[dylan604]

Having doors flying off one of your planes and engine failure causing part of the cowling to bust a window and sucking a passenger out of another is definitely not a bit of politics. Nevermind the bullshit 737Max nonsense. At this point, I'd imagine any Boeing orders left are only in place because Airbus can't keep up. Politics didn't need to come within 10 miles of this decision. It's just the free cherry on top.

[stouset]

The engine that failed on the Southwest flight was a CFM International CFM56, which has also been used on multiple Airbus planes including the A320. The engine itself as well as the containment mechanism that’s supposed to prevent this kind of situation were the responsibility of CFM and had nothing to do with Boeing. This could just as easily have happened on an A320.

This example only serves to highlight how popular narratives take hold and get reinforced by laypeople.

Boeing absolutely deserves to be raked through the coals over MCAS, over their deteriorating engineering culture, and over regulatory capture. But blame them for the things they actually carry responsibility for.

[dpark]

> The engine itself as well as the containment mechanism that’s supposed to prevent this kind of situation were the responsibility of CFM and had nothing to do with Boeing.

NTSB seems to think it’s Boeing’s responsibility to redesign the cowl to prevent this.

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/...

[labcomputer]

If you read your own link, they also think it’s the engine manufacturer’s (CFM’s) responsibility to work with Boeing to redesign the cowl, and recommend that the European Aviation Safety Agency require engine manufacturers to work collaboratively with airplane manufacturers for such cowl design in the future.

[dpark]

I don’t actually see that but I’m also not going to read all 193 pages.

That’s not the point regardless. The post I replied to made the claim that Boeing has no responsibility here. The NTSB clearly disagrees.

[beering]

Come on, you can’t say you can’t be bothered to read the document and also double down on your interpretation of it in the same breath.

[dpark]

My "interpretation of it" is explicitly in the document.

"Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA require Boeing to determine the critical fan blade impact location(s) on the CFM56-7B engine fan case and redesign the fan cowl structure on all Boeing 737NG-series airplanes to ensure the structural integrity of the fan cowl after an FBO event. The NTSB also recommends that, once the actions requested in Safety Recommendation A-19-17 are completed, the FAA require Boeing to install the redesigned fan cowl structure on new-production 737NG-series airplanes. The NTSB further recommends that, once the actions requested in Safety Recommendation A-19-17 are completed, the FAA require operators of Boeing 737NG-series airplanes to retrofit their airplanes with the redesigned fan cowl structure."

Is your position that somewhere in this 193 page document, the NTSB buried a line that says "just kidding, Boeing is faultless here"?

[866-RON-0-FEZ]

If we're stringing random facts together to try and make a point, Airbus was found guilty two days ago of manslaughter in the 2009 Air France crash that fell into the ocean.

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czd2qmdvmq6o

It's the same airplane as the MRTT, A330.

[celsoazevedo]

I think it's fair to call out the parent comment for things that are not exactly caused by Boeing (eg: the engine failure), but I also think it's important to look at the why.

In the case you're referring too, the focus was on poor training and failure to follow up on earlier incidents. It's not the same as designing a system based around a single sensor that is known to fail or forgetting to bolt a door.

[labcomputer]

> It's not the same as designing a system based around a single sensor that is known to fail

Right, they designed the their system with two sensors, and if they disagree, the system gives misleading indications to the pilots! That’s so much better!

[celsoazevedo]

My understanding is that the Airbus equivalent (they don't really have the same thing) uses 3 pitot tubes/angle of attack sensors, not 2. More importantly, Airbus pilots know about the system, while Boeing only told airliners about MCAS after the Lion Air crash.

I'm not a pilot and I don't know that much about planes, but I've read/watched enough about crashes to know that these sensors fail way too often. To rely on only one already sounds like a bad idea, but it's irresponsible not to tell pilots and train them on how to deal with the new "feature".

[SR2Z]

Airbus aircraft are normally fly-by-wire and a system like MCAS would just be folded into the envelope protection that Airbus does. It's already very easy to cross-train from once Airbus to the next because FBW is used to give them all similar handling characteristics.

That wasn't possible in the 737 MAX because the airplane is an older design with hydraulically connected control services, so a separate system had to be added to force the nose down using the trim.

[whatevaa]

If you actually read into the case it's more complicated than just it's Airbus fault. It was caused by one of the confused pilots input. Why they were confused is a complicated story.

[dghlsakjg]

That particular failure mode would have been impossible in most other planes including all Boeings. 1. Pretty much only Airbus doesn’t have linked controls 2. Pretty much just airbus changes what the controls allow you to do (the “law” as they call it) without input from the pilot.

No other airliner make on earth could have suffered that accident. It would have been extremely obvious what the issue was, and how to solve it on any other aircraft I can think of. This was like a car crash caused by the computer changing how the steering wheel worked mid drive.

I still have no idea how Airbus didn’t catch more flack for that design.

[SR2Z]

Because the vast majority of the time, that design stops pilots from stalling the aircraft and makes maintenance easier.

Flying airplanes is not a natural fit for the human brain. It's very helpful to have a computer mediating inputs to keep the aircraft stable.

[dghlsakjg]

And yet, that design did not stop the pilot from stalling the plane as that was the cause of the crash, the design actually helped the pilot stall the plane without even knowing it. The argument isn't that computers shouldn't play a role in flight controls (indeed some military aircraft are unflyable without a computer in the loop), its that the interface - which is completely unique among all other airliners and commercial passenger planes - is so non-intuitive that it allowed something to happen that would not have been possible.

If you go full stick back in any other airliner, the other pilot will know it immediately, and can physically correct the input. Other planes have stall prevention and awareness in the form of stick shakers and stick pushers that give the pilot physical feedback, and in the case of a pusher makes the pilot physically fight against the safe action (in the case of the MAX, trim adjustment - a roundabout way of stick pushing - was implemented in an exceptionally stupid way that made it overpower the pilots)

[kergonath]

Indeed. See here for a decently in-depth analysis: https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/the-long-way-down-the-cr... .

[Retric]

Incidents that are over five years old have minimal impact in terms of current competition between Boing and Airbus.

The airbus A320 family is associated with 1,490 fatalities, there’s just a vast number of flights daily so tiny risks add up. Companies buying new aircraft care far more about maintenance to fuel efficiency than a few rare incidents due to already corrected issues.

[harmmonica]

Can you shed a bit more light on this? I can't find any evidence that there are that many fatalities related to that plane, at least related to its operations in flight. Seems like there are few or if my quick look shows even zero fatalities related to it flying. You wrote "associated" but can you define what you mean by that? During manufacturing, maintenance and other non-flight-related incidents?

[Retric]

That was a mistake on my part those are A320 numbers not A380.

[harmmonica]

Ah, gotcha. Probably not supposed to reply with this, but applaud your quick correction!

[ceejayoz]

> The airbus A380 family is associated with 1,490 fatalities…

What? The A380 has never had a single fatality or even injuries.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_A380#Accidents_and_inci...

> Incidents are over five years old have minimal impact in terms of current competition between Boing and Airbus.

Airbus (and Boeing) has a decade-long backlog. They absolutely do. https://flightplan.forecastinternational.com/2026/04/14/airb...

[Retric]

Ops A320. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_accidents_and_incident...

[dorfsmay]

A380? Did you mean A320?

[Retric]

Yes, corrected remembered the fatalities but should have looked it up anyway.

[eastbound]

> Having doors flying off one of your planes (…) definitely not a bit of politics.

It’s a checkmate of the American system. Boeing delegated construction in parts of the country that needed jobs (=politics), who then botched the job and didn’t get sanctioned because it was bad optics to accuse those providers (2013 airframes). More recent events are also a checkmate of the ultrafinanciarization practices, a checkmate of the consultancy / provider / controller model, and a failure of corruption (the FAA/Boeing dinners inherited from the Macdonnell management) in a context where USA rips at the seams (industrial failure, no-one can be trusted as trustworthy) and tries to renew its ideology (apogee with the Trump elections).

That is a fair bit of politics that made Boeing fail.

[shevy-java]

Yeah - the mass casualties with regards to Max, changed things a lot. Boeing used to be about enginering; that quality dropped indeed decades ago. Not sure why or how.

[tremon]

Not sure why or how

There's plenty of documentation to be found on the why and how, especially following the 737Max issues: https://team-fsa.com/insights/what-happened-to-boeings-cultu...

> Following the 1997 merger with McDonnell Douglas, Boeing’s robust culture eroded. Subsequent safety issues with the Boeing 737 have put the company under international scrutiny and underscored the profound impact of a weakened corporate culture. As Forbes aptly put it, “Boeing’s current travails about safety issues with the 737 MAX 9 can arguably be traced to the company’s weak corporate culture.”

Or read https://www.library.hbs.edu/working-knowledge/why-boeings-pr... for Harvard's take on the same situation.

[p_l]

The best and understated part about it is that the culture change was pushed from Boeing side, and at least some people from McD side of the merger were pushing internal memos warning about actions pushed by Boeing-lifer CEO exemplified in then ongoing 7X7 program (future 787)

[lelanthran]

> Boeing used to be about enginering; that quality dropped indeed decades ago.

I just pointed out in a different thread that software is going through that right now.

[rootsudo]

No, majority of Boeing orders to foreign countries use USA backed loans or is a significant part of pushing US interests in the world.

The message here, and it’s granted if you’re not aviation, finance or political aware is Italy keeping their aviation sector EU based being In the EU themselves and most likely getting tremendously better financing.

While the Boeing incidents you mentioned are unfortunate and a true consequence of engineering culture eroding at Boeing, it does not dispel the true safety of aviation in general nor the high success of the 737 Max.