[spootze]

Regarding the frequentist vs bayesian debates, my slightly provocative take on these three cultures is

- subjective Bayes is the strawman that frequentist academics like to attack

- objective Bayes is a naive self-image that many Bayesian academics tend to possess

- pragmatic Bayes is the approach taken by practitioners that actually apply statistics to something (or in Gelman’s terms, do science)

[DebtDeflation]

A few things I wish I knew when took Statistics courses at university some 25 or so years ago:

- Statistical significance testing and hypothesis testing are two completely different approaches with different philosophies behind them developed by different groups of people that kinda do the same thing but not quite and textbooks tend to completely blur this distinction out.

- The above approaches were developed in the early 1900s in the context of farms and breweries where 3 things were true - 1) data was extremely limited, often there were only 5 or 6 data points available, 2) there were no electronic computers, so computation was limited to pen and paper and slide rules, and 3) the cost in terms of time and money of running experiments (e.g., planting a crop differently and waiting for harvest) were enormous.

- The majority of classical statistics was focused on two simple questions - 1) what can I reliably say about a population based on a sample taken from it and 2) what can I reliably about the differences between two populations based on the samples taken from each? That's it. An enormous mathematical apparatus was built around answering those two questions in the context of the limitations in point #2.

[ivansavz]

That was a nice summary.

The data-poor and computation-poor context of old school statistics definitely biased the methods towards the "recipe" approach scientists are supposed to follow mechanically, where each recipe is some predefined sequence of steps, justified based on an analytical approximations to a sampling distribution (given lots of assumptions).

In modern computation-rich days, we can get away from the recipes by using resampling methods (e.g. permutation tests and bootstrap), so we don't need the analytical approximation formulas anymore.

I think there is still room for small sample methods though... it's not like biological and social sciences are dealing with very large samples.

[lottin]

My understanding is that frequentist statistics was developed in response to the Bayesian methodology which was prevalent in the 1800s and which was starting to be perceived as having important flaws. The idea that the invention of Bayesian statistics made frequentist statistics obsolete doesn't quite agree with the historical facts.

[refulgentis]

I see, so academics are frequentists (attackers) or objective Bayes (naive), and the people Doing Science are pragmatic (correct).

The article gave me the same vibe, nice, short set of labels for me to apply as a heuristic.

I never really understood this particular war, I'm a simpleton, A in Stats 101, that's it. I guess I need to bone up on Wikipedia to understand what's going on here more.

[sgt101]

Bayes lets you use your priors, which can be very helpful.

I got all riled up when I saw you wrote "correct", I can't really explain why... but I just feel that we need to keep an open mind. These approaches to data are choices at the end of the day... Was Einstein a Bayesian? (spoiler: no)

[0cf8612b2e1e]

Using your priors is another way of saying you know something about the problem. It is exceedingly difficult to objectively analyze a dataset without interjecting any bias. There are too many decision points where something needs to be done to massage the data into shape. Priors is just an explicit encoding of some of that knowledge.

[ants_everywhere]

> Priors is just an explicit encoding of some of that knowledge.

A classic example is analyzing data on mind reading or ghost detection. Your experiment shows you that your ghost detector has detected a haunting with p < .001. What is the probability the house is haunted?

[lupusreal]

With a prior like that, why would you even bother pretending to do the research?

[ants_everywhere]

Well, something could count as evidence that ghosts or ESP exist, but the evidence better be really strong.

A person getting 50.1% accuracy on an ESP experiment with a p-value less than some threshold doesn't cut it. But that doesn't mean the prior is insurmountable.

The closing down of loopholes in Bell inequality tests is a good example of a pretty aggressive prior being overridden by increasingly compelling evidence.

[laserlight]

The fact that you are designing an experiment and not trusting it is bonkers. The experiment concludes that the house is haunted and you've already agreed that it would be so before the experiment.

[refulgentis]

You're absolutely right, trying to walk a delicate tightrope that doesn't end up with me giving my unfiltered "you're wrong so lets end conversation" response.

Me 6 months ago would have written: "this comment is unhelpful and boring, but honestly, that's slightly unfair to you, as it just made me realize how little help the article is, and it set the tone. is this even a real argument with sides?"

For people who want to improve on this aspect of themselves, like I did for years:

- show, don't tell (ex. here, I made the oddities more explicit, enough that people could reply to me spelling out what I shouldn't.)

- Don't assert anything that wasn't said directly, ex. don't remark on the commenter, or subjective qualities you assess in the comment.

[thegginthesky]

Frequentist and Bayesian are correct if both have scientific rigor in their research and methodology. Both can be wrong if the research is whack or sloppy.

[slashdave]

I've used both in some papers and report two results (why not?). The golden rule in my mind is to fully describe your process and assumptions, then let the reader decide.

[runarberg]

I understand the war between bayesians and frequentists. Frequentist methods have been misused for over a century now to justify all sorts of pseudoscience and hoaxes (as well as created a fair share of honest mistakes), so it is understandable that people would come forward and claim there must be a better way.

What I don’t understand is the war between naive bayes and pragmatic bayes. If it is real, it seems like the extension of philosophers vs. engineers. Scientists should see value in both. Naive Bayes is important to the philosophy of science, without which there would be a lot of junk science which would go unscrutinized for far to long, and engineers should be able to see the value of philosophers saving them works by debunking wrong science before they start to implement theories which simply will not work in practice.

[Yossarrian22]

Academics can be pragmatic, I've know ones who've sued both Bayesian statistics and MLE

[skissane]

> - subjective Bayes is the strawman that frequentist academics like to attack

I don’t get what all the hate for subjective Bayesianism is. It seems the most philosophically defensible approach, in that all it assumes is our own subjective judgements of likelihood, the idea that we can quantify them (however in exactly), and the idea (avoid Dutch books) that we want to be consistent (most people do).

Whereas, objective Bayes is basically subjective Bayes from the viewpoint of an idealised perfectly rational agent - and “perfectly rational” seems philosophically a lot more expensive than anything subjective Bayes relies on.