[varjag]

> Russia can barely handle a stalemate with Ukraine.

See, people look at the stalemate and often draw false conclusions. It's not that Russia was too weak militarily, it's that Ukraine put up one hell of a fight.

And all these economy size comparisons are mostly meaningless. Sure Russia may have a GDP of Italy but by the same logic Ukraine (which is a fraction of Russian GDP) should have lost long ago.

> They have zero chance against Poland and the Baltics

Russia's chances against the Baltics are pretty good, I would say 1 in 3. And for Putin it's a proposition with no downside: at worst he loses another few hundred thousand subjects.

[sofixa]

> See, people look at the stalemate and often draw false conclusions. It's not that Russia was too weak militarily, it's that Ukraine put up one hell of a fight

While Ukraine unquestionably put up a hell of a fight, the fact that the numerically superior army with the better and more numerical equipment, backed by the multiple times bigger and richer country failed is a failure. Especially when you consider that Ukraine doesn't have a navy and barely had an air force and anti-air, yet Russia failed at establishing air or naval control, let alone dominance.

> Russia's chances against the Baltics are pretty good, I would say 1 in 3.

Russia has no chance of having a war against the Baltics only. Any aggression against them will be met with a swift reaction from Poland, which has a better equipped army than Ukraine. If Ukraine can destroy the best Russian units and hold to a stalemate the majority of the remainder for years, Poland will wipe the floor with the war criminals.

[alxlaz]

> While Ukraine unquestionably put up a hell of a fight, the fact that the numerically superior army with the better and more numerical equipment, backed by the multiple times bigger and richer country failed is a failure. Especially when you consider that Ukraine doesn't have a navy and barely had an air force and anti-air, yet Russia failed at establishing air or naval control, let alone dominance.

That's certainly true, but much of this failure can be ascribed to:

1. Lack of co-ordination (both inter-force and within each unit) and basic best-practices in terms of logistics. The Russian armed forces are still far from anything NATO has in this regard but are also a lot better than when the war began.

2. Poor mobilisation and insufficient initial forces. Most of this was based on the obviously misguided notion that Russian forces would be welcome as liberators (which, haha, no, 40+ years of Soviet or Soviet-backed regimes in Eastern Europe have ensured this would not happen for generations), and is unlikely to be repeated.

3. Considerable strategic depth, which further compounded #1 and #2, which the Baltics don't have.

4. Considerable development of expertise on the Ukrainian side, which has been fighting in Donetsk and Luhansk since the first Russian invasion in 2014, whereas neither Poland nor the Baltics armed forces have had much exposure to real-life war outside the GWOT.

5. A smaller mismatch in terms of equipment than media coverage makes it sound, certainly far smaller than that of the Baltics.

The odds varjag puts forward aren't at all outlandish, especially with NATO commitment so uncertain at this time.

[bluGill]

While US commitment to NATO is uncertain, the rest of NATO still seems certain. Russia might be able to take the Baltic and/or Poland - but they won't be able to keep it. Soon as they cross the border (or more likely start building up) the rest of Europe will start building up their army to attack back.

[pmontra]

A country attacks another one only if it doesn't have political control of it feels that never will. For example Russia doesn't have to attack Belarus and won't have to attack Hungary, and probably not Slovakia. They'll be part of the next Warsaw Pact without any bullet flying if their leaders will get guarantees that they can be leaders forever. Poland looked like it was going that way before the current administration. Ukraine itself have been pro Russia or pro NATO at different times in the last 25 years. No need to attack it when it was pro Russia. So let's see who that "rest of Europe" will be if and when there will be the need to defend some country in the East.

[bluGill]

Political climates can change though. Will Hungary as a whole stand for that? Ukraine woke up when it realized what the leaders were trying.

[dylan604]

Why do you think any of these issues will not also be issues on a western front?

[alxlaz]

I am sure they will be, I'm just saying that a Western front will be extremely different from the Ukrainian front, especially in the Baltics, where #3 is particularly salient. So I would recommend caution when applying over-arching lessons from Ukraine to these situations, that's all.

[varjag]

> Especially when you consider that Ukraine doesn't have a navy and barely had an air force and anti-air, yet Russia failed at establishing air or naval control, let alone dominance.

Ukraine had dozens of airworthy fighter jets and well over a hundred air defense batteries at the start. Many of the latter were lost in the first weeks but Ukraine was fairly packed as far as smaller nations go.

> Russia has no chance of having a war against the Baltics only.

No, Russian chance of occupying significant part of Baltics with realistic level of NATO involvement is 1 in 3. It would be most certainly able to overrun the three states absent NATO support.

> Any aggression against them will be met with a swift reaction from Poland, which has a better equipped army than Ukraine. If Ukraine can destroy the best Russian units and hold to a stalemate the majority of the remainder for years, Poland will wipe the floor with the war criminals.

That's the spirit I was mentioning yeah, "Ukrainians are bit backwards unlike we noble NATO elves". Name one thing in Polish military that Ukrainian military today doesn't have though?

The coming war will be hell of a reality check for many.

[geoka9]

> Name one thing in Polish military that Ukrainian military today doesn't have though?

Lack of combat experience.

But seriously, very good analysis!

[sofixa]

> But seriously, very good analysis

Nah, it's utter bullshit. Russia can't defeat Ukraine on its own, but they think Russia has a 1 in 3 chance of victory if they add Poland, Baltics, Finland to their war? It's pure wishful nonsense.

[varjag]

First if you want me to continue in this tone you set here do let me know. But you'll ultimately come to regret it.

Second I have friends and product manufacturing in the Baltics, so my opinion is anything but wishful. One thing I can not afford though is your head in the sand optimism.

[sofixa]

> One thing I can not afford though is your head in the sand optimism

It's not optimism to be dismissive of opinions with no basis in reality.

Russia cannot defeat Ukraine. If they attack in the Baltic, they'll add at least a few more enemies. It's mathematically impossible for them to fare better with more enemies when their current efforts are suffering due to men and materiel.

[sofixa]

> Ukraine had dozens of airworthy fighter jets

Russia had how many hundreds? And how much time to prepare how to neutralise them?

> , Russian chance of occupying significant part of Baltics with realistic level of NATO involvement is 1 in 3. It would be most certainly able to overrun the three states absent NATO support

No. If Russia attacks the Baltics, it's guaranteed that Poland will join (with at least some NATO support).

> That's the spirit I was mentioning yeah, "Ukrainians are bit backwards unlike we noble NATO elves". Name one thing in Polish military that Ukrainian military today doesn't have though

Years of preparation and conscious arming with a real budget? Ukraine had to go from a small and under equipped (mostly with obsolete Soviet era stuff) army to a total war in mere days. The complete mobilisation meant that there was limited time to train and equip everyone properly. Poland has had years to prepare equipment, training, planning, coordination.

Again, Russia can't handle Ukraine and has no clear path to victory there. Why on earth do you think it could handle more fronts, especially against better equipped and prepared enemies? Nobody is saying Putin is rational, but even he has to know that.

[varjag]

> Russia had how many hundreds? And how much time to prepare how to neutralise them?

Few dozen fighters on alert in a heavy AD environment is objectively a lot. Most of Ukrainian early AD losses happened in the south and were the outcome of treason by the regional command.

> No. If Russia attacks the Baltics, it's guaranteed that Poland will join (with at least some NATO support).

I feel you're talking past me. Yes Poland will join, absolutely: the battle for Suwalki/Kaliningrad will affect it directly if anything. But without the US commitment (which I hope you realize is not happening) there is a 1 in 3 chance of Putin's substantial success.

> Years of preparation and conscious arming with a real budget? Ukraine had to go from a small and under equipped (mostly with obsolete Soviet era stuff) army to a total war in mere days.

Ukraine was waging a war with Russia for 8 years by the day of the full scale invasion. It was prepared about as much as a country in its circumstances could be. Had this invasion happened in 2014 that really would have been the touted 3-day operation.

> Why on earth do you think it could handle more fronts, especially against better equipped and prepared enemies? Nobody is saying Putin is rational, but even he has to know that.

Every serious European government is gearing up for the war now, so it's clearly not just me alone. The mode of fighting had changed substantially. F-35s a great for cooking off tank waves (that mostly don't exist anymore) but are not very useful against waves of meat sweeping through the forests and millions of attack drones.

NATO is still a formidable force even without the US component but coordinated action would be critical and it's a huge question still. Poland and Finland alone will not be enough to blunt the attack on the Baltic states which are very logistically vulnerable. So Putin has a fair, largely consequence free shot at it but the window of opportunity will close within a year or two.

[sofixa]

> Yes Poland will join, absolutely: the battle for Suwalki/Kaliningrad will affect it directly if anything. But without the US commitment (which I hope you realize is not happening) there is a 1 in 3 chance of Putin's substantial success.

So you think that a Russia that cannot defeat Ukraine has a chance to win, meaning you think they have the troops, equipment and logistics to defeat Poland, the Baltics and Finland at the same time? There is no planet on which this makes sense.

> So Putin has a fair, largely consequence free shot at it but the window of opportunity will close within a year or two.

Not only does he not have the troops nor equipment, a year or two window still leaves Macron in the Elysée who will not let such an attack slide, up to and including potential nuclear weapons. And has stated so clearly and publicly.

You seem very confident, but your premise is wrong and lacking in critical information.

[varjag]

> So you think that a Russia that cannot defeat Ukraine has a chance to win, meaning you think they have the troops, equipment and logistics to defeat Poland, the Baltics and Finland at the same time?

No, just the Baltics. There will be no attack on Polish or Finnish mainland and so would these countries reciprocate only on the Baltic theatre. Neither Poland nor Finland will commit all their resources to defending the Baltics exposing the rest of their border.

The Baltics can be supplied only by air, sea and a very vulnerable land corridor. Air and sea will be very much excluded for the duration of hostilites and the Suwalki gap heavily contested. If Russia would manage to hold onto it long enough the Baltic story will be one huge siege of Mariupol. For Estonia the odds are the worst: even if the siege is broken and its neighbors are liberated it's too small and too close to Russia mainland that it could still remain under effective Russian control.

> You seem very confident, but your premise is wrong and lacking in critical information.

Well back in September 2021 I felt that the attack on Ukraine is coming (and have the receipts for that). Certainly not just me alone but at that moment and up to the very invasion there was huge skepticism around, and not just among Putin shills. "How would it help Russian security?" "But Sweden and Finland would join NATO!" "Russian economy would reel from sanctions, why do that!" Yet here we are.

I remember participating at a national championship here in Norway on 18.02.2024 and my teammate asked me what do I think of the situation. My take was that we're days, if not hours from the invasion and certainly within a week. He was quite startled by it then.

This year on the same championship people in the cafeteria were talking about the coming war matter-of-factly.

[ivan_gammel]

>Russia's chances against the Baltics are pretty good, I would say 1 in 3. And for Putin it's a proposition with no downside: at worst he loses another few hundred thousand subjects.

Article 5 is still in effect, even if America won’t take its part. Attack of Baltics will trigger response from all neighbors including Finland, Sweden and Poland. Kaliningrad won’t last long, St.Petersburg will be within reach of artillery etc. It will be suicidal to do that.

One thing that Westerners do not understand is that people in small towns or rural areas of Russia may be expendable, but population of St.Petersburg and Moscow is a protected class. If they suffer, the regime may actually collapse before reaching military goals. For this reason Russian mobilization barely touched both capitals.

[pmontra]

If I were Putin I'd attack some very minor NATO state to check if NATO will really send soldiers to defend it. Example: is really somebody willing to die for Estonia? (Sorry HNers from Estonia, but you are just in the worst possible place of all of NATO.) If not, NATO will crumble into pieces. If yes, let's see who's sending soldiers and who won't, and how they will react to the first week of casualties. Keep going or fold?

Maybe before getting there, if I end up controlling the next parliament of Ukraine I'd take over Moldova, and before that let's teach a lesson to Armenia. That's to keep the army busy and not let soldiers back home where they could cause troubles or, god forbids, create a pacifist movement like after the Afghan war (the Russian one.)

[sofixa]

> If I were Putin I'd attack some very minor NATO state to check if NATO will really send soldiers to defend it. Example: is really somebody willing to die for Estonia

Even if nobody else, the other Baltic states and Poland will defend them. Very decent chance of Finland, Sweden, UK, France joining as well.

[pmontra]

Finland and Sweden yes, because they are the next ones in line on that front. UK probably but not 100%. France, it depends who'll be the president, who controls the parliament and what they'll have to say to get the votes to win the next elections.

[ivan_gammel]

But you are not Putin and he is not you. Attacking Ukraine wasn’t a gamble for him, it was a presumably easy win, like Georgia in 2008. Attack on NATO on Baltic shore isn’t an easy win, it’s a gamble. And what is this test for? America has already learned the lesson and is withdrawing from Russian periphery. Europe has no interest in power games, UK is in irreversible decline. NATO is not going to expand anymore in foreseeable future, primary military goal achieved and Russian authoritarianism is secure. Why he would attack Baltics?

[varjag]

You are trying to hypothesise a rational actor except you model the actor on ordinary people.

An aging authoritarian is not concerned with long term security, well being of his subjects or boring diplomatic minutae. Seeing his days vanishing, he is intent on leaving a mark in history. What matters is not how pretty the mark is going to be but how visible shall it be through centuries. And since the authoritarian's strength is more often brutality than intelligence, the role model would inevitably be Stalin, Genghis Khan or Ivan the Terrible.

Within their framework the dictator is entirely a rational actor but on a very different vector than what think tanks usually muse about.

[ivan_gammel]

You are describing a fantasy fiction, but reality is not that simple. Putin’s actions were very rational by Western standards of reasoning (NB not moral standards). His invasion had a point, but was based on bad intelligence and some logical flaws, just like American invasion to Iraq two decades before. He is no more crazy than Chinese or Iranian leaders and probably more sane than current American administration. He is absolutely ordinary man, a grandpa who accidentally came to power, is afraid of retirement and whose views were influenced by external factors. He is not a philosopher, he had not written lots of books on his ideology etc. He is not on a mission, even if he may dream about it. He just steers the wheel and seizes the opportunities. If you look further in the past, the whole Ukrainian conflict may have started from a single naval base in Sevastopol, loosing which would be a major blow in the chess game. And then one escalation followed another, leading into current quagmire. And he was just carried in the stream. He has no exit strategy but to wait for something to happen. NATO just need to hold firm and have enough presence on borders to make blitzkrieg impossible.

[varjag]

There was no threat of losing Sevalstopol, which was leased until 2049 in non-aligned and then substantially pro-Russian Ukraine. You build your whole chain of reasoning on a faulty premise.

[geoka9]

The latest expansion of NATO was barely a year ago (with Sweden joining).

Russian authoritarianism may be secure, but the current regime's power is not (not to mention their leaders' paranoia).

Their ambition is the control of continental Europe. It might sound crazy, but if you listen to people like Dugin, it is very clear. And it's not that unrealistic in the longer run, considering everything you listed in your post.

The onslaught on Europe will continue - first (already happening) on its unity through the financing and propaganda support of the right-wing populist candidates who don't know (or simply don't care) better and then, once every (relatively) little country in Europe is on their own, on their sovereignty through military threat and/or invasion.

I will also leave this here as I think it is pertinent to the discussion:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313258664_Putin's_R...

[ivan_gammel]

>listen to people like Dugin, it is very clear

Don’t be afraid of scarecrows. He is a powerless freak far away from the decision makers, not Rasputin. Says a lot, but doesn’t really matter. It is much more interesting what people in security council say and who gets the contracts. There’s zero indication of expansion but a lot of messages about not messing with “legitimate interests”. They protect what they think is theirs.

The ambition of the control over continental Europe exists only in imagination of people with no understanding of Russian internal politics. They need absence of threat and parking lot for the money, so they will play the game of influence, but war? Nonsense.

[geoka9]

> It is much more interesting what people in security council say

People in the security council were cowering with fear on 22-02-22 afraid to say the unthinkable and Putin openly gloating while forcing them to say it.

Dugin is a freak alright, but he has the ear of (and is privy to) the paranoid decision makers there; he was talking about the impending war long before anyone else.

> They need absence of threat and parking lot for the money

It will be much easier to park their money in any one of the small rich countries (e.g. Switzerland) once those are not encumbered by the KYC and AML rules imposed by the globalist word order. Same with their luxury properties and kids in private schools.

They don't need to invade every country to control the continent. Look at Finland prior to the collapse of the USSR - while staying mostly independent they still had to run their leadership choices by the Kremlin and did not even think about joining military alliances to avoid confrontation.

> so they will play the game of influence, but war?

Right, they played the game of influence with Ukraine until they lost all influence and and saw an opportunity for military success. On the other hand, they are not invading Georgia or Belarus because the governments are in their pocket and their security apparatuses are basically departments within FSB. For the same reason they won't be invading Hungary or Slovakia any time soon. But the Baltic countries? I'm not so sure.

[johnisgood]

> it's that Ukraine put up one hell of a fight.

I would like to add that, yes, with a lot of money and weapons from the US and other countries, they would not have been able to do it without their help. Am I wrong about the aid's significance, or did it not happen?

[sofixa]

Yes, but the initial stopping of the Russian advance happened before the vast majority of that help arrived. In a way, Russia lost the war the moment it didn't finish it in a few days - it ensured Ukraine could be supplied, and that the resistance will be remembered and kept on.

[johnisgood]

Where can I read more about this, is Wikipedia accurate?

[pmontra]

The Wikipedia page about the Battle of Kyiv https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kyiv_(2022) is what I remember from the news of 3 years ago.