To which I would invoke the spirit of the Turing test: if you can't tell the difference, is it not more sensible to say that it is.

[miyoji]

> (consciousness being a cognitive capacity)

I don't think it makes any sense to say that consciousness is a cognitive capacity. Cognition is one of many qualia that compose the experience of consciousness from the inside, but it's not the only one, and I can easily imagine consciousness without cognition at all.

So I don't think it's weird at all to say that LLMs can be good models of some cognitive capacities (particularly the ones embodied in language) but lacks others, and overall lacks consciousness.

[hodgehog11]

"LLMs could not possibly be good models of some cognitive capacity because they are just a bunch of numbers guessing the next word. They have no linguistic module, so they cannot exhibit cognition". That's the argument. It's pretty clearly stated.

Look, this isn't necessarily directed at you, but I've been a researcher into the theory of deep learning for many years now. I've seen all the phases, heard all the criticism, had to constantly argue against this. Gary Marcus was one of the loudest voices of this argument, but every would-be philosopher came out of the woodwork to explain why LLMs are no more than stochastic parrots because of their design. Geoffrey Hinton famously had to debunk these arguments multiple times.

And now that LLMs start to clearly exhibit intelligent behavior and can be somewhat reliable, now "nobody ever thought that LLMs could not possibly be good models of some cognitive capacity because of next-token predictions, or linear algebra, etc."? No, that's not okay.

[neolefty]

It's perfectly reasonable that we would have disagreements about this, as it's a new thing, complicated and not fully understood, its uses still being explored.

It reminds me, oddly, of the debate over whether video games can be "art". A turning point was when they actually did something that art does: [evoke profound emotion and thoughtfulness](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shadow_of_the_Colossus#Legacy) for the player.

(And before that, "[Can photography be art](https://daily.jstor.org/when-photography-was-not-art/)?")

We may not come to something as simple as "machines can be conscious", but we will certainly have to understand consciousness better if we want to refine our questions.

---

Edit: My point is that we don't need to be angry, but we may have to tolerate people expressing their exploration through overly-confident language, and be patient with that.

And Ted here is obviously exploring. His examination of Claude's constitution clearly shows some nuance. He asks:

> So, given that Claude is not conscious, what are we to make of Claude’s constitution?

And his conclusions are split, between this is useful and this is dishonest. It's a great tension IMO.

> The result is a sentence-continuation machine that is likelier to emit sentences resembling those that a thoughtful, moral person could utter. This might seem like a reasonable goal to work toward; I think we’d all prefer it if chatbots never emitted sentences such as “You should kill yourself.” However, for all the times that “honesty” is mentioned in Claude’s constitution, I would argue that it is fundamentally dishonest to have a machine emit many categories of sentences, including any sentences using first-person pronouns.

[hodgehog11]

I appreciate the diplomatic approach. Disagreements about the nature of consciousness are perfectly natural in this context, and concepts such as "understanding" or "cognition" are often difficult to effectively define. The problem is when certain people (often educated in my experience, but also young and arrogant about their own understanding) attempt to shut down any conversation on these topics by appealing to this very fallacy, and claiming that the debate is a sign of idiocy, that we're just "being tricked" by a useless autocomplete engine. These people are not exploring; they're not even being honest, but rather choosing to not pay attention, like it is still 2022. I used to be patient with them, but it's too late now. There are difficult conversations that need to be had, and there needs to be a space for them.

I also remember the "video games are art" debate and the fury from one side of the aisle. I agree that a better understanding of the opposite side should have been part of the debate. But I don't believe that debate was existential. A better comparison to me is the climate change debate. I'm fine with having that debate in an environment where there is little at stake. But it's too late to be doing it with policymakers; we need to be talking about what to do.