| The page only talks about adopting PQC for key agreement for SSH connections, not encryption in general so the overhead would be rather minimal here. Also from the FAQ: "Quantum computers don't exist yet, why go to all this trouble?" Because of the "store now, decrypt later" attack mentioned above. Traffic sent today is at risk of decryption unless post-quantum key agreement is used. "I don't believe we'll ever get quantum computers. This is a waste of time" Some people consider the task of scaling existing quantum computers up to the point where they can tackle cryptographic problems to be practically insurmountable. This is a possibilty. However, it appears that most of the barriers to a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer are engineering challenges rather than underlying physics.
If we're right about quantum computers being practical, then we will have protected vast quantities of user data. If we're wrong about it, then all we'll have done is moved to cryptographic algorithms with stronger mathematical underpinnings. Not sure if I'd take the cited paper (while fun to read) too seriously to inform my opinion the risks of using quantum-insecure encryption rather than as a cynical take on hype and window dressing in QC research. |
I've heard this 15 years ago when I started university. People claimed all the basics were done, that we "only" needed to scale. That we would see practical quantum computers in 5-10 years. Today I still see the same estimates. Maybe 5 years by extreme optimists, 10-20 years by more reserved people. It's the same story as nuclear fusion. But who's prepping for unlimited energy today? Even though it would make sense to build future industrial environments around that if they want to be competitive.