| There are two problems with this. The first problem is that you are using this quote as an appeal to authority. Eisenhower might have written that he thought it wasn’t needed to end the war, but he was just one voice amongst many. The second problem is you’re not reading carefully with historical context. > It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of “face.”
Japan and its leadership consisted of various factions, ranging from hardliners who wanted to arm every single Japanese citizen and fight to the last child, to those who wanted to surrender and negotiate a peace settlement.Prior to the usage of the atomic weapons to quickly end the war, Japan planned to continue fighting, and the Japanese Army in particular was preparing the homeland to fight to the death. The hardliners who brought Japan into war still had enough sway at this juncture to continue the war and planned to do so. When Eisenhower says “it was my belief”, he’s partially right, there in fact were Japanese military and political officials who were trying to end the war in a way that saves face, and protects the honor of the Emperor. But the problem with his belief as stated is that although there were in fact those folks seeking to end the war, they didn’t have control and could not stop the war on their own. Prior to the usage of the atomic weapons, the United States knew the war was going to be won, but what it didn’t know was whether Japan really was going to fight to the last child or sue for peace. Given the American experience at Okinawa many believed the fighting would continue, and that it would be bloody and many lives would be lost. Instead of dealing with all of that uncertainty, they used the bomb. Japan still hadn’t surrendered with some Imperial Army leadership believing the Americans couldn’t posses more than 1 or 2 and so Japan could keep fighting. The US used it again. Hirohito had enough. Japan surrendered. Etc. The politics of the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy, domestic officials, and the Emperor are quite complicated. There were disagreements and misgivings before war with the United States even took place, and as the war continued there were disagreements even when it seems obvious in retrospect that the United States “didn’t need” to use the atomic weapons. But presenting a single quote from a single man, albeit an important one, as though his disagreement is a coup de grace on a discussion about the usage of atomic weapons to end the war is lazy at the very least, if not downright rude. Instead of dropping a random quote from Eisenhower and being lazy, you should pull up your keyboard and write your original thoughts on the matter, cite your sources where you see fit (I’m not asking for those) and present a coherent argument. As easily as you can produce a quote, so too can that quote be dismissed as just some guy’s opinion. Clearly the President thought differently and used the bombs. I personally am of the opinion that if using the bombs saved the lives of a few thousand (at least) American soldiers it was worth it. Japan started the war. I’m an American - American lives matter more to me than do the lives of others in the context of World War II, including civilians. |
I'm not trying to be rude, and I'm not choosing random quotes. I chose Eisenhower since I was surprised to learn his opinion on the subject, and actually read the quote out of a paper copy of his autobiography. So while I can't be 100% sure that he wrote that, it seems extremely likely that he did.
Until a few years ago, I believed what I had learned in school - that the bombs were necessary to end the war more quickly, and that they actually saved both American and Japanese lives by hastening the surrender. If invading the home islands was the only way, and if there was a fight to the last person, then that would be a reasonable conclusion.
A few counterarguments I heard over time were not easy to dismiss:
1. Why did the surrender come on August 15th? Since no more bombs arrived after August 9th, what changed? In particular, if the US had more nuclear weapons to use, where was the August 12th bomb, since there was apparently a 3 day cycle. From the perspective of the Japanese military leadership, one explanation would be there were no more ready, so the urgency to surrender before further bombs would be lessened.
2. Why did Operation Meetinghouse (March 10th, 1945) which caused a similar amount of destruction with only conventional weapons not precipitate a surrender?
3. How important were the other reasons to use the weapons, such as: a. Testing out their effectiveness against a real enemy target. Conducting such a test initially seemed hard to believe, but in context of the firebombing of cities in Japan (e.g. Tokyo) and Germany (e.g. Dresden) may have made this test plausible to Allied military leaders. The fact that two different types of bomb were used bolsters the argument that this was in part a test. b. Deterring the Soviet armies from continuing to take territory because they had the conventional means to doing so. In other words, this was not just to end WW2, but to set the stage for the post-war environment that was coming soon. c. Making sure that the huge expense of developing the weapons wasn't "wasted" by not using them against an enemy.
I've read Paul Fussell's "Thank God for the Atom Bomb" (which I just re-read now) since it's the most concise yet persuasive argument I've encountered in favor of using atomic weapons to save lives. If I knew of a similar writing making the opposite case, I would share it here. If you know of such a thing, please let me know.
My current understanding of the situation is that the accumulation of damage inflicted against Japan helped cause the leadership to surrender. The proximate tipping point was the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. That meant the end of their peace treaty with the Soviets, the foreclosing of the possibility of the Soviets facilitating peace negotiations with the Allies, and increased the likelihood of an invasion of the home islands by the Red Army before an American invasion could happen. This is the event that finally brought the Japanese government to their senses.