| > You're effectively shifting responsibility to consumers, who are probably not going to see a CVE for one of the dozens of softwares they use every day. Which is again, a problem created by the companies themselves. The way this should work is that the researcher discloses to the company, and the company reaches out to and informs their customers immediately. Then they fix it. But instead companies refuse to tell their customers when they're at risk, and make it out to be the researchers that are endangering people, when those researchers don't wait on an arbitrary, open-ended future date. > Increasing the chance of a bad actor actually doing something with a vulnerability seems bad, actually. Unless you know who knows what already, this is unprovable supposition (it could already be being exploited in the wild), and the arguments about whether POC code is good or bad is well tread, and covers this question. You are just making the argument that obscurity is security, and it's not. |
If that was common practice, bad actors would make sure to be a registered customer of all interesting targets, so that they get informed early about vulnerabilities before there is a fix. And it would create a black market for that information.
When someone gets the information “Asus BIOS has an RCE vulnerability related to driver installation”, they’ll be able to figure out the details quickly with high probability, like OP did.