[n4r9]

You've outlined what I reckon is the appeal of "quantum consciousness". I personally feel that randomness doesn't help to explain free will any more than determinism. I'm more inclined to believe that free will (in the strictest sense) is an illusion.

[carlmr]

The problem with this approach is that even if you say that our thinking is non-deterministic because of true random effects on the quantum level, you still have to explain how deterministic calculations on random values make for free will.

You still have no influence on it, even if there is randomness involved.

[cogman10]

You also have to explain why will is changed when the brain is damaged.

Really hard to justify free will (IMO) when a person's entire personality can be fundamentally altered by a bash to the head. What does "free will" mean if everything that makes you you can be changed with, say, a lobotomy.

It is, at best, an illusion and nothing more.

[ruthmarx]

There is no illusion, and brain damage has no bearing on free will.

Free will is simply you making a choice, that's it.

If you want to argue about what 'you' means, feel free, but it doesn't really change anything here.

[n4r9]

What is "choice"? Is it simply executing one of a set of possibilities? If you take such a general definition of free will, then a slot machine is manifesting it's free will to deny you a payout.

[ruthmarx]

Making a decision either on impulse, intuition, or rational preferences.

> Is it simply executing one of a set of possibilities? If you take such a general definition of free will, then a slot machine is manifesting it's free will to deny you a payout.

Sure, or even just a dice. Except that's a rather silly definition of free will since it omits the 'will' part, i.e. thought.

[The_Colonel]

> free will (in the strictest sense)

In what sense? Can you produce a strict definition, what is "free will", what is "illusion"?

This is a battle of definitions. Pick the definitions you like, and you can prove what you set out to prove.

[n4r9]

The "strictest sense" is something like:

1. We have control over our decisions

2. Our decisions are independent of past events

I agree that this is pretty hand-wavey and open to semantics. But I don't think that there is any realistic, coherent way to interpret and reconcile the above two statements [edit - without resorting to some kind of non-physicalism e.g. God, spirit planes... ].

[Filligree]

Not even a six-year-old would believe #2. It’s endlessly fascinating that there are people who do, but most people realise their past affects their future decisions.

[The_Colonel]

> We have control over our decisions

That begs the question - what is "me"?

If I take "me" as the configuration of atoms in my brain, or simply the information if you will, then "me" is determining my future actions, therefore "me" is in control of my decisions.

Alternatively, I could define "me" as the whole system - the configuration (electrical signals), the hardware (brain, neurons), the physics. I think most "free will deniers" will say that physics is not part of "me", but I disagree - physics is not separable from matter and information, physical laws permeate everything, they are necessarily part of "me". You don't need any God here, this definition is as physical as it gets.

> Our decisions are independent of past events

Doesn't this require essentially random behavior? Sounds somewhat absurd ...

[n4r9]

> I could define "me" as the whole system - the configuration (electrical signals), the hardware (brain, neurons), the physics.

I think that's fine. But imagine an outside observer who is privy to the current state of the system plus future environmental inputs. In principle, that observer is able to calculate the system's evolution exactly, and therefore predict all future decisions of the person-system. For many people this is contrary to the idea of free will. For how can something be "free" if it is bound by the laws of physics and is known in advance to any sufficiently sophisticated observer.

[The_Colonel]

> In principle, that observer is able to calculate the system's evolution exactly

Which is fine, actually even more, it's confirming the presence of free will.

I have a Snickers bar in front of me. I like Snickers, but I also want my teeth healthy, keep diabetes away from me and keep my weight in check. I will decide to either eat it or not, depending on the current subjective trade-offs between my priorities. Acting on my wishes and priorities like this seems exactly in line with free will.

In your understanding, what behavior does an observer need to see to detect free will for you? The decision cannot depend on my goals of feeling good eating Snickers / keeping my weight in check? Based on what should free will make decisions? If it's on nothing, should the behavior with free will be random? That seems very counter-intuitive.

> if it is bound by the laws of physics

As mentioned earlier, this is no external constraint in my physicalist understanding of the world - laws of physics are an inseparable part of "me" as a system.

[n4r9]

> The decision cannot depend on my goals of feeling good eating Snickers / keeping my weight in check?

You have conceded that your decision is pre-determined. Most people consider pre-determined events not to be "free". What are they even "free" from?

[digging]

#2 is obviously false - and #1 is obviously true, to me. Whether or not you wrote this comment was a decision you made. The only way "free will" is even an open question is if you can't decide what "you" are.

If you only allow yourself to identify with the highest-level, most rational aspects of the decision engine you live inside, then that's a mistake which will haunt you with questions like "am I really in control?" forever. If you identify with a broader sense of your self, it's pretty obvious that you are making decisions, for both rational and irrational reasons. Your conscious experience is part of what it feels like for a human to make decisions.