If we're stringing random facts together to try and make a point, Airbus was found guilty two days ago of manslaughter in the 2009 Air France crash that fell into the ocean.
I think it's fair to call out the parent comment for things that are not exactly caused by Boeing (eg: the engine failure), but I also think it's important to look at the why.
In the case you're referring too, the focus was on poor training and failure to follow up on earlier incidents. It's not the same as designing a system based around a single sensor that is known to fail or forgetting to bolt a door.
> It's not the same as designing a system based around a single sensor that is known to fail
Right, they designed the their system with two sensors, and if they disagree, the system gives misleading indications to the pilots! That’s so much better!
My understanding is that the Airbus equivalent (they don't really have the same thing) uses 3 pitot tubes/angle of attack sensors, not 2. More importantly, Airbus pilots know about the system, while Boeing only told airliners about MCAS after the Lion Air crash.
I'm not a pilot and I don't know that much about planes, but I've read/watched enough about crashes to know that these sensors fail way too often. To rely on only one already sounds like a bad idea, but it's irresponsible not to tell pilots and train them on how to deal with the new "feature".
Airbus aircraft are normally fly-by-wire and a system like MCAS would just be folded into the envelope protection that Airbus does. It's already very easy to cross-train from once Airbus to the next because FBW is used to give them all similar handling characteristics.
That wasn't possible in the 737 MAX because the airplane is an older design with hydraulically connected control services, so a separate system had to be added to force the nose down using the trim.
If you actually read into the case it's more complicated than just it's Airbus fault. It was caused by one of the confused pilots input. Why they were confused is a complicated story.
That particular failure mode would have been impossible in most other planes including all Boeings. 1. Pretty much only Airbus doesn’t have linked controls 2. Pretty much just airbus changes what the controls allow you to do (the “law” as they call it) without input from the pilot.
No other airliner make on earth could have suffered that accident. It would have been extremely obvious what the issue was, and how to solve it on any other aircraft I can think of. This was like a car crash caused by the computer changing how the steering wheel worked mid drive.
I still have no idea how Airbus didn’t catch more flack for that design.
And yet, that design did not stop the pilot from stalling the plane as that was the cause of the crash, the design actually helped the pilot stall the plane without even knowing it. The argument isn't that computers shouldn't play a role in flight controls (indeed some military aircraft are unflyable without a computer in the loop), its that the interface - which is completely unique among all other airliners and commercial passenger planes - is so non-intuitive that it allowed something to happen that would not have been possible.
If you go full stick back in any other airliner, the other pilot will know it immediately, and can physically correct the input. Other planes have stall prevention and awareness in the form of stick shakers and stick pushers that give the pilot physical feedback, and in the case of a pusher makes the pilot physically fight against the safe action (in the case of the MAX, trim adjustment - a roundabout way of stick pushing - was implemented in an exceptionally stupid way that made it overpower the pilots)
In the case you're referring too, the focus was on poor training and failure to follow up on earlier incidents. It's not the same as designing a system based around a single sensor that is known to fail or forgetting to bolt a door.