[fsckboy]

when people talk about the hard problem of consciousness or the mind-body problem, they're not talking about the brain aspect (which might sum up what you're referring to) but "what does this feel like" aspect. Why would electro-chemical-chromodynamic processes in brain feel like anything at all? what is that mechanism? will we be able to recreate it, either in a dish, or in a brain we construct? how will we know, since I can't even be sure you feel the same things I feel.

I'm not trying to create a big woo-woo mystery, i'm just saying rationalists should not be quick to assume they know what is going on or where the answer lies.

[chaboud]

We’re knocking on the door of simulated signal interfaces (primitive work already exists), and there’s also been quite a bit of progress in neural activity detection and scanning (e.g., imagery from scans).

Casting folks as “rationalists” is reductive, and people actively asserting what is understood (and not understood) being painted as “assuming” is more than a bit fallacious. I’m not accepting an unfalsifiable claim. Primarily because it’s a logical fallacy, but also because it has no utility.

Folks are free to believe that they’re brains in perfect jars (despite having no evidence to support it), but, if that’s not the case, it makes sense to work with the signals, inputs, and levers we have available to us.