[chaostheory]

My guess is that they were overtly trying to show Russia that we aren’t a direct threat to them anymore in the vain attempt to avoid fighting a two front war in the upcoming global war. Unfortunately, Putin is likely going to keep invading up to Germany’s Fulda Gap. If we’re still a part of NATO, we would have no choice but to declare war.

[sennalen]

This is WW3 playing out. Russia installed its people in America to dismantle our defenses.

[sofixa]

> Unfortunately, Putin is likely going to keep invading up to Germany’s Fulda Gap

Russia can barely handle a stalemate with Ukraine. They have zero chance offensively against Poland and the Baltics, let alone the full blown might of the EU+UK (which also have independent nuclear weapons in France and to an extent the UK). That doesn't mean that a Polish offensive can march into Moscow, but it doesn't have to for Putin to lose power. He's showing his strongman strong army bullshit to be little more than a paper tiger, and at some point even the nihilistic to death Russians will get tired of the meat grinder for literally no reason.

[Braxton1980]

So if a direct military conflict is difficult for Putin wouldn't it be best to attack the US by manipulating it's population?

[varjag]

> Russia can barely handle a stalemate with Ukraine.

See, people look at the stalemate and often draw false conclusions. It's not that Russia was too weak militarily, it's that Ukraine put up one hell of a fight.

And all these economy size comparisons are mostly meaningless. Sure Russia may have a GDP of Italy but by the same logic Ukraine (which is a fraction of Russian GDP) should have lost long ago.

> They have zero chance against Poland and the Baltics

Russia's chances against the Baltics are pretty good, I would say 1 in 3. And for Putin it's a proposition with no downside: at worst he loses another few hundred thousand subjects.

[sofixa]

> See, people look at the stalemate and often draw false conclusions. It's not that Russia was too weak militarily, it's that Ukraine put up one hell of a fight

While Ukraine unquestionably put up a hell of a fight, the fact that the numerically superior army with the better and more numerical equipment, backed by the multiple times bigger and richer country failed is a failure. Especially when you consider that Ukraine doesn't have a navy and barely had an air force and anti-air, yet Russia failed at establishing air or naval control, let alone dominance.

> Russia's chances against the Baltics are pretty good, I would say 1 in 3.

Russia has no chance of having a war against the Baltics only. Any aggression against them will be met with a swift reaction from Poland, which has a better equipped army than Ukraine. If Ukraine can destroy the best Russian units and hold to a stalemate the majority of the remainder for years, Poland will wipe the floor with the war criminals.

[alxlaz]

> While Ukraine unquestionably put up a hell of a fight, the fact that the numerically superior army with the better and more numerical equipment, backed by the multiple times bigger and richer country failed is a failure. Especially when you consider that Ukraine doesn't have a navy and barely had an air force and anti-air, yet Russia failed at establishing air or naval control, let alone dominance.

That's certainly true, but much of this failure can be ascribed to:

1. Lack of co-ordination (both inter-force and within each unit) and basic best-practices in terms of logistics. The Russian armed forces are still far from anything NATO has in this regard but are also a lot better than when the war began.

2. Poor mobilisation and insufficient initial forces. Most of this was based on the obviously misguided notion that Russian forces would be welcome as liberators (which, haha, no, 40+ years of Soviet or Soviet-backed regimes in Eastern Europe have ensured this would not happen for generations), and is unlikely to be repeated.

3. Considerable strategic depth, which further compounded #1 and #2, which the Baltics don't have.

4. Considerable development of expertise on the Ukrainian side, which has been fighting in Donetsk and Luhansk since the first Russian invasion in 2014, whereas neither Poland nor the Baltics armed forces have had much exposure to real-life war outside the GWOT.

5. A smaller mismatch in terms of equipment than media coverage makes it sound, certainly far smaller than that of the Baltics.

The odds varjag puts forward aren't at all outlandish, especially with NATO commitment so uncertain at this time.

[bluGill]

While US commitment to NATO is uncertain, the rest of NATO still seems certain. Russia might be able to take the Baltic and/or Poland - but they won't be able to keep it. Soon as they cross the border (or more likely start building up) the rest of Europe will start building up their army to attack back.

[pmontra]

A country attacks another one only if it doesn't have political control of it feels that never will. For example Russia doesn't have to attack Belarus and won't have to attack Hungary, and probably not Slovakia. They'll be part of the next Warsaw Pact without any bullet flying if their leaders will get guarantees that they can be leaders forever. Poland looked like it was going that way before the current administration. Ukraine itself have been pro Russia or pro NATO at different times in the last 25 years. No need to attack it when it was pro Russia. So let's see who that "rest of Europe" will be if and when there will be the need to defend some country in the East.

[dylan604]

Why do you think any of these issues will not also be issues on a western front?

[alxlaz]

I am sure they will be, I'm just saying that a Western front will be extremely different from the Ukrainian front, especially in the Baltics, where #3 is particularly salient. So I would recommend caution when applying over-arching lessons from Ukraine to these situations, that's all.

[varjag]

> Especially when you consider that Ukraine doesn't have a navy and barely had an air force and anti-air, yet Russia failed at establishing air or naval control, let alone dominance.

Ukraine had dozens of airworthy fighter jets and well over a hundred air defense batteries at the start. Many of the latter were lost in the first weeks but Ukraine was fairly packed as far as smaller nations go.

> Russia has no chance of having a war against the Baltics only.

No, Russian chance of occupying significant part of Baltics with realistic level of NATO involvement is 1 in 3. It would be most certainly able to overrun the three states absent NATO support.

> Any aggression against them will be met with a swift reaction from Poland, which has a better equipped army than Ukraine. If Ukraine can destroy the best Russian units and hold to a stalemate the majority of the remainder for years, Poland will wipe the floor with the war criminals.

That's the spirit I was mentioning yeah, "Ukrainians are bit backwards unlike we noble NATO elves". Name one thing in Polish military that Ukrainian military today doesn't have though?

The coming war will be hell of a reality check for many.

[geoka9]

> Name one thing in Polish military that Ukrainian military today doesn't have though?

Lack of combat experience.

But seriously, very good analysis!

[sofixa]

> But seriously, very good analysis

Nah, it's utter bullshit. Russia can't defeat Ukraine on its own, but they think Russia has a 1 in 3 chance of victory if they add Poland, Baltics, Finland to their war? It's pure wishful nonsense.

[sofixa]

> Ukraine had dozens of airworthy fighter jets

Russia had how many hundreds? And how much time to prepare how to neutralise them?

> , Russian chance of occupying significant part of Baltics with realistic level of NATO involvement is 1 in 3. It would be most certainly able to overrun the three states absent NATO support

No. If Russia attacks the Baltics, it's guaranteed that Poland will join (with at least some NATO support).

> That's the spirit I was mentioning yeah, "Ukrainians are bit backwards unlike we noble NATO elves". Name one thing in Polish military that Ukrainian military today doesn't have though

Years of preparation and conscious arming with a real budget? Ukraine had to go from a small and under equipped (mostly with obsolete Soviet era stuff) army to a total war in mere days. The complete mobilisation meant that there was limited time to train and equip everyone properly. Poland has had years to prepare equipment, training, planning, coordination.

Again, Russia can't handle Ukraine and has no clear path to victory there. Why on earth do you think it could handle more fronts, especially against better equipped and prepared enemies? Nobody is saying Putin is rational, but even he has to know that.

[varjag]

> Russia had how many hundreds? And how much time to prepare how to neutralise them?

Few dozen fighters on alert in a heavy AD environment is objectively a lot. Most of Ukrainian early AD losses happened in the south and were the outcome of treason by the regional command.

> No. If Russia attacks the Baltics, it's guaranteed that Poland will join (with at least some NATO support).

I feel you're talking past me. Yes Poland will join, absolutely: the battle for Suwalki/Kaliningrad will affect it directly if anything. But without the US commitment (which I hope you realize is not happening) there is a 1 in 3 chance of Putin's substantial success.

> Years of preparation and conscious arming with a real budget? Ukraine had to go from a small and under equipped (mostly with obsolete Soviet era stuff) army to a total war in mere days.

Ukraine was waging a war with Russia for 8 years by the day of the full scale invasion. It was prepared about as much as a country in its circumstances could be. Had this invasion happened in 2014 that really would have been the touted 3-day operation.

> Why on earth do you think it could handle more fronts, especially against better equipped and prepared enemies? Nobody is saying Putin is rational, but even he has to know that.

Every serious European government is gearing up for the war now, so it's clearly not just me alone. The mode of fighting had changed substantially. F-35s a great for cooking off tank waves (that mostly don't exist anymore) but are not very useful against waves of meat sweeping through the forests and millions of attack drones.

NATO is still a formidable force even without the US component but coordinated action would be critical and it's a huge question still. Poland and Finland alone will not be enough to blunt the attack on the Baltic states which are very logistically vulnerable. So Putin has a fair, largely consequence free shot at it but the window of opportunity will close within a year or two.

[ivan_gammel]

>Russia's chances against the Baltics are pretty good, I would say 1 in 3. And for Putin it's a proposition with no downside: at worst he loses another few hundred thousand subjects.

Article 5 is still in effect, even if America won’t take its part. Attack of Baltics will trigger response from all neighbors including Finland, Sweden and Poland. Kaliningrad won’t last long, St.Petersburg will be within reach of artillery etc. It will be suicidal to do that.

One thing that Westerners do not understand is that people in small towns or rural areas of Russia may be expendable, but population of St.Petersburg and Moscow is a protected class. If they suffer, the regime may actually collapse before reaching military goals. For this reason Russian mobilization barely touched both capitals.

[pmontra]

If I were Putin I'd attack some very minor NATO state to check if NATO will really send soldiers to defend it. Example: is really somebody willing to die for Estonia? (Sorry HNers from Estonia, but you are just in the worst possible place of all of NATO.) If not, NATO will crumble into pieces. If yes, let's see who's sending soldiers and who won't, and how they will react to the first week of casualties. Keep going or fold?

Maybe before getting there, if I end up controlling the next parliament of Ukraine I'd take over Moldova, and before that let's teach a lesson to Armenia. That's to keep the army busy and not let soldiers back home where they could cause troubles or, god forbids, create a pacifist movement like after the Afghan war (the Russian one.)

[sofixa]

> If I were Putin I'd attack some very minor NATO state to check if NATO will really send soldiers to defend it. Example: is really somebody willing to die for Estonia

Even if nobody else, the other Baltic states and Poland will defend them. Very decent chance of Finland, Sweden, UK, France joining as well.

[pmontra]

Finland and Sweden yes, because they are the next ones in line on that front. UK probably but not 100%. France, it depends who'll be the president, who controls the parliament and what they'll have to say to get the votes to win the next elections.

[ivan_gammel]

But you are not Putin and he is not you. Attacking Ukraine wasn’t a gamble for him, it was a presumably easy win, like Georgia in 2008. Attack on NATO on Baltic shore isn’t an easy win, it’s a gamble. And what is this test for? America has already learned the lesson and is withdrawing from Russian periphery. Europe has no interest in power games, UK is in irreversible decline. NATO is not going to expand anymore in foreseeable future, primary military goal achieved and Russian authoritarianism is secure. Why he would attack Baltics?

[varjag]

You are trying to hypothesise a rational actor except you model the actor on ordinary people.

An aging authoritarian is not concerned with long term security, well being of his subjects or boring diplomatic minutae. Seeing his days vanishing, he is intent on leaving a mark in history. What matters is not how pretty the mark is going to be but how visible shall it be through centuries. And since the authoritarian's strength is more often brutality than intelligence, the role model would inevitably be Stalin, Genghis Khan or Ivan the Terrible.

Within their framework the dictator is entirely a rational actor but on a very different vector than what think tanks usually muse about.

[geoka9]

The latest expansion of NATO was barely a year ago (with Sweden joining).

Russian authoritarianism may be secure, but the current regime's power is not (not to mention their leaders' paranoia).

Their ambition is the control of continental Europe. It might sound crazy, but if you listen to people like Dugin, it is very clear. And it's not that unrealistic in the longer run, considering everything you listed in your post.

The onslaught on Europe will continue - first (already happening) on its unity through the financing and propaganda support of the right-wing populist candidates who don't know (or simply don't care) better and then, once every (relatively) little country in Europe is on their own, on their sovereignty through military threat and/or invasion.

I will also leave this here as I think it is pertinent to the discussion:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313258664_Putin's_R...

[johnisgood]

> it's that Ukraine put up one hell of a fight.

I would like to add that, yes, with a lot of money and weapons from the US and other countries, they would not have been able to do it without their help. Am I wrong about the aid's significance, or did it not happen?

[sofixa]

Yes, but the initial stopping of the Russian advance happened before the vast majority of that help arrived. In a way, Russia lost the war the moment it didn't finish it in a few days - it ensured Ukraine could be supplied, and that the resistance will be remembered and kept on.

[johnisgood]

Where can I read more about this, is Wikipedia accurate?

[pmontra]

The Wikipedia page about the Battle of Kyiv https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kyiv_(2022) is what I remember from the news of 3 years ago.

[netsharc]

That feels overly deferrential to Putin...

It's like a person with muscles witnessing a beating and then when the perpretaror notices, looking away and saying "I didn't see anything!".

[anonymars]

Or worse, rifling through the victim's pockets (mineral deal) and demanding a thank you.

So far John McCain had this one right. Show Putin weakness at your peril. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HLAzeHnNgR8

[netsharc]

The mineral deal smells like a sharing the spoils of war with Putin, I wonder if Putin mentioned it on that phone call they had.

Thinking of a Moscow-Washington phone call makes me think of https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=6&v=6T2uBeiNXAo

> Why do you think I'm calling you? Just to say hello? Of course I like to speak to you. Of course I like to say hello.

Oh SNL, please make a spoof of this...

[JKCalhoun]

Yeah, Chamberlain-level deferential.

[cwillu]

So, cowardice?

[kevin_thibedeau]

He'll do anything to keep his kompromat from being disclosed.

[ModernMech]

There's no kompromat, Trump and Putin just have the same goals. This whole idea that Putin has kompromat on Trump and that's the only reason he would be deferential to Putin rests on the idea that the American president is aligned morally, politically, and strategically with the long-term interests of America. Sadly, this is not true. The oath Trump took was empty.

Trump does not have a pro-America agenda; he has a pro-Trump agenda. His whims are not morally, politically, or strategically aligned with the goals and prospects of the American people, they're aligned with a global billionaire class, to which Putin belongs. That is why they get along. They are allies.

[unethical_ban]

This is what I have said for a long time. Trump the individual cares about Trump, he operates like an animal. He may not overtly hate the country, but he has no feeling of obligation or patriotism. I don't think he knows what patriotism is.

If something he does helps America, it is because it helps him, or because it inflates his ego via people applauding him.