[fsckboy]

my argument is only to get you to unassert that you know anything about the nature of the mind. (the other part, about the simulation, is how I find it more comfortable to think about the universe, but i have no proof, just like to point out that it's just as plausible)

[chaboud]

We actually (myself included, to an extent) know a great deal about the mind, perception, and cognition. There’s lots still to learn, but we’ve been poking, prodding, and experimenting for a long time.

I’ll give an example that is related to my current day job, where we make devices with displays (e.g., TV’s). I have commonly had people say that picture quality and color on televisions is subjective. However, until we’re into advanced features like content-adaptive processing, it isn’t. Instead, color is objectively and reproducibly measurable as a set of physical properties, and the mappings of those properties to the TV-buying public is very aligned with the science behind color theory.

Now, color theory as we apply it is a blend of physics (very, very reproducible) and perception. The perceptual part of color is largely reproducible over large populations, but there are certainly mutations, conditions, and variances that lead to some degree of varied perception, up to and including blindness (though TV’s these days throw off enough infrared that their brightness is generally detectable by non-sighted users). So, might we all be living in a simulation? Or a simulation of a simulation? Sure. But that has no practical impact because it is an unanswerable question.

Conversely, operating with the assumption that the physical-world sensing and reasoning apparatus available to me isn’t some complex prank is working out pretty well for the trillions+ creatures out there (insects could be an interesting discussion) that appear to be going about their daily lives. Why ask people to prove a negative?

In the meantime, we’ll continue to try to better understand how minds work.

[fsckboy]

when people talk about the hard problem of consciousness or the mind-body problem, they're not talking about the brain aspect (which might sum up what you're referring to) but "what does this feel like" aspect. Why would electro-chemical-chromodynamic processes in brain feel like anything at all? what is that mechanism? will we be able to recreate it, either in a dish, or in a brain we construct? how will we know, since I can't even be sure you feel the same things I feel.

I'm not trying to create a big woo-woo mystery, i'm just saying rationalists should not be quick to assume they know what is going on or where the answer lies.

[chaboud]

We’re knocking on the door of simulated signal interfaces (primitive work already exists), and there’s also been quite a bit of progress in neural activity detection and scanning (e.g., imagery from scans).

Casting folks as “rationalists” is reductive, and people actively asserting what is understood (and not understood) being painted as “assuming” is more than a bit fallacious. I’m not accepting an unfalsifiable claim. Primarily because it’s a logical fallacy, but also because it has no utility.

Folks are free to believe that they’re brains in perfect jars (despite having no evidence to support it), but, if that’s not the case, it makes sense to work with the signals, inputs, and levers we have available to us.