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by fernly
453 days ago
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I find the OP very difficult to comprehend, to the point that I question whether it has content at all. One difficulty is in understanding their use of the word "embedding", defined (so to speak) as "internal representations (embeddings)", and their free use of the word to relate, and even equate, LLM internal structure to brain internal structure. They are simply assuming that there is a brain "embedding" that can be directly compared to the matrix of numerical weights that comprise an LLM's training. That seems a highly dubious assumption, to the point of being hand-waving. They mention a profound difference in the opening paragraph, "Large language models do not depend on symbolic parts of speech or syntactic rules". Human language models very obviously and evidently do. On that basis alone, it can't be valid to just assume that a human "embedding" is equivalent to an LLM "embedding", for input or output. |
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If there were no such structure, then their methods based on aligning neural embeddings with brain "embeddings" (really just vectors of electrode values or voxel activations) would not work.
> They mention a profound difference in the opening paragraph, "Large language models do not depend on symbolic parts of speech or syntactic rules". Human language models very obviously and evidently do. On that basis alone, it can't be valid to just assume that a human "embedding" is equivalent to an LLM "embedding", for input or output.
This feels like "it doesn't work the way I thought it would, so it must be wrong."
I think actually their point here is mistaken for another reason: there's good reason to think that LLMs do end up implicitly representing abstract parts of speech and syntactic rules in their embedding spaces.