[emp17344]

>Unless your position is that the intelligence of a brain that was grown in a vat with no inputs would be equivalent to that of a normal person.

Entirely possible - we just don’t know. The closest thing we have to a real world case study is Helen Keller and other people with significant sensory impairments, who are demonstrably unimpaired in a general cognitive sense, and in many cases more cognitively capable than the average unimpaired person.

[dpark]

I think you are trying to argue for a very abstract notion of intelligence that is divorced from any practical measurement. I don’t know how else to interpret your claim that inputs are divorced from intelligence (and that we don’t know if the brain in a jar is intelligent).

This seems like a very philosophical standpoint, rather than practical. And I guess that’s fine, but I feel like the implication is that if an LLM is in some way intelligent, then it was exactly as intelligent before training. So we are talking about “potential intelligence“? Does a stack of GPU’s have “intelligence”?

[emp17344]

Intelligence isn’t rigorously defined or measurable, so any conversation about the nature of intelligence will be inherently philosophical. Like it or not, intelligence just is an abstract concept.

I’m trying to illustrate that the constraints that apply to LLMs don’t necessarily apply to humans. I don’t believe human intelligence is reliant upon sensory input.

[dpark]

It can’t be both. If intelligence is this abstract and philosophical then the claims about inputs not being relevant for human intelligence are meaningless. It’s equally meaningless to say that constraints on LLM intelligence don’t apply to human intelligence. In the absence of a meaningful definition of intelligence, these statements are not grounded in anything.

The term cannot mean something measurable or concrete when it’s convenient, but be vague and indefinable when it’s not.