[maxglute]

I think too much of US global security commitments that is underpinned by nuclear umbrella where non-nuclear partners are not going to feel assured about US strategic deterrence if posture shifts away from POTUS can smash red button in heat of the moment to maybe US will eventually retaliate with nuclear... after say warsaw has already been nuked... if there needs to be a committee to debate whether it's worth the risk to trade moscow for new york (which they may not). The lack of oversight is the point, therefore consistent "clarity" that POTUS, even if deranged, doesn't need to consult others. Because US partners _need_ to be assured that US nukes can be in the air in minutes to deter themselves from being nuked, and only way to ensure that perception is to remove all red tape when delegating nuclear authority. There can't be any official/public rhetoric to doubt US is capable of prompt retaliation, even if adversaries do not find posture credible (just like some don't find NFU credible).

Hence the quibbing over verbiage on public facing US nuclear operations manual in other reply chain also largely doesn't matter - formal US nuclear operations documentation itself is ultimately philosophical/propaganda/strategic - we can pretend they actually define US nuclear authority - but IMO their primary purpose is inform adversary nuclear deterrence game theory. Ultimately we don't know what actual US nuclear operations procedure is/will be - there may very well be none-public nuclear operations that is much less flippant than one man decides to end the world, maybe adversary specific ones based on correlation of forces.

[protomolecule]

So you are saying that "US global security commitments" actually increase the danger of the global nuclear catastrophe. Doesn't look secure for me.