Inasmuch as the entire field of epistemology isn't useful, sure, science was doing just fine without philosophers attempting to describe it. I mean, what were you planning to use it for? What does the word "useful" mean to you in this context?
The thing here is that whether or not the model of Bayesian epistemology is "useful", it's a fairly accurate description of how scientists approach the acquisition of knowledge, so when you attack that you're attacking science. And the thing is, outside of the brains of philosophers, science works--Bayesian epistemology does describe a process of knowledge acquisition that is effective. Planes still fly, smallpox is still eradicated, microchips still direct electricity to perform computation. Popper can say, "well ackchyually, we haven't actually increased confidence in the hypothesis of acquired immunity, we've only decreased confidence in the other hypotheses," but smallpox isn't going to say, "You know what, Popper, you're right," and reappear to decimate Europe. So de facto it sure seems like we do often know things with some degree of confidence when we eliminate other hypotheses, Popper notwithstanding.
And as I've said over and over: we need science more than ever. Polio just re-emerged in the US, and vaccine denialism is prevalent. While philosophers are sitting in their ivory towers saying "well ackchyually nothing is knowable" people are dying of diseases for which the prevention is not only knowable but known. So you'll excuse me not liking philosophers much here.
This is Adderall-brained LessWrong gibberish. Bayesian epistemology is not "a fairly accurate description of how we acquire knowledge" compared to critical rationalism. There's only a small, specific community of extremely online people who think otherwise.
The thing here is that whether or not the model of Bayesian epistemology is "useful", it's a fairly accurate description of how scientists approach the acquisition of knowledge, so when you attack that you're attacking science. And the thing is, outside of the brains of philosophers, science works--Bayesian epistemology does describe a process of knowledge acquisition that is effective. Planes still fly, smallpox is still eradicated, microchips still direct electricity to perform computation. Popper can say, "well ackchyually, we haven't actually increased confidence in the hypothesis of acquired immunity, we've only decreased confidence in the other hypotheses," but smallpox isn't going to say, "You know what, Popper, you're right," and reappear to decimate Europe. So de facto it sure seems like we do often know things with some degree of confidence when we eliminate other hypotheses, Popper notwithstanding.
And as I've said over and over: we need science more than ever. Polio just re-emerged in the US, and vaccine denialism is prevalent. While philosophers are sitting in their ivory towers saying "well ackchyually nothing is knowable" people are dying of diseases for which the prevention is not only knowable but known. So you'll excuse me not liking philosophers much here.