[Mizza]

The first part is is precisely correct, and then the second part is precisely wrong:

> We have no way to operate on hypotheses nobody has thought of, so we just operate on the set of hypotheses we have thought of. Since the sum of this set of probabilities must be 1, decreasing the probability of one hypothesis does increase the probability of all the other hypotheses in the set.

We've been able to go to the moon because we understood general relativity, which absolutely could not have been created from a purely Bayesian approach for the reasons you made clear - it required new ideas.

[kerkeslager]

Did you read the very next sentence, or did you just stop at the first thing you found to disagree with? I said:

> Where Popper's critique becomes important is if we keep decreasing the probabilities of all the hypotheses in the set--this indicates that the hypothesis which is true is not in the set (i.e. nobody has come up with the correct hypothesis to test). This indicates a need for new hypotheses.

I'll add that once relativity was hypothesized, it was added to the finite set of hypotheses that humans had hypothesized. Your "counterexample" is well within the scientific process I described.

[Mizza]

Then it's not a very useful framework, is it.

[kerkeslager]

Inasmuch as the entire field of epistemology isn't useful, sure, science was doing just fine without philosophers attempting to describe it. I mean, what were you planning to use it for? What does the word "useful" mean to you in this context?

The thing here is that whether or not the model of Bayesian epistemology is "useful", it's a fairly accurate description of how scientists approach the acquisition of knowledge, so when you attack that you're attacking science. And the thing is, outside of the brains of philosophers, science works--Bayesian epistemology does describe a process of knowledge acquisition that is effective. Planes still fly, smallpox is still eradicated, microchips still direct electricity to perform computation. Popper can say, "well ackchyually, we haven't actually increased confidence in the hypothesis of acquired immunity, we've only decreased confidence in the other hypotheses," but smallpox isn't going to say, "You know what, Popper, you're right," and reappear to decimate Europe. So de facto it sure seems like we do often know things with some degree of confidence when we eliminate other hypotheses, Popper notwithstanding.

And as I've said over and over: we need science more than ever. Polio just re-emerged in the US, and vaccine denialism is prevalent. While philosophers are sitting in their ivory towers saying "well ackchyually nothing is knowable" people are dying of diseases for which the prevention is not only knowable but known. So you'll excuse me not liking philosophers much here.

[Mizza]

This is Adderall-brained LessWrong gibberish. Bayesian epistemology is not "a fairly accurate description of how we acquire knowledge" compared to critical rationalism. There's only a small, specific community of extremely online people who think otherwise.

[kerkeslager]

Since you've provided no basis for saying that, I guess we'll just have to take your word against my explanation. :shrug: