[Chance-Device]

I used to think this, but now I think something different - isn’t Russia a useful domestic and geopolitical tool? Perhaps the US does not want for Russia either to be too weak or too strong, perhaps they simply want them to be useful.

[apeescape]

But would Russia's friendship be more useful than Europe's? I can see the logic behind strengthening ties with Russia to keep them from aligning with China, but Russia has proven itself an unreliable partner in the past, so you have to assume that as soon as Russia sees more benefit in fraternizing with China than the US, they'll turn their coats. The EU has been a pretty loyal vassal, even when disgruntled. But I think we've gone over the tipping point now. The US has shown it can't be trusted upon.

[Chance-Device]

I don’t think they are a partner in the strictest sense, they’re more a useful enemy. Keeping Russia in a certain position - weak enough that they’re not a real threat, strong enough that they can represented as one, means they can be used for domestic and foreign political ends.

This view is the only thing that to me makes sense of what’s happening.

[maxglute]

RU has reliably said they would respond to NATO expansion or pulling UKR away from RU influence. RU has also reliably sent gas to EU while responding to efforts by US+EU to swing UKR. RU under Putin is geopolitically reliable, at least in realist sense.

EU are reliable vassals, but they're reliable in the sense that their vassalage doesn't add much to strategic balance, especially vs PRC. EU/NATO bluntly net drain in US security commitments and trade balance. Like EU could have been buying 100s of billions more in US arms and LNG, US looking at the 2T+ trade deficit with EU in last 20 years and wondering if that's worth the hegemon privilege. EU + most US partners think they have a tributary system where vassal supports the hegemon, but it's really an expensive client state system where US pays off vassals. Looking at projected US finances - they can't afford to pay off everyone anymore. Also bluntly, US vassals aren't going to reverse payment flow and become tributaries. If it comes to parity burden share as past US admins has pressured, there's less reason to even be "partners" and more reason for EU to try to be their own pole.

[bad_haircut72]

This medievil view of Europe as vassals instead of allies is why US is about to get a medievil style government again.

[maxglute]

And European leaders drunk on atlanticist koolaid brainwashing them into thinking that they're allies / partners instead of vassals is why they're in this mess to began with. It's always been medievil beneath the veneer.

[jjk166]

The problem is this theory has no predictive power. Everything can be a useful domestic and geopolitical tool, and everything might be a better tool if weaker or stronger, and everything might be disposed of in favor of some other tool which is better yet. Further, different leaders may place different values on various tools, or may favor different approaches to acquiring them.

There is literally no observation that could not be viewed as confirming this assumption by a sufficiently generous mind.

[Chance-Device]

Really? So if Russia were not in the position it’s in now, how would the US be able to force European rearmament? If the real adversary were, say, China, but China were far too smart to do anything provocative enough to lead to this response, having another more reckless but ultimately less dangerous enemy that you can contain might be useful, no?

[jjk166]

A few issues.

First, there are countless other ways to get Europe to rearm if that was actually the goal. Russia's position at the moment is virtually the same as it was a few months into the invasion, which is strong enough that european powers are scared of escalation but not strong enough that anyone thinks an unprovoked Russian attack on NATO territory is either imminent or inevitable. Making Russia weaker to lower fears of retaliation or letting Russia steam-roll Ukraine would both seem like they would better motivate Europe to quickly rearm instead of pressuring for a ceasefire.

Second, it is not at all clear that was the goal. Note that this is extremely against America's interests. As the major supplier of arms to Europe, America wielded tremendous influence over Europe (as evidenced by TFA) while at the same time ensuring Europe was well armed with weapons that would be easily compatible with the US's own military so that they could be readily called as allies. Europe replacing American systems with others does not mean Europe will be militarily stronger, it only means they will not be reliant on the US for what strength they have.

Third, there is no reason to believe that Europe would not feel compelled to build up military capability against China for exactly the same reason the US does. Nor is there any reason to believe China is too smart not to play into America's hands while Russia apparently is. Further, the US doesn't need Europe to rearm for a war with China - even with massive investment, Europe is not going to have the force projection capabilities to support a total war in the Pacific theater, what America really needs is a coalition of economic allies which will side with it in containing China - a need that is not at all served by antagonizing those very allies.

That's not to say any of your assumptions can't be true, just that it's a lot more assumptions than just "the current American leadership is not working to advance the American hegemony."