[nmhancoc]

> Taxing land will be passed through 100% to the renter

Replies like this genuinely confuse me. How do you think rent prices are set now? I’ll tell you, they’re generally set to maintain a given occupancy rate, which is to say, they’re set as high as the market allows. The market being a group of renters which make an income, of which landlords generally take a third or more.

If we implemented a LVT tomorrow, the renters don’t get additional capacity to pay rent as mana from heaven. The rents wouldn’t budge.

Any claim otherwise requires it be the case that there’s capacity to raise rents that landlords aren’t currently utilizing, i.e. that landlords are undercharging renters en masse. I have never seen evidence in support of such a claim.

[AnthonyMouse]

> How do you think rent prices are set now? I’ll tell you, they’re generally set to maintain a given occupancy rate, which is to say, they’re set as high as the market allows.

"What the market allows" is affected by taxes.

Suppose the risk-adjusted return to investing in real estate in some area is equivalent to the overall market, and rents are currently $1000/mo. Then if new people move into the area, rents start to go up from higher demand, but that brings rents above the overall market rate of return, which makes it profitable for developers to invest money in building new buildings, which increases supply to match the increase in demand and acts to mitigate the increase in rents.

Now suppose you raise taxes on property ownership, so that to match the overall market rate of return, rents would have to be $1500/mo in order to cover all the existing costs plus the new taxes. Then nobody is building anything new until rents hit $1500/mo, because new construction isn't profitable until then. So when new people move in, there is an increase in demand but no corresponding increase in supply, and that persists until rents get above $1500/mo. By which point the renters are paying the new taxes.

Notice that this is effectively the same thing that happens when you impose restrictive zoning rules like single family zoning. They effectively act as a tax because now you have to buy a lot more land for each housing unit you want to add, so the cost of construction goes up and rents with it.

[nmhancoc]

This actually gets at one of the main criticisms land value tax (LVT) proponents have of traditional property taxes, which tax both land and buildings.

Let’s unpack your example with some rough numbers to see where the logic leads.

You assume rents are currently $1,000/month and that a new tax causes them to rise to $1,500/month to maintain the same return. That implies an added tax burden of $500/month per lot. If the lot is 10,000 sq-ft (common for single-family homes where I live), that’s about $0.05/sq-ft/month, or $0.60/sq-ft/year in land tax.

Now let’s look at whether this disincentivizes development.

Say a developer replaces that single-family home with a fourplex:

* Each unit is ~1,000 sq-ft - Construction cost is ~$270/sq-ft, so total is ~$1.08M * Required rent for a 5% return = $1,125/month per unit - The land tax ($500/month) is now split over 4 units = $125/month per unit * Total required rent = $1,250/month per unit, or $1.25/sq-ft/month

Compare that to the single-family home:

Rent = $1,500/month, also $1.25/sq-ft/month

So the developer earns the same return per square foot, and houses more people on the same land. Renters gain a cheaper overall option at the same cost per square foot. New development isn't disincentivized — it's neutral or even encouraged under a pure LVT.

Where your argument usually does apply is with regular property taxes, because those are assessed on both the land and the structure:

Single-family home is taxed on $240K (structure) + land Fourplex is taxed on $1.08M (structure) + land Per unit, that’s $270K in taxable improvements vs. $240K Unless the land is very expensive, higher-density development pays more tax per unit, even though it uses the land more efficiently. And that penalty grows with scale (e.g. high-rises).

That's the core issue LVT proponents focus on: property taxes tend to penalize building, while land value tax does not. In fact, LVT often makes better use of land more attractive by decoupling the tax burden from how much you invest in construction.

[AnthonyMouse]

> You assume rents are currently $1,000/month and that a new tax causes them to rise to $1,500/month to maintain the same return. That implies an added tax burden of $500/month per lot.

That implies an added tax burden of $500/month per unit. It's only $500/month per lot if the lot is only expected to have one unit.

> New development isn't disincentivized — it's neutral or even encouraged under a pure LVT.

You're getting this result by comparing it to existing property tax, which even more heavily disincentivizes new development.

Consider what happens if you only compare LVT to itself, i.e. to see what happens if you raise the amount of LVT by $500/lot.

If you build the fourplex, the amount of LVT increases by $500/lot or $125/unit. Now incentive to build the fourplex is lost unless the tenants are going to eat another $125/mo in rent.

And wait a minute here, under the existing property tax system the government was getting $500/mo/unit in property tax. If the typical plot is going to have a fourplex on it and the tax is expected to raise the same amount of revenue as the old property tax then it needs to be $2000/lot and thereby likewise increase the required rents by $500/mo/unit.

Where the incentive changes is that now you'll want to build not just fourplexes but highrises to try to dilute the LVT over more units. But now you've got a weird incentive: If existing rents are high enough then you want to build a highrise. But as soon as they drop below the point that building a highrise is profitable -- and highrises have a higher construction cost per unit -- you certainly don't want to build anything smaller than that, because the higher LVT per unit for smaller structures outweighs the lower construction cost per unit for smaller structures. So as soon as prevailing rents can't justify any more highrises, you get no more construction at all. Even if there are still a bunch of abandoned lots.

[nmhancoc]

> That implies an added tax burden of $500/month per unit. It's only $500/month per lot if the lot is only expected to have one unit.

In the starting scenario the housing supply are single family homes, so there's one unit per lot to begin with. That it happens to be $500/unit is a coincidence of math rather than a fixed statement. Governments don't levy taxes (particularly an LVT) on a per unit basis, it's only ever on a per lot basis.

> Consider what happens if you only compare LVT to itself, i.e. to see what happens if you raise the amount of LVT by $500/lot.

The point of an LVT isn't to raise it by itself, it's to trail changes in land value.

Even if you were to arbitrarily raise it by $500/lot, the price is still more affordable for the fourplex renters than the house renters. So you should still expect less negative profit from the fourplex than the single family home. That the profit is negative will disincentivize future development, but it would also includes maintenance on the single family homes. And it'd be least bad for the fourplexes, because it's more spread out.

> And wait a minute here, under the existing property tax system the government was getting $500/mo/unit in property tax.

They were getting $500/lot, that happened to coincide with per unit but is non essential. And can't be, an LVT can only ever be charged at lot level. It's a _land_ value tax, not a unit value tax.

> If the typical plot is going to have a fourplex on it and the tax is expected to raise the same amount of revenue as the old property tax then it needs to be $2000/lot and thereby likewise increase the required rents by $500/mo/unit.

Huh? The government is overseeing a certain number of lots. Total revenue given a certain tax per lot is independent of the number of units on the lot. Also the costs, for local government, are largely per lot, in the sense that the maintenance on infrastructure dominated by lot level servicing rather than incremental uses of it. The exception to this would be schools. There's no reason to think that the tax needs to increase to be equal per uni.

> Where the incentive changes is that now you'll want to build not just fourplexes but highrises to try to dilute the LVT over more units.

This implies that the tax is not set per unit, which contradicts your previous paragraph. I happen to think this is correct, incidentally.

> So as soon as prevailing rents can't justify any more highrises, you get no more construction at all. Even if there are still a bunch of abandoned lots.

Construction is generally less discrete than you're suggesting. There's generally various buildings of various degrees of age (and various levels of depreciation) in a city at a given time. Also, most cities have a spread of land values, with land being most highly valued (and thus incentivized to be most dense) in the core and less so as you spread out.

And LVT would, rather than the discrete steps you suggest, probably look like: as it increases there's an incentive to sprawl, and as long as that population is still bringing traffic and receipts into the urban core the urban core will be incentivized to redevelop to higher density. That will bring people in from the previous sprawl, until there's additional demand at which point the sprawl either increases in density or moves further out, etc.

[chii]

> So when new people move in, there is an increase in demand

but the presumption that there will be a stream of people moving in is false. The people would just not move to a place with high rent (all else being quite equal).

So high rents will lower the incoming demand. Aka, the current rent is almost always the max the market will bear, regardless of people moving in (or out) - so you can assume it's at some sort of equilibrium.

A new tax on the land will cause the owner to obsorb it, and under that equilibrium assumption above, they will not be able to raise the rent to compensate. Unless, the new tax has an equal and opposite tax credit to renters! Who now have more money, and would be able to accept a higher rent as they've become slightly richer.

[AnthonyMouse]

> but the presumption that there will be a stream of people moving in is false. The people would just not move to a place with high rent (all else being quite equal).

People move into places where there are jobs. All else is not equal, because other places don't have those jobs. Notice that higher rents correlate with population growth. Under your theory, if rents went up, shouldn't the local population decline rather than increase?

Also notice that the overall population increases over time as a result of births and immigration, and that existing structures are occasionally damaged in various ways and have to be renovated or rebuilt. The result is that the steady-state is rents going up unless you have active investment in new housing.

> So high rents will lower the incoming demand. Aka, the current rent is almost always the max the market will bear, regardless of people moving in (or out) - so you can assume it's at some sort of equilibrium.

"What the market will bear" is supply and demand. If you add costs to supplying more housing, supply won't increase until the price matches the new costs. It changes the intersection point with the same demand curve.

> Unless, the new tax has an equal and opposite tax credit to renters! Who now have more money, and would be able to accept a higher rent as they've become slightly richer.

Your assumption is that renters can't pay higher rents. It's that they won't pay higher rents if lower rents are available, which is caused by competition between landlords and increases in supply from new construction. Take that away and people have to outbid each other for the now more constrained number of units, and then people have to pay higher rents and have it come out of their other spending, or take on more debt. Because you pay for housing or you're homeless.

[Ekaros]

>If we implemented a LVT tomorrow, the renters don’t get additional capacity to pay rent as mana from heaven. The rents wouldn’t budge.

Isn't idea of LVT to replace other taxes? Like income tax. So they would get more capacity as their other tax burden would be lesser.

Obviously if it was entirely new additional tax it would take more time for rents to creep up.

[genewitch]

Let's assume what you say is true. Then the reason it's impossible in the US is because landlords would do everything in their power to stop it, because they'd be the ones eating the cost.

[nmhancoc]

I don’t think so, actually. Real estate is a pretty small sector of the economy (maybe 13 or 14% of GDP according to Google. That’s about as much as manufacturing, but not politically unassailable.

The real reason these sorts of reforms will never kick in is that roughly 2/3 of Americans are in owner occupied housing, it’s the largest asset on most of their balance sheets, and an LVT will in many cases effectively zero that out.

So it’s the homeowners (particularly the older cohorts) which will vote against this policy to the detriment of the younger cohort.

[sokoloff]

Which amounts to: “We propose to fix this problem by seizing the value embodied in the homes of 2/3 of Americans, while leaving their mortgages intact.”

That being not politically tenable is a feature of democracy, not a bug.

[AnthonyMouse]

It is kind of a bug, because otherwise how do you fix it?

Housing got set up as a pyramid scheme where the price keeps going up because supply is constrained, so younger people have to take out ever-bigger mortgages in order to have somewhere to live. Nobody wants the prices to be unaffordable until they buy a house, but once they do they're locked in to the high price they bought in at and want prices to go up even more. When you have a majority of people on the hellbound side of the line then you're locked into a death spiral that violently explodes once the prices get so high that the majority can no longer afford a home.

[chii]

> otherwise how do you fix it?

fixing it implies it is a problem in the first place. It isn't a problem.

There is no right to ownership of a property (despite it being called the american dream). As long as rental vacancy is sufficient to not cause mass homelessness, it isnt a problem. And if does become a problem, the issue becomes one of production of supply and density (related to allowed zoning), and not the price and taxation (of land).

And it is through the fight to afford to buy property that productivity and innovation can be forged.

[AnthonyMouse]

> fixing it implies it is a problem in the first place. It isn't a problem.

Isn't it?

80% of people own a home, so they vote for policies that increase housing costs. Then 70% of people can afford to own a home, so they vote for policies that increase housing costs.

Eventually only 45% of people can afford a home, so the now-majority of renters vote for different policies. The entire edifice built on ever-increasing home values collapses because policies to support their continued increase are no longer favored by the majority. Without the expectation of continued price increases, speculators divest. There is a massive housing crash and all the people who did own a home end up underwater on their mortgages, but they're no longer in the majority so the now-majority only cheers because housing costs have finally come down and they're no longer paying two thirds of their income in rent. The now-underwater homeowners hand the keys back to the bank, because why pay a $500,000 mortgage when you can now get a house for $250,000?

That's a pending disaster. Maybe we should consider policies that get housing prices down in a controlled way, instead of causing a giant recession?

> There is no right to ownership of a property (despite it being called the american dream). As long as rental vacancy is sufficient to not cause mass homelessness, it isnt a problem.

"As long as there isn't mass homelessness, having landlords milk workers for everything they have is fine"? You get "can't afford medicine" and "can't afford nutritious food" long before you get homelessness. You get "can't afford to start a business" long before even those things. That's bad. That's a problem.

> And if does become a problem, the issue becomes one of production of supply and density (related to allowed zoning), and not the price and taxation (of land).

Those things are related. If taxation is higher then investment in new construction goes down.

Land value tax also does something extra weird. Suppose the annual tax on a plot of land is a million dollars. Meanwhile the amortized construction cost of putting one house on it is $30k annually, a 10 unit complex is $400k and a 25 unit complex is $1.5M annually, because taller buildings cost more per unit. Then the annual cost per unit with the LVT is $1.03M for the house, $140k for the 10 unit complex and $100k for the 25 unit complex. Even though the 25 unit complex costs twice as much per unit than the house to build, and 50% more per unit than the 10 unit complex, and even though the local population density may only require 5 housing units on each plot of land.

So the result is that you get a lot of 25+ unit condos/apartments, and then a lot of abandoned plots with nothing on them at all, because it's not cost effective to build on them unless you're going to build at least 25 units, but it's also not worth the construction cost of 25 units unless rents stay above $100k/year/unit. So you get enough towers to get rents down to the cost of the tower plus the LVT on the land under it and then construction stops because it both costs too much to build more towers (higher construction cost per unit) and costs too much to build smaller structures on the remaining land (LVT kills you with fewer units per plot).

> And it is through the fight to afford to buy property that productivity and innovation can be forged.

High rents cause poverty and crime, not productivity and innovation.

[sokoloff]

There are many other forms of government which are less subject to the influence of the people and their silly preferences.

If you don’t want to switch forms of government, formulating a holistic plan, addressing weaknesses in the plan, laying out how the transition will work, educating the people about it, and convincing them why your plan is better is what I’d recommend.

[AnthonyMouse]

The general problem is the "democracy is two wolves and a sheep voting on what's for dinner" thing. If you can get at least 51% of people to vote for "I've got mine" then you've created a system of injustice. Which is nominally why we use a republic rather than a direct democracy.

But those checks and balances have been eroded over time, or weren't strong enough to begin with, so then the majority e.g. votes to constrain new construction because they value their own short-term financial gain over the greater harm they're causing to the minority.

And then the same dynamic plays out for some other issue, but this time you're in the minority and you take -50 damage instead of a +10 gain. So the problem is that it's in everyone's interest to stop this from happening in general, but only in the minority's interest to do it on any particular issue, and democracy in and of itself isn't structured to handle that.

[chgs]

Old rich people want young working people to pay for their lives.

No surprise there.

[actionfromafar]

I wonder what may happen when that generation fades away.

[chgs]

Wealth that isn’t concentrating on the 1% will be diluted as part of inheritance. Those from a poor background will continue to be screwed no matter how well they are doing. Tabitha who makes clogs for shitzus as a job (standard person on uk real Estate shows) will co time to live rent free massive houses while those working and living in the cities massive rent and commuting will do tie to pay far more tax.

[sokoloff]

Old and young are late-bound.

I don’t think any of this is particular to nor confined to a specific generation.

[actionfromafar]

I just meant that, at this time, there is big cohort of old people living in large (and largely empty) houses.

[protocolture]

>they’re set as high as the market allows.

Huge red flag, this isnt the case. It isnt a perfectly liquid market.

>If we implemented a LVT tomorrow, the renters don’t get additional capacity to pay rent as mana from heaven.

No of course not, the process would probably take 12 months, as home owners identify their losses, and instruct rental agencies to end leases and increase prices. Accepting that while the house might be on the market for longer than usual, attracting a higher income tenant and getting them to sign for term is going to long term resolve the new hole in their budget.

>that landlords are undercharging renters en masse. I have never seen evidence in support of such a claim.

I am living this discussion right now. So this is amusing me.

I rented my current property in 2020 for 320 p/w. It was probably worth 400 p/w I had a handshake agreement with the rental agency that they would leave the price where it is, and I would complete as much maintenance myself before raising a fuss.

In 2022, the owners had to sell the property to pay for medical treatment. The old owners had no mortgage, and loved having a fixed stable income. Their biggest risk was having the property untenanted for any length of time. So they left the price alone while the world moved on.

The new owner has raised the rent every 12 months since. The previous owners sold at a massive gain, and the new owner was struggling to pay the mortgage. My calculation based on sale price is that their mortgage payments were in excess of 380 p/w and, considering the sale grandfathered my no maintenance agreement, are looking at considerable maintenance costs.

Current cost to me is ~500 per week.

Issues: Market is currently roughly (we have big discussions about this) permitting 520 - 540 pw for similar properties.

My barrier is that its a substantial cost to move. So I negotiate all the price rises with the real estate in terms of property improvements.

If they saw a taxation increase imposed by an LVT, they would not hesitate to pass it on to me over 12 months. I would have to reevaluate the costs to move. If the same increase occurred roughly evenly across where I want to live, I would probably just have to make it work. I cant go anywhere to avoid the LVT increase, and it costs money to relocate. I would have to further erode my spending in other areas to account for it. And I could.

This really comes back to what the LVT is designed to do. Its designed to enforce the most efficient use of the land. The outcome is intrinsic to the goal. The land is not being used most efficiently (I rue the day that my landlord figures out that we have the exact amount of land required to battleaxe the block, turning my backyard into another property) which for humans, as opposed to spherical cows, is actually fantastic in a lot of cases. Under an LVT my landlord would be required to run the property in the most taxation efficient manner, which is counter to my interests as a renter.

But yeah, the rental market is not liquid. There's costs to move. Costs for having the property on the market untenanted for significant time. Costs to bring a property up to spec between renters etc etc. And lots of people live in that gap. To the point where our local real estate industry body actually issued guidance to real estates that they should raise the rent as frequently as possible because it wasn't getting done very often, suppressing prices.

[eru]

> No of course not, the process would probably take 12 months, as home owners identify their losses, and instruct rental agencies to end leases and increase prices.

Why don't home owners just instruct rental agencies right now to end leases and increase prices? Why do they need to wait for some hypothetical tax to kick in?

[sokoloff]

Because their tenant can just go down the street and rent from another landlord whose costs did not increase by $10-20K/yr.

In a world where LVTs increased taxes on all nearby landlords, that threat is an empty one. Sure, they can threaten to go move 10 miles away or eventually to go move into a beehive apartment that will be built 3 years from now to optimally house humans while not leaving a shred of land under-used.

[eru]

> Because their tenant can just go down the street and rent from another landlord whose costs did not increase by $10-20K/yr.

Well, that only works iff landlords can pass down these taxes. That's exactly what we are discussing. So this is begging the question.

> In a world where LVTs increased taxes on all nearby landlords, that threat is an empty one. [...]

It doesn't matter. Even if only left-handed landlords paid LVT, rents wouldn't change depending on the handedness of your landlord. (However, left-handed landlords would likely sell to righthanded landlords, because the property is worth more to them.)

[sokoloff]

It is not begging the question to identify that a key economic factor would change under an LVT to be different from today. This change would affect the number of landlords who could profitably offer units for rent at today’s prices, which I posit would affect their willingness to supply units at that price, shifting their supply curve.

Your own observation that rents would not change based on handedness of your landlord implies that you understand this.

[eru]

The supply of land is fixed.

(You can change the supply of land on the market, by eg giving a tax subsidy for keeping land off the market. That's what the British council tax does in many counties: you get a rebate, if your property ain't occupied.

But LVT specifically does not depend on what you do with the property. It's due one way or another, thus it has no influence on the supply of land.)

[notahacker]

Fixed term rental contracts in many jurisdictions, and lack of motivation, particularly for landlords buying property primarily for anticipated capital gains who are quite happy with a "reliable" tenant paying no much more than their costs, but won't be prepared to do the same thing when the monthly cost goes up (and most of the anticipated capital gain disappears...)

[eru]

Sure. But how do any of these factors suddenly change with an LVT?

An LVT doesn't change any of the opportunity costs here. Getting more rent is exactly as useful (or not) as without an LVT.

[notahacker]

If you go from covering your costs and expecting to making a capital gain to not covering your costs and not expecting to make a capital gain, you're much more likely to put the rent up

[eru]

Approximately all landlords are already charging the maximum they can. Especially commercial landlords. Otherwise, they would break the fiduciary duties to their shareholders.

[protocolture]

Because they dont have a need to risk long term vacancies.

[chgs]

If you live in an in demand area there is no risk. Price can be increased until people move out.

If you live where there’s no demand and r prey houses already you can force prices down just as easily.

Mortgages prove costs aren’t passed on. A landlord with a lot gage doesn’t on the whole charge a higher rent than one without.

[protocolture]

>A landlord with a lot gage doesn’t on the whole charge a higher rent than one without.

Thats literally my experience, the new owner with a mortgage charged me more.

[eru]

You got lucky with the old owner. They gave you a sweetheart deal.

I hope your new landlord will lower your rent, when they refinance to a cheaper mortgage. (Or are only higher mortgage rates pass through? What's the difference?)

[eru]

Sure. But how does this change with an LVT?

[protocolture]

Your question that I answered wasn't about LVT, so shoehorning LVT back in here seems irrelevant.

If your question is, AH BUT SOMETIMES THEY DONT INCREASE RENT ALWAYS SO MAYBE THEY WONT INCREASE IT WITH AN LVT. But we are talking about a situation where the cost to supply a rental property has increased dramatically.

Landlords will fit into 2 categories.

1. Landlords who can absorb the cost.

2. Landlords who cannot absorb the cost.

Landlords have 3 options.

1. Try and absorb the cost.

2. Pass on the cost through increased rent (possibly leaving the property untenanted)

3. Sell

Landlords who cannot absorb the cost either need to pass it on or sell. Theres no "absorb it" long term for them. Likely the vast majority will try to pass the cost on before doing so.

The question remains whether landlords who can absorb the cost, increase prices. If enough of the market bites on the rent increases they likely will.

Also, there's another leg here. If significant numbers of landlords remove their properties from market, scarcity will drive up rental prices anyway. We literally did this to ourselves years ago when we removed negative gearing. Negative gearing has a tendency to drive up rental prices, but it also drives up supply of rental properties. We removed it for a year or two and the result was a dramatic increase in rental prices due to lack of supply. Renters cannot become home owners fast enough to ensure elastic demand, that's why house ownership : rentals is often seen as arbitrage. You take a product from one market and make it available to consumers in another market.

[chii]

> If significant numbers of landlords remove their properties from market, scarcity will drive up rental prices anyway.

unless you're imagining they're destroying the property, you cannot "remove" it from the market (or they decide to leave it vacant deliberately - an illogical a choice as destroying the property).

If they sell to a owner occupier, it removes that buyer's original rental demand, by the same amount as the removal of the rental property from the market.

If they live in it themselves, it's the same (just no money changing hands).

[6510]

Or we could simply see you paying as much rent as possible as the most efficient use of the land. That would simplify the plot considerably.

[protocolture]

I mean yeah it is the most efficient use of the land. One of the reasons most efficient use isnt a good metric for everyone.

[nmhancoc]

This was a long reply and I’d like to honor it by addressing what you bring up, but there’s a lot so forgive me for jumping around.

Let’s start by noting that we’ve now shifted the argument from “100% of this tax will be charged to renters” to, “this will get passed through to renters who were previously being undercharged.”

It’s hard to directly argue with your anecdote because I don’t know where you are or what your rental market is like, so I’ll address the argument more broadly.

Let’s examine how common that arrangement is. To the best of my search small time landlords of the variety you mention own something on the order of 35 and 40% of rental units. The rest, primarily multifamily (apartments) are owned by corporate landlords.

The corporate landlords were sued by the last admin for price fixing using realpage. I don’t know if or how that case was resolved but I think it’s safe to conclude they’re probably not undercharging.

For the small time landlords, probably some aren’t undercharging and some are. After all, how hard is checking neighborhood rents on Zillow once a year? Even if none are, we’re still admitting at least 60% of renters aren’t getting the kind of deals you mention. So this is a minority case, and probably shouldn’t be the basis of policy.

Addressing this point: > Under an LVT my landlord would be required to run the property in the most taxation efficient manner, which is counter to my interests as a renter.

Even granting that that’s true, I’d argue it’s not persuasive. The government needs some amount of money to function. LVT is one source of that money, income taxes are another, sales taxes are another, wealth taxes are another, etc.

So your argument fundamentally resolves down to “other members of society should make up the deficit in taxes I would otherwise pay so that I (and others in my situation) can enjoy a yard or more space than I otherwise would.”

And the basic question here is, why? In what way does it benefit literally anyone else in society that you have a bigger yard? This is a blunt and perhaps impolite way to put it, but it’s true.

Going back to those alternatives, we can counterfactually raise income taxes on some waiter bussing tables or a SWE slinging code at Facebook, on an author with a copyright, or on someone who owns a business. But, if we do, we should expect less of all of those services. That serves as a reason to avoid such a tax.

In contrast, with the yard, I can’t think of a single such service provided or reason to avoid the tax. And that’s the crux of the Georgist argument more than railroads or slumlords. It’s the empty lot, or the lawn as we now call it.

[protocolture]

>The government needs some amount of money to function.

The issue at hand isnt "Does the government need money to function" unless we are going full MMT derp we can all accept a level of taxation is necessary.

The issue at hand is whether LVT is a better distribution of the burden of taxation.

>So your argument fundamentally resolves down to “other members of society should make up the deficit in taxes I would otherwise pay so that I (and others in my situation) can enjoy a yard or more space than I otherwise would.”

My argument is largely that by shifting the burden of tax from a progressive tax regime, that is only targeting those by an amount calculated on what they can afford, to a tax regime thats largely dictated by circumstance and subjective valuation, you will hurt a lot of people who dont deserve it.

If we go too far in this direction we will have to define basic moral principles, because that seems to be where you are heading. I dont necessarily think that earning income should mark you for punishment either. But just as not taxing the homeless is fairly universal, not taxing people who organised their retirement and arent a burden is also fairly universal. Your mileage may vary.