[JumpCrisscross]

> entire point of the US command and control system is to guarantee that the President and only the President is capable of authorizing nuclear war whenever he needs to

This may be necessary to ensure the deterrent is credible. But for first strike use, authorisation should require at the very least Congressional approval. (Not the whole Congress, obviously, but maybe the Senate Select and House Permanent Select Committees.) Ideally, all three branches of government.

[defrost]

" should "

Ah, should - imagine a world in which "should" carried sway.

Meanwhile: Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-72 - Nuclear Operations (2020)

    POSITIVE CONTROL

    The President may direct the use of nuclear weapons through an execute order via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the combatant commanders and, ultimately, to the forces in the field exercising direct control of the weapons.

Page 21 of 29: https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Doctrine-Publications/AFDP-3-72-...

For anybody in the chain that might question that, or want Congressional approval consider the fate of Harold Hering, the Major who was kicked out of the Air Force for asking a “dangerous question” while training to be a Missile Launch Officer at Vandenberg Air Force Base.

Hering had asked, in essence, how could he, in his Minuteman missile bunker, know that an order to launch he received from the President had been a legal, considered, and sane one?

The answer is, you don't, you just jump as high as you can.

( even if the guy telling you to jump is also telling you they're eating cats and dogs in Ohio )

[JumpCrisscross]

> anybody in the chain that might question that, or want Congressional approval consider the fate of Harold Hering, the Major who was kicked out of the Air Force for asking a “dangerous question” while training to be a Missile Launch Officer at Vandenberg Air Force Base

I mean, yes. Hering was in the chain of command. The nuclear chain of command. About the last thing you want in that chain is even a notion of a whiff of a perception that when the President says launch the missiles don't launch.

It's completely different for e.g. the Congress to ask these questions. They don't because this isn't an issue Americans have cared about for a while.

[defrost]

If the President orders a launch, the military launches ... that's it.

Congress can ask questions about that later, if they're still about - but they don't have a place in the chain between POTUS deciding to launch and the launch.

Ordering a strike before any missiles have landed on US soil has been possible the entire time (ie ordering what would be an effective First Strike) and deemed neccessary as carrying out such orders after missiles have landed has been considered as likley too little to late - predicated on having accurate justification (knowledge of incoming missiles) etc.

History has been littered with false alarmns that should have (but didn't) trigger a launch - that remains at the judgement of the serving POTUS who might be a combat veteran or a reality TV show host.

[JumpCrisscross]

> If the President orders a launch, the military launches ... that's it

Sure. That doesn't mean every launch must be legal or undeliberateable.

> they don't have a place in the chain between POTUS deciding to launch and the launch

Why not?

The Constitution "vests in the Congress the power to declare war" [1]. It has largely delegated that power to the President. But the spirit of the War Powers Clause recognises that war is a major political decision with national consequences. So is a nuclear first strike.

> Ordering a strike before any missiles have landed on US soil has been possible the entire time (ie ordering what would be an effective First Strike)

Not what first strike means [2]. (You're describing launch on warning, which is firmly in the retaliatory column [3].)

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Powers_Clause

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_strike_(nuclear_strategy...

[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Launch_on_warning

[defrost]

> Why not?

"Why not?" as a philosphical question is a bit esoteric for me.

"Why not?" in the straight forward sense is easier- they simply do not appear a prerequisite for ordering a nuclear strike in the linked Nuclear Operations (2020) procedures.

> The Constitution "vests in the Congress the power to declare war"

Sure - but that's been bypassed a good many times to date hasn't it? Congress can declare war - but they don't appear to be neccessary for war to be declared, it seems a sitting POTUS can do that with an executive order.

In any case what is specifically being discussed here is that order to launch a nuclear strike, not an order to "start a war" and all that entails (spinning up additional arms production, etc.).

> Not what first strike means [2]. (You're describing launch on warning,

The full quote included predicated on having accurate justification [ such as ] (knowledge of incoming missiles) etc. meaning a POTUS can hand wave or invent any number of reasons in addition to being fooled by false alarms and issue an order to launch missiles.

More importantly .. none of that really matters, these operation procedures were written with the expectation that time would be critical and that the POTUS would be a rational judge of the appropriate actions and thus vested with the power to simply issue an order sans any pesky chain of required justification when the clock was supposedly ticking.

Once the order is issued it requires someone to bell the cat and actually mutiny to stop the ordered launch .. questioning whether the order was justified isn't on the cards.

I did originally link to a long form three part look into all these scenarios for a reason, there's much reference there to expert commentary on the ins and outs of the US chain of command for nuclear launch.

[JumpCrisscross]

> "Why not?" in the straight forward sense is easier- they simply do not appear a prerequisite for ordering a nuclear strike in the linked Nuclear Operations (2020) procedures

Nobody argued the Congress needs to be consulted for a nuclear strike today. This entire conversation is around a proposal which, by definition, isn't present reality.

> that's been bypassed a good many times to date hasn't it

What are you thinking of? The modern trend has been the Congress giving the President broad war powers [1].

> what is specifically being discussed here is that order to launch a nuclear strike, not an order to "start a war"

There is no situation where a nuclear first strike doesn't start a war. It would very likely end the era of America being the master of alliances and trigger a global rebalancing against Washington.

> meaning a POTUS can hand wave or invent any number of reasons in addition to being fooled by false alarms and issue an order to launch missiles

Sure. And any President since the founding of the republic has had the capacity to break any number of laws restricting their power. (Many times, they have.) That doesn't make those laws or the Constitution worthless.

Between the President and the silos are a number of people. The current rules mean there is no legitimate reason for anyone in that chain to question a first strike order. That changes if you have a procedure the President is blowing off. (It's also better than SecDef making it up as they go [2].)

I'm not particularly concerned about a U.S. President blowing an aneurysm and nuking Canada. I am concerned about Russia and Pakistan. Having a procedure for first use here lets us push for multi-party first-use authorisation elsewhere.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authorization_for_Use_of_Milit...

[2] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/milley-acted-prevent-t...

[082349872349872]

Many countries can credibly claim to have a "No First Strike" policy; the US is not one of them.

[JumpCrisscross]

> Many countries can credibly claim to have a "No First Strike" policy; the US is not one of them

Many as in two: China and India [1]. And "credibly" is doing a lot of work there. If America began a strategic bombing campaign of China's military, economic and population centers with conventional weapons fired off aircraft carriers, I find it ridiculous to imagine China would refuse to ever nuke a CVN.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_first_use#Countries_against...

[082349872349872]

Sorry, I wasn't sufficiently clear: even countries which currently are not nuclear-capable may become so in the future, and all of them will easily have a more credible NFU policy than the country which used Fat Man and Little Boy.

[maxglute]

I think too much of US global security commitments that is underpinned by nuclear umbrella where non-nuclear partners are not going to feel assured about US strategic deterrence if posture shifts away from POTUS can smash red button in heat of the moment to maybe US will eventually retaliate with nuclear... after say warsaw has already been nuked... if there needs to be a committee to debate whether it's worth the risk to trade moscow for new york (which they may not). The lack of oversight is the point, therefore consistent "clarity" that POTUS, even if deranged, doesn't need to consult others. Because US partners _need_ to be assured that US nukes can be in the air in minutes to deter themselves from being nuked, and only way to ensure that perception is to remove all red tape when delegating nuclear authority. There can't be any official/public rhetoric to doubt US is capable of prompt retaliation, even if adversaries do not find posture credible (just like some don't find NFU credible).

Hence the quibbing over verbiage on public facing US nuclear operations manual in other reply chain also largely doesn't matter - formal US nuclear operations documentation itself is ultimately philosophical/propaganda/strategic - we can pretend they actually define US nuclear authority - but IMO their primary purpose is inform adversary nuclear deterrence game theory. Ultimately we don't know what actual US nuclear operations procedure is/will be - there may very well be none-public nuclear operations that is much less flippant than one man decides to end the world, maybe adversary specific ones based on correlation of forces.

[protomolecule]

So you are saying that "US global security commitments" actually increase the danger of the global nuclear catastrophe. Doesn't look secure for me.