[supern0va]

Your statement seems to be implying (correctly) that LLMs can program, but just not as well as humans. If they're able to program presumably without "thinking" as you seem to be (implicitly) narrowly defining it, then why do you think that limits them to always being sub-par?

It seems like if they can do it, that there's no reason they can't eventually be trained to do it better up to and beyond human performance. It seems strange to suggest that thinking unlocks some nominal margin of "better" specifically that can't be overcome.

All of that aside, even if they can't outperform the top human programmers...what if they get to within a margin where they're still better than most? Isn't a 95th percentile programmer that can run 24/7 and continuously refine its work still going to ultimately come out on top?

[kelseyfrog]

I'm more interested in the conclusion that programming doesn't require thinking. And that's where the argument breaks. It seems so obvious, but sometimes the most obvious things are the least true.

[supern0va]

>I'm more interested in the conclusion that programming doesn't require thinking.

I suspect it largely has to do with how one defines "thinking". It seems like people like to implicitly define it in such a way as to require a human (or animal), but there are many examples of thinking/intelligence in nature that don't require a brain or even neurons.

I'm genuinely curious: without using the word "think" with all of its ambiguity, can you articulate what it is that we're doing that these models are not capable of? Because it's pretty clear (to me, at least) from the research, particularly a lot of the mechanistic interpretability work coming out of Anthropic, that the models are at least doing something akin to what we think of as thinking, even if it appears foreign to us.

Like, I'm not sure how you could read this and not see some spark of seems like thinking: https://www.anthropic.com/research/tracing-thoughts-language...