I'm more interested in the conclusion that programming doesn't require thinking. And that's where the argument breaks. It seems so obvious, but sometimes the most obvious things are the least true.
>I'm more interested in the conclusion that programming doesn't require thinking.
I suspect it largely has to do with how one defines "thinking". It seems like people like to implicitly define it in such a way as to require a human (or animal), but there are many examples of thinking/intelligence in nature that don't require a brain or even neurons.
I'm genuinely curious: without using the word "think" with all of its ambiguity, can you articulate what it is that we're doing that these models are not capable of? Because it's pretty clear (to me, at least) from the research, particularly a lot of the mechanistic interpretability work coming out of Anthropic, that the models are at least doing something akin to what we think of as thinking, even if it appears foreign to us.
I suspect it largely has to do with how one defines "thinking". It seems like people like to implicitly define it in such a way as to require a human (or animal), but there are many examples of thinking/intelligence in nature that don't require a brain or even neurons.
I'm genuinely curious: without using the word "think" with all of its ambiguity, can you articulate what it is that we're doing that these models are not capable of? Because it's pretty clear (to me, at least) from the research, particularly a lot of the mechanistic interpretability work coming out of Anthropic, that the models are at least doing something akin to what we think of as thinking, even if it appears foreign to us.
Like, I'm not sure how you could read this and not see some spark of seems like thinking: https://www.anthropic.com/research/tracing-thoughts-language...