[defrost]

> What is it that the author thinks is particularly unusual about this image?

In two decades of crawling through most of the declassified public nuclear material from the US nuclear weapons program, some exposure to classified material, and numerous hours of interviews with working and retired nuclear scientists he believes it's the single most detailed schematic of an actual specific type of warhead he's seen so far.

https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/about-me/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alex_Wellerstein

As he's blogging about this it's almost certain he has had real current working nuclear weapons experts from his contact list read the advances and not disagree.

Correct or not, it's not a casual random thought from someone with no exposure to such diagrams.

[gnfargbl]

OK, but my question remains: what is it that the author thinks is particularly unusual about this image?

I'm not a nuclear scientist, but I did study nuclear physics to master's level. To my eye, there's nothing at all interesting about this image. It looks like informed speculation. Without any confirmation that this is a real weapons design (and I see no reason at all to believe it is) then it tells us absolutely nothing which hasn't been in the public domains for decades.

> As he's blogging about this it's almost certain he has had real current working nuclear weapons experts from his contact list read the advances and not disagree.

That seems extremely unlikely to me. People who have held the appropriate clearance to verify whether this is or is not representative of a real weapon, do not tend to casually liaise with someone who has spent their career attempting to prise open that veil of secrecy. In fact, their own careers and liberty depend on not making such personal connections.

[next_xibalba]

> what is it that the author thinks is particularly unusual about this image?

The level of detail, particularly the articulation of components/subsystems (primary, secondary, radiation case, interstage medium, tamper, fusion fuel, and a "sparkplug"). All according to the article. Per author, DoE has very strict guidelines on the depiction of nukes, and this image appears to violate those guidelines. The official depictions are often just simple shapes, like "two circles in a box," that do not convey any meaningful information about weapon design.

I am speculating here, but it seems like DoE must believe that anything beyond simple shapes may provide bad actors (i.e. anyone but US Govt and allies) clues as to how to build a thermo-nuke.

[gnfargbl]

> I am speculating here, but it seems like DoE must believe that anything beyond simple shapes may provide bad actors (i.e. anyone but US Govt and allies) clues as to how to build a thermo-nuke.

And with good reason: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jun/24/usa.science

It's a bit like the Egg of Columbus. Doing it the first time needs a team of visionary geniuses, but once the trick is known to work then even us pedestrians could manage it given enough time and resources.

[bobthepanda]

the problem is usually getting the fissile material.

as far as non-state actors go though, other types of WMD are probably more attainable. Aum Shinrikyo is probably the most infamous example where a cult manufactured multiple chemical weapons. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aum_Shinrikyo#Tokyo_subway_sar...

[Earw0rm]

Yes and no. For terrorism purposes, the primary (more or less the same as a "Hiroshima"-level "A"-bomb) would surely more than suffice.

I'm sort of struggling to think why anyone other than a nation state (looking to prove itself worthy of a seat at various tables) would want to possess more bang than that.

Granted there are a few nations at or close to A-bomb tech whom we would definitely not want having its bigger brother. Iran and NK especially.

[1attice]

"640 kilotons ought to be enough for anyone"

[xattt]

And now if you want to run a nuclear program, the minimum amount is at least 16 gigatons.

[cthalupa]

I feel like the Nth Country Experiment kind of invalidates the idea that it makes sense to worry so much about hiding all of this, though? That 3 fresh physics PhDs were able to design a working bomb in as many years without having subject matter expertise to me shows that shows that the sort of adversary that has the resources to build such a project will have access to the resources to design it, too.

[kstrauser]

Conclusion: that's a diagram of the obvious approach to building a thermonuclear device, which happens to be completely wrong for classified reasons, and if you pursue this design you're going to waste a decade before you figure out why.

[tsss]

More likely is that the obvious approach is also totally the right approach and anyone with the relevant education could easily come up with it themselves, but the US government still censors it out of security theatre.

[pests]

The blog goes into detail about how releasing any wrong information or misinformation about a secret, still defines the bounds and brackets the real information, and allows eliminating possible options (as no agency would reveal the truth.)

If that was the case, an actor could go "this is obviously not the way to build this, lets move on" so in a way, you have sped up the development.

Just like saying, "We have 100,000 nukes" (a lie), everyone knows its a lie, which means we DO NOT have 100,000 nukes, as we wouldn't reveal the truth.

Enough of these little "misinformations" get released, the closer to the truth someone can get.

[numpad0]

Or, there are 5 people doing this type of research across the world, 3 of them barely taking calls on iOS and the rest just finally managed to migrate from IRIX to Cygwin last year, and they are to take all necessary actions for operational security and talent acquisition.

[Titan2189]

I would ask you to elaborate, but I guess that'd be pointless

[kstrauser]

I don't work in or around this field and never have. You have as much knowledge about it as I do. That was just my interpretation of the situation, based on watching too many movies.

[echelon]

> which happens to be completely wrong

Or simply suboptimal.

[forgot-im-old]

The author should look into https://www.castelion.com/ a company started by SpaceX employees and with deep connections to Elon's Starlink and Strategic Defense Initiative.

They have some interesting images.

[next_xibalba]

Link? I can't find any images that articulate a nuclear warhead like the one in OP's link.

[defrost]

As nmadden noted there's a lot of detail in the article .

> That seems extremely unlikely to me.

None the less his nuclearsecrecy blog has been about for many many years and he's had a great deal of contact with people who have walked up to the line. It's not that uncommon for historians to have neither confirm nor deny but we can understand various silences relations with experts - even the OG Manhatten Project had embedded historians and archivists who toed the line on handling and preserving materials and held long meetings on what to release | not release and when.

There are even a few DoE employed HN users here who know their areas of expertise and comment right up to the point where they shut up (an often shut down | change accounts) - they don't say what they shouldn't but they have chatted until they don't anymore .. which is interesting in itself.

[gnfargbl]

There's a lot of detail about why the author thinks it is notable that Sandia released this image. There's very little about what it is in this image itself that the author finds interesting, save for some comment about a dip which could be intended to focus neutron flux from the primary to the secondary. I feel that's the kind of thing an appropriate undergraduate would imagine in a short amount of time.

[rsfern]

I think you’re just looking for the surprise factor in the wrong place. The notability is all about Sandia’s public release criteria, which are pretty much orthogonal to whether or not the information is publicly known. I don’t think the author finds any particular detail interesting or new in and of itself, they even compare to other public illustrations that have the kind of detail you are talking about.

[renhanxue]

The author is a historian whose main published work is the book Restricted Data: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the United States. He isn't very interested in the information itself; he's interested in where it comes from and in the process that led to its release. It's notable not because it contains interesting information, it's notable because it seems like it might represent a radical break with established patterns in US government procedures with regards to restricted data (which is a special and very weird kind of classification that only applies to nuclear secrets).

In other words: the author is interested in the institutions and policies that manage nuclear secrets, not so much in the secrets themselves.

In a different post[0] regarding a fumbled redaction that released similar information about what a warhead looks like, he had this to say:

> It’s also just not clear that these kinds of [declassification] mistakes “matter,” in the sense of actually increasing the danger in the world, or to the United States. I’ve never come across a case where some kind of slip-up like this actually helped an aspiring nuclear weapons state, or helped our already-advanced adversaries. That’s just not how it works: there’s a lot more work that has to be done to make a working nuke than you can get out of a slip-up like this, and when it comes to getting secret information, the Russians and Chinese have already shown that even the “best” systems can be penetrated by various kinds of espionage. It’s not that secrets aren’t important — they can be — but they aren’t usually what makes the real-world differences, in the end. And these kinds of slip-ups are, perhaps fortunately, not releasing “secrets” that seem to matter that much.

> If anything, that’s the real critique of it: not that these mistakes happen. Mistakes will always happen in any sufficiently large system like this. It’s that there isn’t any evidence these mistakes have caused real harm. And if that’s the case… what’s the point of all of this secrecy, then?

> The most likely danger from this kind of screw up is not that enemy powers will learn new ways to make H-bombs. Rather, it’s that Congressmen looking to score political points can point to this sort of thing as an evidence of lax security. The consequences of such accusations can be much more damaging and long-lasting, creating a conservatism towards secrecy that restricts access to knowledge that might actually be important or useful to know.

[0]: https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2021/05/17/how-not-to-redact...

[morpheuskafka]

> There are even a few DoE employed HN users here who know their areas of expertise and comment right up to the point where they shut up (an often shut down | change accounts)

It seems like one could pretty easily build a database and track online commenters that are government affiliated. I've seen several on reddit from various three letter agencies (see r/TSA, r/1811, r/securityclearance, r/cbpoapplicant/). They usually try to self-limit what they share, but inevitably say things that aren't approved to be public.

If you gathered a database of posts across these forums, it would be easier to reconstruct info across different sources. Regularly scraping the site and flagging whatever gets deleted by the mods to read is also a good strategy, as they do often remove posts for being too sensitive.

You could also identify patterns of content they engaged with that resulted in information disclosure. For example, there used to be a CBP officer on Reddit that had offered on at least one occasion to look up someone's PASSID in their internal systems because their GE application had gotten stuck in processing. Someone could make a similar post to solicit them to "help" them with a similar situation as a means of info gathering.

As you said, what they don't share is often informative as well. For example, someone asked that account what it meant when the officer said they "had three BTPs" and sent them to secondary; his response was that it was too sensitive to disclose. I can't find the term in any public docs, so the existence of this procedure itself is info that could be valuable to a threat actor. They could also just try posting about the same thing until someone different reveals slightly more info.

These internal acronyms can also be used as a shibboleth when posting to subconsciously make people more comfortable sharing info in response. If the term is internal, and you ask a question to a "fellow employee" online, they may disclose things that they think you already know. You can find a lot of info about the systems they use in public PIA/SORN notices. Unclassified codenames can also be used as a Google search tactic to uncover content posted by insiders and filtering out news articles and other public results.

For example, this Quizlet user is easily searchable given the plethora of military acronyms, and contains information about the location of wiring inside a naval facility and the structure of classified satellite networks: https://quizlet.com/578117055/tcf-specific-flash-cards/ , https://quizlet.com/414907821/eiws-study-guide-here-it-is-bo..., https://quizlet.com/463959814/scif-flash-cards/.

Now Google some of those terms and find more Quizlets: https://quizlet.com/593984066/osi-308-odin-sphere-enclaves-f..., https://quizlet.com/595864454/transport-layers-flash-cards/.

This one has info about hidden security features on a USAF ID badge authorizing access to parked aircraft (logo mistakes and base name spelled with 1 for L): https://quizlet.com/763351519/response-force-member-knowledg....

Even detailed descriptions of agency procedures by the public is valuable, if summarized and put into a database. Inevitably, things are overheard or observed each time one interacts with security forces. Everything from their facial expression, how much they are typing, etc. can reveal how you are perceived. On Chinese social media, for example, there is a lot of discussion of US immigration procedures and which ports/offices are perceived as most strict. One could run statistics based on others posts about visa and entry denials to identify weaknesses and reconstruct non-public procedures.

For example, this thread discusses a TSA procedure I saw myself: https://old.reddit.com/r/tsa/comments/14l1ca1/what_is_the_bo.... One respondent says it is sensitive, and another tries to deflect the question by saying it is to "weight down light things" while also admitting it "distinguishes the bag for the X-ray operator."

It's pretty obvious that the "paper weight" (the code name which someone helpfully shared) contains the image of a prohibited item (or a known pattern) to test that the X-ray operator is paying attention; the tray was sent to secondary but not actually searched beyond removing the object.

This comment (https://www.reddit.com/r/tsa/comments/1clxfn8/comment/l2wox2...) indirectly confirms that TSA does collaborate with law enforcement to help forfeit cash which was the subject of a recent lawsuit by the Institute for Justice, by saying "there was no need to notify anyone because they traveling domestically," implying that they do notify LE if international.

[qb1]

Does the TSA officially work with local law enforcement? I am not sure about their policy, but many TSA staff want local law enforcement jobs. As such, TSA staff will do whatever they preceive as favor to local law enforcement to gain "preceived" advantage from local law enforcement in future hiring "you scratch my back, I will get yours" type situation and mentality. Problematically, the favor depends on the customs and courtesies of the location. Overall, this leads to what a previous poster described as a "win" for point counting congresspeople while leaving society less safe and vulnerable to self interest of a TSA staffer for personal gain.

[scubbo]

> walked up to the line

I'm not familiar with that idiom, and searching for it only gives me "Walk the line" - what does it mean?

[MereInterest]

I read it as being related to the "line in the sand" idiom. There exists some set of rules, the "line". Exactly what is and isn't allowed under those rules is a bit arbitrary, like the exact location where you would draw a line in the sand with your finger. What matters is that the line has been drawn, and everybody knows that the line may not be crossed.

Under that metaphor, a person may stay very far from the line, to avoid accidentally stepping over it, or they may walk right up to the line. Metaphorically, the former would be a person who refuses to answer any questions about nuclear secrets, regardless of whether the question can be legally answered. The latter would be a person who knows exactly what can be legally answered, and will give as full of an answer as is allowed. They know where the line in the sand is, and have walked up to the line.

[scubbo]

That's helpful, thank you!

[MadnessASAP]

It means going to the limit of what is allowed, the line represents some limit/law/threshold that cannot be crossed. In this case the veil of secrecy that separates what is/is not public about nuclear weapons.

Normally you would stay well away from said "line". Occasionally though someone may "walk" right up to the "line" but no further.

You can take it to mean that someone knows something secret but is carefully only talking about what isn't secret. The risk is that they might inadvertently reveal some information of what is beyond the line.

[scubbo]

That makes sense, thank you!

[Merad]

To "cross the line" means that you went too far, in this context meaning that someone revealed secrets or otherwise talked about things that they shouldn't reveal. So to walk up to the line means that the person was willing to talk about the topic or share their knowledge, but did so without "crossing the line."

[MobiusHorizons]

It’s related to the term crossed the line, which I believe originated with Cesar crossing the rubicon. Crossing the line means breaking some rule or taboo in a way that has significant or permanent consequences. Walking up to the line is getting close without crossing.

[fragmede]

ChatGPT's really good for that kind of a thing, but in this case it's a saying popularized by a Johnny Cash song about staying loyal and committed to his wife while being on the road and facing temptation.

[scubbo]

Ironic that you mention ChatGPT in the same comment as answering a question about a phrase that I was explicitly _not_ asking about.

[tgsovlerkhgsel]

> OK, but my question remains: what is it that the author thinks is particularly unusual about this image?

This is explained in the blog post: Publications generally avoid going anywhere near that level of detail, even if not representing actual/accurate data (to avoid the appearance of leaking anything sensitive even if it actually isn't - as the post explains).

[ethbr1]

Aka most of Congress doesn't have a background in nuclear physics but does want airtime. And everyone reacts when someone yells "Nuclear secrets!"

[nmadden]

The article goes into a lot of detail about why the author thinks its unusual.

[DoneWithAllThat]

I’m sorry but all I can think of reading your comment is “but why male models?”.

[jonstewart]

Read the article?