[specproc]

I spent a fair bit of time in the former Soviet Union, what happened there is instructive for what comes next.

I think we will see, across the West broadly, to varying extents:

- peripheral states flipping (e.g., Baltics)

- widespread looting of public assets, a new oligarchal class minted

- total destruction of the middle class, particularly those with ties to government and NGOs (I'm in this camp and miserable for it)

- at least one civil war, lots of territorial disputes kicking off, separatism

- breakdown of law and order, local gangsters as local authorities

- mass ex-migration, ethnic cleansing

- weak governments, coups, demagogues, vassalage

- hyperinflation and scammy get rich quick scams (watch crypto)

[michaelchisari]

The collapse of the Soviet Union was ahistorical in many ways. It's rare that collapse of an empire can be pinpointed to a single day. And what you saw was a result of shock therapy imposed from the outside. I doubt that would happen to the US.

It's unlikely collapse will be felt as a singular, apocalyptic event. More like a slow, steady loss of influence and excess wealth. Countries on the periphery stop considering the empire's perspectives before making their own decisions. Other trading partners emerge. Bridges stop getting maintained until they're no longer usable.

And soft power declines. Imagine a day when the biggest pop star in the US, someone on the scale of Michael Jackson or Madonna nationally, is virtually unknown outside of its borders.

There are reasons to believe the American empire is in decline, but I maintain this will look more like Britain. It could take 50 years before American fully realize it.

Thankfully, that means there's plenty of time to reverse or mitigate the trends, or to make a decision to strengthen the Republic over the Empire.

[dh2022]

I beg to differ. The collapse of USSR was 100% caused by internal causes.

First was the abominable low productivity in oil/gas and agricultural sectors from 1950s through 1980s.

Then came the corruption of Brezhnev era. Andropov tried to get some reforms going: first against corruption and then some Chinese-style economic changes. But Andropov died very quickly.

Eventually came Gorbachev- who had good intentions. Unfortunately he prioritized political reforms over economic. He wanted economic reforms with no pain, something to show his people some progress. Unfortunately that was impossible so he ended up with some half baked ideas (like limit alcohol sales. Or letting factory managers keep their profits expecting the managers to invest profits in new technology- managers used the profits to pay themselves. Or introduce free markets pricing between factories-when managers complained they had to pay market prices on inputs and nobody were buying their outputs the result was to subsidize factories for both inputs and outputs)

The result of these Econ reforms was that the Soviet state was running out of money. (A humanitarian policy was that for the first time in Russia’s history bad agricultural results did not result in famine-for the first time the govt bought food on the international market paying in Western currencies)

Add a few ambitious politicians who did not want to take orders from the center (Yeltsin being the principal example, but also Kravchuk) and the process of dissolution already started by the Baltic independence could only end with total collapse.

The shock therapy you mention was designed, advocated, and ultimately implemented by Gaidar - a Soviet economist fully trained by the Soviet state.

Sorry for the long reply. If you are interested in this topic I recommend reading two books, both called “Collapse” one written by Gaidar, the other one written by Zubok.

[michaelchisari]

| The collapse of USSR was 100% caused by internal causes.

I wouldn't take the time to argue otherwise, although it's a question of what's considered an "internal cause." Afghanistan comes to mind. But generally, yes, absent any external pressure, the internal mismanagement still would have had the Soviet system in a very bad way and collapse would have been a matter of time.

So we're not particularly in disagreement there, except for matters of degree (100%? eh.)

But I disagree strongly that shock therapy can be put solely on the shoulders of Gaidar. You can't talk about shock therapy without talking about Jeffrey Sachs. Although I wouldn't put it all on his shoulders either. It was an extremely complicated situation from top to bottom.

But most of all, my post was really more about the how the American empire's fall will not look like the Soviet's. And I stand by that completely.

[dh2022]

Afghanistan - economically not a big impact. The economic pressures in the 80s were low agricultural productivity requiring imports from Western countries, low oil/gas prices and productivity, endemic corruption. And if we really want to be pedantic, nobody forced USSR to invade Afghanistan.

I had to look up Jeffrey Sachs (0). He was an adviser-that is all he did. He did not impose anything on Yeltsin or Russia.

I agree that American decline will not resemble Russian collapse. Their commonality is both declines have internal causes. But other than that there isn’t much in common.

(0) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeffrey_Sachs#Russia

[michaelchisari]

| I had to look up Jeffrey Sachs

Like I said, it's complicated.

| I agree that American decline will not resemble Russian collapse.

Then we are in agreement.

[specproc]

Britain's demise was relatively swift, and took place over the course of the two world wars. It fell almost immediately into vassalage, under the US. Not quite a bang, but not as drawn out as you suggest.

Its former colonies experienced all I described above and more. In this case, the colonies are most of the world: where are the bases? Everywhere.

With the States, here's the scenario, not too far fetched. We will see 1) constitutional breakdown, as Trump (or his crew) digs in, and 2) economic breakdown, 2008 but exponentially worse.

This would constitute a Soviet scale collapse, to my mind.

[michaelchisari]

I put the collapse of Britain's empire at around 75 years, which is faster than the Ottomans or Spanish empires, but still nothing compared to the Soviets, which to reiterate, was an historical anomaly.

As for the US, for all the current turmoil, the dollar is still supreme in global economics, its soft power is still immense, despite the immigration chaos its still the primary destination for immigrants, and it would take decades for countries to push out our military bases because doing so would often mean building up their own military infrastructure.

Trump's unconstitutionality is a threat, and that the US has a series of bubbles built on shaky economics is not controversial. But I don't see how that could possibly result in a Soviet style singular day of collapse. At least internally, there isn't a cultural and linguistic separation between states the way there was with Russian imposition on their Soviet satellite countries.

And of course, there's the previously mentioned shock therapy, something that wouldn't have the same level of violent effect because the US is already a market economy. And there's nobody powerful enough to impose something like that on us regardless. Unlike the Soviets, if the US goes down, much of the world goes down with us, so there's strong incentives for an off-ramp, not a destabilization.

I agree there are major structural issues, and the US democratic system is being stress tested daily, but its all symptoms of decline, not imminent collapse.

[specproc]

> but its all symptoms of decline, not imminent collapse.

I'll see you after the mid-terms.

[jgilias]

The situations are not comparable at all. That was the collapse of an authoritarian (wasn’t totalitarian anymore by the time it’d collapse) system running (badly) on command economy. Most of the points you mention are therefore just really off.

Say, the Baltics flipping. Where the hell are we supposed to flip to? Russia? Where ethnic minorities are sent to die in expansionist wars in disproportionate numbers?

[I-M-S]

I believe OP was referring to Baltics flipping from USSR to the West (the EU). Some US analogues might include Canada flipping (already happening), no more coups in South American countries that vote in a "wrong" government, or the Middle Eastern countries allying with China (no longer impossible).

[b112]

Good lord, Canada is not "flipping" anywhere. We've always had trade with China, and the US to this day has far more trade with China! We're the same we've always been, it's the US that has gone bananas, and decided to threaten annexation and purposeful economic collapse.

As a result, we've just stopping traveling, and as a country, buying from the US. We're sourcing 100+ billion over the next few years from other Western allies, not China.

That's not flipping anything. We always bought from other Western nations and allies in the past. We're just doing more of that, because, you know, you guys have turned into back stabbing asshats, who stab their friends in the back.

You may wonder the reaction, but your statement (while I'm sure was just meant as an observation) is quite harsh to take. Imagine if a friend tries to steal your car, then later calls you unloyal if you don't trust them. You'd be baffled.

[silvestrov]

> peripheral states flipping (e.g., Baltics)

This is already happening with trade (e.g. soy beans) and with military purchases.

Canada is moving quickly with moving trade elsewhere.

[PaulDavisThe1st]

There will be no "peripheral states flipping" in the USA. Secession is not an option here.

[silvestrov]

This is only true as long as there is money for the military.

When money is gone, the military is gone.

Money goes easily when a country has a large debt and need other countries to continue to buy into that debt.

[PaulDavisThe1st]

It's not the military that makes it impossible.

It's the incredible level of interwoven left/right, progressive/conservative, urban/rural populations in more or less every state.

More people voted for the current president in CA than in more or less any other state. Yet it is viewed as a "blue" state. The millions of Democratic voters in large cities like Houston or Atlanta may not control their state legislatures, but they are not going to sit by as those legislatures attempt to secede. Rural voters across most states are not going to sit by while their urban-controlled legislatures attempt to secede.

We don't have "peripheral" states here, and we don't have "red or blue" states. We have a mostly urban/rural divide that does not follow state boundaries in any sense at all.

[righthand]

People are building bunkers and tax avoidance as protest is becoming popular again. I think all people want is to secede.

[PaulDavisThe1st]

These are niche behaviors. Most Americans live where they live, plan to remain there (with the possible exception of what is left of the trans community in nominally red states, and some women in similar states). If and when the shit truly hits the fan (to the extent that it has not already done so), most Americans will be right where they are now, without bunkers and having filed their taxes.

[righthand]

I’m not talking about how most people are operating. I’m talking about the current thought movements going on and what people are doing because of the times. These are each niche things that are becoming popularized ideas. The divide you’re talking about Red vs Blue is not where strong bonds lie. We can see that from the extreme flip-flopping on Trump by various demographics and the similarities between Maga and Democratic party being built through small disparate demographics. It might take another 5 or 10 years but people will probably largely stop paying federal taxes and put the money into savings or something elsewhere.

[flopsamjetsam]

> When money is gone, the military is gone.

I feel like the lesson from other countries is that the military will be the last thing to go. Public funding of everything else will be sacrificed to keep the military powerful, and leaders will be from the military. That will be a complete breakdown of democracy of course.

[empath75]

It wasn’t an option in the USSR, either.

[PaulDavisThe1st]

The "peripheral" countries mentioned in the GP were nations or at the very least distinct semi-national entities before the USSR.

States in the USA have no effective history before being a part of the USA.

[roxolotl]

I do not think it will happen but this is why in discussions about this happening, or historical fiction, typically the places that break off are the ones that were distinct _before_ they joined the US. Any of the 13 colonies, New England as a block having the strongest colonial identity that I'm aware of, Texas, or California generally are where it's assumed to start as those were countries/had identities very much outside of the US while also having economies that might be ok.

[b3ing]

Wrong, Hawaii and New Mexico ( which included parts of Arizona, Colorado and Texas) do

[PaulDavisThe1st]

That's fair (I live in NM).

But I would still say that the status of lower-48 states is quite different than, say, Belarus and the USSR.

Yes, Nuevo Mexico existed prior to becoming part of the US, but most of the distinctive identity-forming elements of Nuevo Mexico have been lost or significantly diminished (for a variety of reasons).

I know nothing of Hawaii, the situation there may be similar or very different.

The USSR existed for only about 70 years. There were likely people alive at its creation who were still alive as the eastern European states left it. That's a very different scenario than NM (which effectively entered the US in 1848 with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo).

[tw-20260303-001]

Under the current understanding of “not an option”. Who knows when this changes.

[PaulDavisThe1st]

It won't change until states nominally considered "red" or "blue" actually lose the vast majority of their nominally opposed population (e.g. Atlanta's current population migrates out of GA). Until then, just about every state is a complex mixture of populations with different political alignments and sufficient sizes to make secession extremely difficult if not impossible.